Abstract
We study the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes in bottleneck congestion games. These games model situations in which strategic players compete for a limited number of facilities. Each player allocates his weight to a (feasible) subset of the facilities with the goal to minimize the maximum (weight-dependent) latency that he experiences on any of these facilities. We derive upper and (asymptotically) matching lower bounds on the (strong) price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games for a natural load balancing social cost objective (i.e., minimize the maximum latency of a facility). We restrict our studies to linear latency functions. Linear bottleneck congestion games still constitute a rich class of games and generalize, for example, load balancing games with identical or uniformly related machines with or without restricted assignments.
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de Keijzer, B., Schäfer, G., Telelis, O.A. (2010). On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6386. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_29
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