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An Evolutionary Game Model for the Risk Management Cooperation Among the Project Participants

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Modeling Risk Management in Sustainable Construction

Part of the book series: Computational Risk Management ((Comp. Risk Mgmt))

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Abstract

An evolutionary game model for the risk management cooperation of owner and contractor is presented. Using this model, the parameters of the evolutionary system are analyzed. The rule of the cooperation between owner and contractor is illustrated. The results indicate that cooperation cost and distributing mechanism for loss or profit are the key factors influencing cooperation among the project participants.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Infrastructure Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Liaoning Dalian, People’s Republic of China

    Guo-jun Zhang

  2. Department of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Dalian Nationalities University, Liaoning Dalian, People’s Republic of China

    Yun-li Gao

Authors
  1. Guo-jun Zhang
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  2. Yun-li Gao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guo-jun Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Risklab, University of Toronto, Spadina Crescent 1, Toronto, M5S3G3, Ontario, Canada

    Desheng Dash Wu

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zhang, Gj., Gao, Yl. (2011). An Evolutionary Game Model for the Risk Management Cooperation Among the Project Participants. In: Wu, D. (eds) Modeling Risk Management in Sustainable Construction. Computational Risk Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15243-6_18

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