Abstract
The following seven theses are possible policy recommendations for the future formulation of European investment protection “after Lisbon.”
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Notes
- 1.
Generally, see Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law–History, Politics, Theory, 2004; Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, Law & Contemp. Prob. 68 (2005), p. 127; Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, L. Quart. Rev. 93 (1977), p. 195; Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, Columb. L. Rev. 97 (1997), p. 1.
- 2.
“The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Lisbon Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations.”; Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Dutch/Czech BIT), Partial Award, 17 March 2006, Para. 300, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-PartialawardFinal.pdf; Koroma, The Effects of Globalization on the Development of International Law, in: Hobe (ed.), Globalisation–the State and International Law, 2009, p. 27: “The objective of international investment law is, however, not investor protection for its own sake, but rather protection of the infrastructure of and thereby promotion of economic growth and development. Investment treaties are thus both a product and a motor of globalization.”
- 3.
Regarding the development of international investment law, see Braun, Investitionsschutz durch internationale Schiedsgerichte, TranState Working Papers 89 (2009), Universität Bremen, Sonderforschungsbereich 597, Staatlichkeit im Wandel, passim, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27911; Braun, Globalization: The Driving Force in International Investment Law, in: Waibel/Kaushal/Chung/Balchin (eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, 2009, Chap. 2.
- 4.
Regarding other forms and possibilities of dispute resolution, see Braun, Home-State Assisted Negotiations—an Alternative to Mediation?, in: Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2009, 2010; Coe, Towards a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes–A Preliminary Sketch, in: (ed.), Investor-State Arbitration: Perspectives on Legitimacy and Practice, Suffolk University 2009, pp. 73–112; Salacuse, Is there a better way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 31 (2007–2008), pp. 138–185; Schwebel, Is Mediation of Foreign Investment Disputes Plausible? ICSID Journal Fall 2007, pp. 237–241.
- 5.
UNCTAD, Latest Developments in investor-State dispute settlement, IIA MONITOR (2009) 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2009/6, p. 2: “a trend (…) indicating that international investment arbitration is no longer an exceptional phenomenon, but part of the “normal” investment landscape”; p. 8: “Developments in 2008 confirm the trend towards increased use of international arbitration to resolve investment disputes.”
- 6.
BG v Argentina, Award: “The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties has effected a profound transformation of international investment law. Most significantly, under these instruments investors are entitled to seek enforcement of their treaty rights by directly bringing action against the State in whose territory they have invested. Investors may seek redress in arbitration without securing espousal of their claim or diplomatic protection. The Argentina-U.K. BIT is a paradigm of this evolution.” Award, 24 December 2007, UNCITRAL, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BG-award_000.pdf, M.N. 145; Schreuer, Paradigmenwechsel im internationalen Investitionsrecht, in: Hummer (ed.), Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht zur Jahrtausendwende, 2002, p. 237; Salacuse/Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, Harv. Int’l L. J. 46 (2005), p. 67 (88: “revolutionary innovation [whose]…uniqueness and power should not be overlooked”); Wälde, Improving Mechanism for Treaty Negotiation and Investment Disputes, in: Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2008/2009, 2009, p. 505 (509: “[…] it is difficult to deny that we are facing a spectacular success in terms of international institutional and legal reform”).
- 7.
Sachs/Sauvant, BITs, DTTs and FDI flows: an overview, in: Sauvant/Sachs (eds.), The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment Flows, 2009, p. xxvii et seq.; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007, 2007, p. 17; UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation in International Investment Agreements, 2005, p. 42.
- 8.
Regarding Chinese investment protection policy, see Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall—the New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 15 (2007), pp. 73–118; Berger, China and the Global Governance of Foreign Direct Investment: The Emerging Liberal Bilateral Investment Treaty Approach, Discussion Paper, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2008; Congyan, Change of the Structure of International Investment and the Development of Developing Countries’ BIT Practice, JWIT 8 (2007), p. 829 (844); Rooney, ICSID and BIT Arbitrations and China, Journal of International Arbitration 24 (2007), p. 689.
- 9.
