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Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Bilinear Pairings

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6377))

Abstract

Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-party PAKE) protocols enable two communication parties, each shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server, to establish a common session key with the help of the trusted server. We propose a provably-secure 3-party PAKE protocol using bilinear pairings, and prove its security in the random oracle model. The proposed protocol requires four communication steps, which is more efficient than previous solutions in terms of communication complexity. In addition to the semantic security, we also present the authentication security to resist the undetectable on-line dictionary attacks.

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Wei, F., Ma, C., Cheng, Q. (2010). Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Bilinear Pairings. In: Zhu, R., Zhang, Y., Liu, B., Liu, C. (eds) Information Computing and Applications. ICICA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6377. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16167-4_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16167-4_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16166-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16167-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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