Abstract
As argued in the introductory section of the previous chapter it is important to find robust voting procedures for constitutions. In our approach, ‘robust’ means ‘exactly and strongly consistent’ (ESC): the game induced by the social choice function should have a strong equilibrium for each profile of preferences which, moreover, results in the same outcome as truthful voting. In this chapter we extend the study of ESC representations to general effectivity functions. We start, in Section 10.2, by generalizing the definition of a feasible elimination procedure to arbitrary effectivity functions: the generalization uses blocking coalitions instead of blocking coefficients. An effectivity function will be called ‘elimination stable’ if it admits at least one feasible elimination procedure (f.e.p.) for each profile of linear orderings (strict preferences). We show that if the effectivity function is maximal, stable, and elimination stable, then it has an ESC representation. In fact, each selection from the maximal alternatives – alternatives that result from an f.e.p. – is an ESC representation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Peleg, B., Peters, H. (2010). Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions. In: Strategic Social Choice. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13874-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13875-1
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)