Supply Chain Reactivity Assessment Regarding Two Negotiated Commitments: Frozen Horizon and Flexibility Rate

  • Aïcha Amrani-Zouggar
  • Jean-Christophe Deschamps
  • Jean-Paul Bourrières
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 338)


The problem addressed in this paper is the supply chain reactivity assessment through numerical experimentations regarding specifically two negotiated commitments within supply contract: the frozen horizon and flexibility rate. Analysis of impact of these commitments on each partner will be depicted in term of storage costs, reliability and reactivity indicators. The decision making inside each partner is operated under rolling horizon planning and based on production linear programming model wherein different contractual commitments are included. To carry out experimental scenarios, simulation platform is developed from which expecting numerical results afford deciders to get more understanding about the commitments that should be contracted and the relevant dimensioning of them.


Supply chain Tactical production planning supply contract commitments simulation 


  1. 1.
    Christopher, M.: Logistics and Supply Chains management. In: Financial Times. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs (2005)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Mentzer, J.T., Foggin, J.H., Golicic, S.G.: Supply chain collaboration: enablers, impediments and benefits. Supply Chain Management Review 4(4), 52–58 (2000)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Amrani-Zouggar, A., Deschamps, J.C., Bourrières, J.P.: Supply chain contracts design according to industrial risks. In: IFIP-APMS Proceedings, pp. 22–33 (2008)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Amrani-Zouggar, A., Deschamps, J.C., Bourrières, J.P.: Supply chain planning under various quantity commitment contracts. In: Proceedings of IFAC – INCOM (2009)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Cachon, G.: Supply chain coordination with contracts. In: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management. Steve Graves and Ton de Kok. North Holland, Amsterdam (2003)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Bassok, Y., Anupindi, R.: Analysis of supply contracts with total minimum commitments. IIE Transactions 29(5), 373–381 (1997)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Liston, P., Byrne, P.J., Heavey, C.: Contract costing in outsourcing enterprises: Exploring the benefits of discrete-event simulation. Int. J. Production Economics 110, 97–114 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Anupindi, R., Bassok, Y.: Supply contracts with quantity commitments and stochastic demand. In: Tayur, S., Ganeshan, R., Magazine, M. (eds.) Quantitative models for supply chain management, pp. 198–232. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1999)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Schneeweiss, C., Zimmer, K., Zimmermann, M.: The design of contracts to coordinate operational interdependencies within the supply chain. Int. J. Production Economics 92, 43–59 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Millart, H.H.: The impact of rolling horizon planning on the cost of industrial fishing activity. Computers Operational Research 25(10), 825–837 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aïcha Amrani-Zouggar
    • 1
  • Jean-Christophe Deschamps
    • 1
  • Jean-Paul Bourrières
    • 1
  1. 1.IMS - LAPS/GRAIUniversity of Bordeaux, UMR 5218CNRSTalence CedexFrance

Personalised recommendations