Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets
In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.
We prove properties and compare revenue of those different pricing models via analysis and simulation.
KeywordsSponsored Search Mechanism Design multi-slot AD auction GSP Forward-looking Nash Equilibrium
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