The Meaning and Structure of the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law

Hallevy, Gabriel

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-13714-3_1

The Meaning and Structure of the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law

Gabriel Hallevy²

Chapter
First Online: 01 January 2010

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Abstract

Criminal law is part of the scientific sphere called “law,” or the legal science. Therefore, criminal law is a scientific sphere. In the past, in the Anglo-American legal systems, there was a conceptual difficulty in classifying law as a science because of its development through case-laws, which made use of the praxis of binding precedents (stare decisis). This attitude matched the general scientific development in Anglo-American countries, which was casuistic. By contrast, the European-Continental legal systems considered law to be a science, and therefore in Europe it was necessary to study at the university to become a jurist. In the first university in Europe, the University of Bologna, law was one of the scientific subjects being studied. The Faculty of Law of Bologna played a crucial role in the development of law in the Middle Ages (jus commune).

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Notes

1.
For the development of the law as science in the Middle Ages and afterwards in Europe see Harold J. Berman and Charles J. Reid Jr., Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of the Sixteenth Century, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1 (1994).
2.
University of Bologna was established in 1088 AD, and it is considered as the first university in Europe. For the development of the law as science in the European universities see Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages 135 (1935).
3.
John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 7–14, 27–34 (1969).
4.
W. D. Lewis, The Law of England Considered as a Science, 10 L. Rev. & Q. J. Brit. & Foreign Jurisprudence 23 (1849); George W. Goble, Law as a Science, 9 Ind. L. J. 294 (1934); John D. Appel, Law as a Social Science in the Undergraduate Curriculum, 10 J. Legal Educ. 485 (1958); John J. Bonsignore, Law as a Hard Science: On the Madness in Method, 2 ALSA F. 49 (1977); Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Lynn R. Campbell, Law as a Social Science, 9 Dalhousie L. J. 404 (1984); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. J. 1005 (1989).
5.
George L. Priest, Social Science: Theory and Legal Education: The Law School As University, 33 J. Legal Educ. 437 (1983); Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United States: Natural Law Theory and Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. Legal Educ. 311 (1998).
6.
Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 18 (1989).
7.
Ibid, at pp. 19–22, 147–160.
8.
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 25–28 (5th ed., 2006); Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978); Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law ch. 6 (1968).
9.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (1977); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 425 (1986); Barbara Hudson, Pushing the Poor: a Critique of the Dominance of Legal Reasoning in Penal Policy and Practice, Penal Theory and Practice 302 (Robin Antony Duff ed., 1994); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 181–204 (1985).
10.
Paul R. Dimond and Gene Sperling, Of Cultural Determinism and the Limits of Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1065 (1985); Morris D. Forkosch, Determinism and the Law, 60 Ky. L. J. 350 (1952); John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 Geo. L. J. 2045 (1988); Ian Shrank, Determinism and the Law of Consent – A Reformulation of Individual Accountability for Choices Made without Free Will, 12 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 796 (1978); Jos Andenaes, Determinism and Criminal Law, 47 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 406 (1957); Michele Cotton. A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal Law, 15 B. U. Pub. Int. L. J. 5 (2006).
11.
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 157–248 (5th ed., 2006).
12.
See 2 Kings 14:6: “But he did not execute the sons of the assassins. He obeyed the Lord’s commandment as recorded in the law scroll of Moses, Fathers must not be put to death for what their sons do, and sons must not be put to death for what their fathers do. A man must be put to death only for his own sin”; Ezekiel 18:20: “The person who sins is the one who will die. A son will not suffer for his father’s iniquity, and a father will not suffer for his son’s iniquity; the righteous person will be judged according to his righteousness, and the wicked person according to his wickedness”.
13.
See e.g. Gabriel Hallevy, The Impact of Defense Arguments Based on the Cultural Difference of the Accused in the Criminal Law of Immigrant Countries and Societies, 5 J. of Migration & Refugee Issues 13 (2009).
14.
The first secondary principle is discussed hereinafter at Chap. 2; The second secondary principle is discussed hereinafter at Chap. 3; The third secondary principle is discussed hereinafter at Chap. 4; The fourth secondary principle is discussed hereinafter at Chap. 5.
