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A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand

  • Julia DrechselEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 644)

Abstract

In Chap. 5, we presented an economic lot sizing game where several players face dynamic demand that should be satisfied while making joint orders. Joint orders can reduce total costs because fixed ordering costs can be shared among the partners. In the following sections, we will introduce an extension of the before presented ELS game: In many practical situations, demand cannot be forecasted with certainty. Thus, a model that could handle uncertainties might be an interesting new feature for the ELS game.

Keywords

Cost Share Master Problem Grand Coalition Stability Constraint Uncertain Demand 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Drechsel, J., & Kimms, A. (2009). An Algorithmic Approach to Cooperative Interval-Valued Games and Interpretation Problems. Business Research, 2(2), 206–213.Google Scholar
  2. Young, H. P. (1985). Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 14(2), 65–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DuisburgGermany

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