Abstract
In this chapter we extend the model of Chapters 9 and 10 to a classical voting system with still finitely many alternatives (candidates) but with very many voters. Such a system is representative of political elections on the local or national level. As an, in our view, best approximation we model voters as elements of a non-atomic measure space. In particular, this approach allows us to accommodate the fact that in such voting systems single voters have negligible influence on the final outcome, and to avoid potential combinatorial complexities of a model with a large but finite number of voters.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Peleg, B., Peters, H. (2010). Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters. In: Strategic Social Choice. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_11
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13874-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13875-1
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