Braun/Schonard, Der neue deutsch-chinesische Investitionsförderungs- und -schutzvertrag im Lichte der Entwicklung des völkerrechtlichen Investitionsschutzes, RIW (2007), pp. 561–569; Braun / Schonard, The new Germany-China Bilateral Investment Treaty – A Commentary and Evaluation in Light of the Development of Investment Protection under Public International Law, ICSID Review 22 (Fall 2007), pp. 258–279; Braun/Schonard,
Chinese Journal of International Economic Law (2009).
- 10.
After China (approximately 120 concluded bilateral investment treaties): Egypt (approximately 100), Republic of Korea (approximately 80); UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008, 2008, p. 15, fig. I.11; UNCTAD, South-South Investments Agreements Proliferating, IIA Monitor No. 3 (2007), pp. 1 et seq.
- 11.
Braun, Home-State Assisted Negotiations—an Alternative to Mediation?, in: Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: Fordham Papers 2009, 2010; Wegen/Raible, Unterschätzt die deutsche Wirtschaft die Wirksamkeit des völkerrechtlichen Investitionsschutzes?, SchiedsVZ (2006), p. 225 (226); Schöbener, Der Rechtsrahmen des Internationalen Investitionsrechts: Ein Überblick zu den bilateralen Investitionsschutzabkommen, WiVerw 2009, p. 3 (18).
- 12.
Classically, see Samuelson, The pure theory of public expenditure, Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (1954), p. 387; Kaul/Grunberg/Stern, Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 1999; referring to international economic law: Tietje, Begriff, Geschichte und Grundlagen des Internationalen Wirtschaftssystems und Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Tietje (ed.), Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009, p. 58; Meessen, Economic Law as an Economic Good, in: Meessen/Bungenberg/Puttler, Economic Law as an Economic Good, 2009, p. 3.
- 13.
MCI Power Group and New Turbine v Republic of Ecuador, Decision on Annulment, 19 October 2009, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MCI-Annulment.pdf, Para. 24: “(…) The responsibility for ensuring consistency in the jurisprudence and for building a coherent body of law rests primarily with the investment tribunals.”; and Para. 25: “(…) Although there is no hierarchy of international tribunals, as acknowledged in SGS v. Philippines, the Committee considers it appropriate to take those decisions into consideration, because their reasoning and conclusions may provide guidance to the Committee in settling similar issues arising in these annulment proceedings and help to ensure consistency and legal certainty of the ICSID annulment mechanism, thereby contributing to ensuring trust in the ICSID dispute settlement system and predictability for governments and investors.”
- 14.
See also the Energy Charter Treaty: http://www.encharter.org.
- 15.
Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in: Tietje/Kraft (eds.), Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 83, 2009, p. 16.
- 16.
Art. 345 TFEU; see also the “harmonization precept,” Art. 207 Para. 6; Art. 113, 114 Para. 2 TFEU.
- 17.
Nettesheim, Kompetenzen, in: v. Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge, 2009, (2nd edition) p. 415 (432 et seq.).
- 18.
In general, see Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy?–Foreign Investment in the European Constitution, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 32 (2005) 3, pp. 259–291; Karl, The Competence for Foreign Direct Investment–New Powers for the European Union?, 5 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 5 (2004) 3, pp. 413–448; Shan, Towards a Common European Community Policy on Investment Issues, Journal of World Investment 2 (2001) 3, pp. 603–625; Griebel, Überlegungen zur Wahrnehmung der neuen EU-Kompetenz für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrages von Lissabon, RIW (2009), p. 469.
- 19.
German companies alone have invested a total of approximately €800 billion abroad.
- 20.
In detail, see Johannsen, Die Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in: Tiejte/Kraft/Lehmann (eds.), Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 90, 2009, p. 22, with further references.
- 21.