15.
Hereinafter at Chap. 6.
16.
Another Latin maxim in that theme is Nulla Poena sine Lege.
17.
Schottlaender, Die Geschichtliche Entwicklung des Satzes: Nulla Poena sine Lege, 132 Strafrechtliche Abhandlungen 1 (1911).
18.
Russ VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian Law 21, 108 (2000). The translation of this second law is: “If a man acts lawlessly, they shall kill him”.
19.
Digesta, 42.48.19.155(2); Digesta, 50.16.131: “Poena non irrogatur, nisi quae quaque lege vel quo alio jure specialiter huic delicto imposita est”.
20.
Article 39 of the Magna Carta provides: “Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super cum ibimus, nec super cum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre”.
21.
Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 93 (1470, trans. Gregor, 1874): “In such a Constitution, under such humane laws, every man may live safely and securely”…”Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death, than that one innocent person should be condemned and suffer capitally”.
22.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 87 (1979).
23.
Cal Winslow, Sussex Smugglers, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (1975).
24.
Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 179, 207, 217 (1975).
25.
See e.g. in John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 27–34, 40–49 (1969); J. M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory 258–277 (1992).
26.
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 181–204 (1985).
27.
Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Teil I: Grundlagen 2–7 (2002).
28.
John Brewer and John Styles, An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 14 (1980).
29.
Joseph Vining, Legal Identity 2 (1978).
30.
Lindsay Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order 6 (1997).
31.
Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (1971); E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters 259–265 (1975); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, Albion’s Fatal Tree (1977); Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History – A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law 16–19 (2nd ed., 2006).
32.
Ian Dennis, The Critical Condition of Criminal Law, 50 Current Legal Problems 213 (1997).
33.
Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 181 (1968): “…the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not be applied to him”.
34.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and Minimal State (1981).
35.
Norrie, supra note 31, at p. 19: “Change of the law is for the legislators. The proper and logical solution to the problem of law is a comprehensive legal code, which in one coherent, logical, concise document establishes the law, its penalties, and the duties of free citizen” (emphasis in original).
36.
On June 28, 1935 the German penal code has been amended and provided: “Irgendeine Person wird bestraft werden, der eine Handlung einsetzt, die das Gesetz erklärt, strafbar zu sein, oder, der von Strafe gemäß grundlegenden Ideen von Strafgesetz und der gesunden Empfindung der Leute verdient. Wenn kein bestimmtes Strafgesetz direkt zutreffend zur Handlung ist, wird es gemäß dem Gesetz, die grundlegende Idee bestraft werden, von dem ihm am besten passt”. The Soviet used this approach within articles 6 and 10 of the Soviet penal code of 1926.
37.
Norrie, supra note 31, at p. 19: “The code both guards individual liberty against the State and safeguards individual property and security through deterrence. It provides the ideal text for the individual to read and calculate by, as well as maximum protection and respect for his liberty”.
38.
Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347; Abbott, [1977] A.C. 755; Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 15, 227 (1978); Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law 17–23 (3rd ed., 2003, 2006).
39.
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997).
40.
George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 206–211 (1998).
41.
Ibid. Krey, supra note 27, at pp. 2–19.
42.
Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 32 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005).
43.
Ibid at p. 33.
44.
Article 8 of the declaration of rights of the man and the citizen (La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) from August 26, 1789 provides: “Nul ne peut être puni qu’en vertu d’une loi établie et promulguée anterieurement au délit et légalement appliquée”.
45.
Article 4 of the Code Napoléon of 1810 provided: “Nulle contravention, nul délit, nul crime, ne peuvent être punis de peines qui n'étaient pas prononcées par la loi avant qu'ils fussent commis”.
46.
Hall, supra note 42, at p. 34.
47.
Article 1 of the German penal code provides: “Eine Tat kann nur bestraft werden, wenn die Strafbarkeit gesetzlich bestimmt war, bevor die Tat begangen wurde”.
48.
Grundgesetz, art. 103 (II) provides: “Eine Tat kann nur bestraft werden, wenn die Strafbarkeit gesetzlich bestimmt war, bevor die Tat begangen wurde”.
49.
