Nash consistent representations

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)


In Chapter 2 we have seen how a constitution of a society or more formally, an effectivity function, and a set of rules that enable the members of the society to exercise their rights simultaneously, i.e., a game form representing the effectivity function, govern the behavior of the members of a (civilized) state. In this chapter we introduce a new element: the preferences of the society members over the social states.1


Nash Equilibrium Topological Space Social Welfare Function Game Form Simple Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of RationalityThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Quantitative EconomicsUniversity of MaastrichtMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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