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A Multi-trapdoor Commitment Scheme from the RSA Assumption

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6168))

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Abstract

Gennaro introduced the notion of multi-trapdoor commitments which is a stronger form of trapdoor commitment schemes at CRYPTO 2004. Multi-trapdoor commitments have several cryptographic applications. For example, Gennaro proposed a conversion that makes a non-interactive multi-trapdoor commitment scheme into a non- interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment scheme and a compiler that transforms any proof of knowledge into concurrently non-malleable one. Gennaro gave constructions of multi-trapdoor commitments, but they rely on stronger assumptions, such as the strong RSA assumption, the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

In this paper, we propose a non-interactive multi-trapdoor commitment scheme from the standard RSA assumption. Thus, as a corollary of our result, we obtain a non-interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment scheme from the standard RSA assumption. Our scheme is based on the Hohenberger-Waters signature scheme proposed at CRYPTO 2009. Several non-interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment schemes (in the common reference string model) have been proposed, but all of them rely on stronger assumptions (e.g., strong RSA).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Laboratories, 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Ryo Nishimaki & Eiichiro Fujisaki

  2. Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, W8-55, 2-12-1 Ookayama Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Ryo Nishimaki & Keisuke Tanaka

Authors
  1. Ryo Nishimaki
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  2. Eiichiro Fujisaki
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  3. Keisuke Tanaka
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Macquarie University,, NSW 2109, North Ryde, Australia

    Ron Steinfeld

  2. Qualcomm Incorporated, Suite 301, Level 3, 77 King Street, NSW 2000, Sydney, Australia

    Philip Hawkes

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Nishimaki, R., Fujisaki, E., Tanaka, K. (2010). A Multi-trapdoor Commitment Scheme from the RSA Assumption . In: Steinfeld, R., Hawkes, P. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6168. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14081-5_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14081-5_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14080-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14081-5

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