Feasible elimination procedures

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)


We have seen in Chapter 8 that a possible way to avoid the consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is to construct exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We recall that such functions ensure that the sincere outcome is an outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium for each profile of preferences of the voters. In this chapter and the next ones we investigate which effectivity functions (constitutions) admit exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions (voting procedures). This is a relevant question since voting is a basic characteristic of democratic societies. On a smaller scale, a society (cf. Definition 2.2.1) may be some committee and also then the existence of robust voting procedures is an important issue.


Social Choice Democratic Society Social Choice Function Vote Procedure Strong Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of RationalityThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Quantitative EconomicsUniversity of MaastrichtMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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