Abstract
In this chapter we explain why we adopt Gärdenfors’s (1981) model of a constitution rather than Arrow’s model of a (‘well behaved’) social welfare function. We start, in Section 1.2, with the definition of a social welfare function and recall some of the questions that it invoked. Then we proceed to formulate Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in Section 1.3. This theorem has severe implications for Arrow’s notion of a constitution. We quote Arrow’s (1967) account of the dilemma posed by his impossibility theorem.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Peleg, B., Peters, H. (2010). Introduction to Part I. In: Strategic Social Choice. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_1
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13874-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13875-1
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