For an express approval of the Council regarding the continuance of the investment treaties of the member states see the German Federal Constitutional Court Ruling of June 30, 2009, Paras. 377–380: “The continued legal existence of the agreements already concluded is not endangered. International agreements of the Member States that were concluded before 1st January 1958 shall in principle not be affected by the Treaty establishing the European Community (Art. 307.1 TEC; Art. 351.1 TFEU). In many cases, this provision is not directly applicable because bilateral investment protection agreements have, as a general rule, been concluded more recently, but the legal concept exists that a situation in the Member States which qualifies as a legal fact will in principle not be impaired by a later step of integration (see Bernhardt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft als neuer Rechtsträger im Geflecht der traditionellen zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, EuR (1983), p. 199 (205); Schmalenbach, in: Calliess/Ruffert, TEU/TEC, 3rd ed. 2007, Art. 307 TEC, Margin no. 5). With a view to the mixed competence in investment issues, the existing investment protection agreements must be authorized by the European Union (see Council Decision of 15 November 2001 Authorising the Automatic Renewal or Continuation in Force of Provisions Governing Matters Covered by the Common Commercial Policy Contained in the Friendship, Trade and Navigation Treaties and Trade Agreements Concluded between Member States and Third Countries, OJEU 2001 L 320/13). This corresponds to the current practice, expressly declared or tacitly practiced, concerning the continued validity of international agreements concluded by the Member States.” The legal view, which can be understood from Art. 351 Para. 1 TFEU (ex Art. 307 Para. 1 Treaty of Rome), is that a legal situation in the member states would not, in principle, be affected by a later step towards integration, cf. Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in: Tietje/Kraft (eds.), Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 83, 2009, p. 18.
- 22.
Such as the principle of non-discrimination or the basis of fair and just treatment. Higher standards of protection, similar to those provided by the German bilateral investment treaties, will in all likelihood not be included in the negotiating mandate owing to maintenance of the principle of consensus as there is a possible conflict of interests amongst the 27 European Union member states between capital-exporting and capital-importing states.
- 23.
Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, Journal of International Arbitration 26 (2009) 2, p. 181 (215).
- 24.
Something similar was provided for in the investment chapters – this was, however, “before Lisbon”: Art 21 No. 2 [Promoting Investment] of the EU-Chile Association Agreement: “Cooperation will cover in particular the following: (b) developing a legal framework for the Parties that favours investment, by conclusion, where appropriate, of bilateral agreements between the Member States and Chile to promote and protect investment and avoid dual taxation,” http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_111620.pdf; Art. 50 of the Agreement Euro-Med Countries, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127986.pdf; Art. 21 Cotonou Agreement; Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EC Law, Common Markets Law Review 46 (2009), p. 383 (393).
- 25.
Kuijper, Fifty years of EC/EU external relations: Continuity and the dialogue between judges and member states as constitutional legislators, Fordham Int’l L.J. 31 (2007–2008), p. 1571 (1597); regarding international trade policy: Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice, J. Int’l Econ. L. 10 (2007) 3, p. 529.
- 26.
Council of European Union, 15375 / 06 [unpublished], revised version of 6 March 2009; see also the suggested formulation by Karl, The Competence for Foreign Direct Investment–New Powers for the European Union?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade 5 (2004) 3, p. 413 (448) for an European Union investment protection treaty: “The parties to the treaty undertake to respect all other obligations to the other treaty partner regarding the investments of an investor. The EU can ensure that the member states observe their obligations to the parties to the treaty. This includes, e.g. obligations arising from a BIT with individual member states or from other investment protection agreements with an investor of the other treaty partner.”
- 27.
Art. 2 Para. 1 IBRD Articles of Agreement in conjunction with Art. II Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; Art. 34 Para. 1 ICJ Statute, Federal Law Gazette 1973 II, p. 505.
- 28.
Fair and just treatment, no discrimination, observance of concluded treaties, etc.
- 29.
Annex IX Art. 4 UNCLOS: “1. The instrument of formal confirmation or of accession of an international organization shall contain an undertaking to accept the rights and obligations of States under this Convention in respect of matters relating to which competence has been transferred to it by its member States which are Parties to this Convention. 2. An international organization shall be a Party to this Convention to the extent that it has competence in accordance with the declarations, communications of information or notifications referred to in Article 5 of this Annex. 3. Such an international organization shall exercise the rights and perform the obligations which its member States which are Parties would otherwise have under this Convention, on matters relating to which competence has been transferred to it by those member States. The member States of that international organization shall not exercise competence which they have transferred to it.”
- 30.
Regarding this, see Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EC Law, Common Markets Law Review 46 (2009), p. 383 (396 fn. 70).
- 31.
Regarding this, see Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, in: Schwarze/Hatje (eds.), Der Reforvertrag von Lissabon, EuR Beiheft 1, 2009, p. 195.
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Braun, T.R. (2011). For a Complementary European Investment Protection. In: Bungenberg, M., Griebel, J., Hindelang, S. (eds) International Investment Law and EU Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14855-2_6
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