Abstract
Reinhard Selten’s work marks the beginning of the experimental analysis of oligopoly. Indeed, his research includes both one of the first experiments on quantity competition and the first one on price competition. In the aftermath a very rich literature has emerged, dealing both with theory-based issues linked to the many oligopoly models that appeared as the result of the application of game-theory to industrial organization and with more applied questions that came out of the economic analysis of regulation and anti-trust issues.
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Notes
- 1.
The four equilibrium quantity triplets are (4, 5, 7), (5, 5, 6), (5, 6, 7) and (4, 6, 6), with the third of these only being a weak equilibrium.
- 2.
The other substantial motive groups are fighting motives, attempts at influencing the price to increase profits, exploration around previous decisions, output limitation due to liquidity constraints, attempts at fixing a price equal to average price, retreat and optimization according to accounting. For details about these motives please see the original article, which also contains a discussion of how different motives are used at different points in time.
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Abbink, K., Brandts, J. (2010). Drei Oligopolexperimente. In: Sadrieh, A., Ockenfels, A. (eds) The Selten School of Behavioral Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13983-3_6
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