Abstract
As we have seen, the traditional AGM theory of belief revision put forward a number of postulates to constrain how the state of beliefs of an agent should change when faced with a new belief that possibly contradicts her previous beliefs. The whole AGM framework was formulated under the assumption that the logic used to represent a belief set was classical. Since classical theories degenerate in the presence of inconsistency, inconsistency plays a major role in the whole process, and this has two major consequences: firstly, a ‘proper’ revision is only triggered when the new belief is inconsistent with the previous belief set; and secondly, the postulates cannot be applied directly to non-classical logics.
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Gabbay, D.M., Rodrigues, O.T., Russo, A. (2010). Revision by Translation. In: Revision, Acceptability and Context. Cognitive Technologies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14159-1_7
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