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A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement

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Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6280))

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Abstract

The Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK–security arguments. We propose a strong security model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper–proof device is used to store long–lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie–Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Netheos R&D,  

    Augustin P. Sarr

  2. Institut Fourier – CNRS, Université Grenoble 1,  

    Augustin P. Sarr & Philippe Elbaz-Vincent

  3. LIP6 – CNRS, Université Paris 6,  

    Jean-Claude Bajard

Authors
  1. Augustin P. Sarr
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  2. Philippe Elbaz-Vincent
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  3. Jean-Claude Bajard
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA

    Juan A. Garay

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università di Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano, (SA), Italy

    Roberto De Prisco

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Sarr, A.P., Elbaz-Vincent, P., Bajard, JC. (2010). A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement. In: Garay, J.A., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6280. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15316-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15317-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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