Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Yang Sun
  • Ming Yin
  • Yunhong Zhou
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6213)


In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

We prove properties and compare revenue of those different pricing models via analysis and simulation.


Sponsored Search Mechanism Design multi-slot AD auction GSP Forward-looking Nash Equilibrium 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiaotie Deng
    • 1
  • Yang Sun
    • 1
  • Ming Yin
    • 2
  • Yunhong Zhou
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceCity University of Hong KongHong Kong
  2. 2.School of SoftwareTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.Baidu ResearchBeijingChina

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