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Trust in Anonymity Networks

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CONCUR 2010 - Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6269))

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Abstract

Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance, as we move steadily towards a wired, online community. Its import touches upon subjects as different as eGovernance, eBusiness and eLeisure, as well as personal freedom of speech in authoritarian societies. Trust metrics are used in anonymity networks to support and enhance reliability in the absence of verifiable identities, and a variety of security attacks currently focus on degrading a user’s trustworthiness in the eyes of the other users. In this paper, we analyse the privacy guarantees of the Crowds anonymity protocol, with and without onion forwarding, for standard and adaptive attacks against the trust level of honest users.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ECS, University of Southampton,  

    Vladimiro Sassone, Sardaouna Hamadou & Mu Yang

Authors
  1. Vladimiro Sassone
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  2. Sardaouna Hamadou
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  3. Mu Yang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification (LSV), ENS de Cachan & CNRS, 94235, Cachan cedex, France

    Paul Gastin

  2. LIAFA, Université Paris Diderot, 75205, Paris cedex, France

    François Laroussinie

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Sassone, V., Hamadou, S., Yang, M. (2010). Trust in Anonymity Networks. In: Gastin, P., Laroussinie, F. (eds) CONCUR 2010 - Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6269. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15375-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15375-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15374-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15375-4

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