Abstract
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the quantitative aspects of Information Flow, partly because often the a priori knowledge of the secret information can be represented by a probability distribution, and partly because the mechanisms to protect the information may use randomization to obfuscate the relation between the secrets and the observables.
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Alvim, M.S., Andrés, M.E., Palamidessi, C. (2010). Entropy and Attack Models in Information Flow. In: Calude, C.S., Sassone, V. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. TCS 2010. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol 323. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15240-5_4
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