Most of the provisions of the principle of legality in criminal law of the German law are concentrated in articles 1-10 of the German penal code. See more in Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts – Allgemeiner Teil 128–137 (5 Auf., 1996); Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, Introduction to German Law 387, 388–389 (2nd ed., Mathias Reimann and Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005); Nigel Foster, German Legal System & Laws 203 (2nd ed., 1996).
50.
Arthur Kaufmann, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Strafrecht, Grundfragen der gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaft, Festschrift für Henkel 89 (1974).
51.
Albin Eser, The Principle of ‘Harm’ in the Concept of Crime – A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 Duq. U. L. R. 345 (1966); BVerfGE 45, 187.
52.
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 214–215 (1979).
53.
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220, [1961] 2 All E.R. 446, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 45 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 125 J.P. 437; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd., [1973] A.C. 435, [1972] 2 All E.R. 898, [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143; Tan, [1983] Q.B. 1053.
54.
Hughes v. Holley, (1988) 86 Cr. App. R. 130; Pattni, [2001] Crim. L.R. 570; Cotter, [2002] Crim. L.R. 824; Clark, [2003] 2 Cr. App. R. 363.
55.
Taylor, [1950] 2 K.B. 368; Gomez, [1993] A.C. 442, [1993] 1 All E.R. 1, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1067; Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593; Hinks, [2001] 2 A.C. 241, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1590, [2000] 4 All E.R. 833; Andrew Ashworth, Interpreting Criminal Statutes: A Crisis of Legality?, 107 L.Q.R. 419 (1991).
56.
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] All E.R. 1, [1935] A.C. 462, [1935] 104 L.J.K.B. 433, [1935] 153 L.T. 232, [1935] 51 T.L.R. 446, [1935] 79 Sol. Jo. 401, [1935] 25 Cr. App. Rep. 72, [1935] 30 Cox C.C. 234; Lambert, [2002] 2 A.C. 545, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 206, [2002] 1 All E.R. 2; Sheldrake, [2005] 1 A.C. 264, [2005] 1 All E.R. 237, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 28.
57.
Article 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42 provides: “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”; See more in Percy, [2002] Crim. L.R. 835, [2002] A.C.D. 24; A. v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87, [2004] U.K.H.L. 56; Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (2002).
58.
Chan Chi-hung, [1996] A.C. 442; Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 73–74 (5th ed., 2006).
59.
Lim Chin Aik, [1963] A.C. 160, [1963] 1 All E.R. 223, [1963] 2 W.L.R. 42; Cambridge and Isle of Ely County Council v. Rust, [1972] 2 Q.B. 426, [1972] 3 All E.R. 232, [1972] 3 W.L.R. 226.
60.
Charles, (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 252; Oxford v. Moss, (1978) 68 Cr. App. R. 183, [1979] Crim. L.R. 119; Gold, [1987] Q.B. 1116, [1987] 3 All E.R. 618, [1987] 3 W.L.R. 803, [1988] A.C. 1063; Preddy, [1996] A.C. 815, [1996] 3 All E.R. 481, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 255.
61.
Hunt, [1987] A.C. 352, [1987] 1 All E.R. 1, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 1115, 84 Cr. App. R. 163; Carass, [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. 77; Andrew Ashworth and Meredith Blake, The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law, [1996] Crim. L. R. 306 (1996).
62.
United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 538, 35 L.Ed. 190 (1891); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678, 47 L.Ed. 979 (1903); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948).
63.
The sixth amendment of the United States constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”; See more in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1921); Yu Cong Eng. V. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 46 S.Ct. 619, 70 L.Ed. 1059 (1926).
64.
The fifth amendment of the United States constitution provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”; and the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”; See more in Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 103–104 (4th ed., 2003).
65.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).
66.
Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass. 740, 665 N.E.2d 976 (1996); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000); State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 2002).
67.
United States Constitution, art I, §§ 9, 10.
68.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001).
69.
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993).

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Assoc.Prof. Gabriel Hallevy

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Hallevy, G. (2010). The Meaning and Structure of the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law. In: A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13714-3_1

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13714-3_1
Published: 13 August 2010
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