Advertisement

Truthful Auction for CPU Time Slots

  • Qiang Zhang
  • Minming Li
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6213)

Abstract

We consider the task of designing a truthful auction mechanism for CPU time scheduling problem. There are m commodities (time slots) T = {t 1, t 2, ...,t m } for n buyers I = {1,2,...,n}. Each buyer requires a number of time slots s i for its task. The valuation function of buyer i for a bundle of time slots T i is v i (T i ) = w i (m − t), where t is the last time slot in T i and |T i | = s i . The utility u i of buyer i is v i (T i ) − p(T i ). It is well-known that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism gives the incentive to bid truthfully. Although optimal social welfare is computationally feasible in CPU time scheduling problem, VCG mechanism may produce low revenue. We design an auction which also maintains the incentives for bidders to bid truthfully. In addition, we perform simulations and observe that our truthful mechanism produces more revenue than VCG on average.

Keywords

Mechanism Design Truthful Mechanism Auctions  Scheduling 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Bar-Yossef, Z., Hildrum, K., Wu, F.: Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods. In: Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p. 970 (2002)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Buyya, R., Stockinger, H., Giddy, J., Abramson, D.: Economic models for management of resources in grid computing. In: Technical Track on Commercial Applications for High-Performance Computing, SPIE International Symposium on The Convergence of Information Technologies and Communications, ITCom 2001 (2001)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Clarke, E.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public choice 11(1), 17–33 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Deng, X., Huang, L., Li, M.: On walrasian price of cpu time. Algorithmica 48(2), 159–172 (2007)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Wright, A.: Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods. In: Meyer auf der Heide, F. (ed.) ESA 2001. LNCS, vol. 2161, pp. 416–427. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 617–631 (1973)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Huberman, B., Hogg, T.: Distributed computation as an economic system. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 141–152 (1995)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37 (1961)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Walsh, W., Wellman, M., Wurman, P., MacKie-Mason, J.: Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In: Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (1998)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Qiang Zhang
    • 1
  • Minming Li
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceCity University of Hong KongHong Kong

Personalised recommendations