Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks in Delay-and Disruption-Tolerant Networks

  • Godwin Ansa
  • Enyenihi Johnson
  • Haitham Cruickshank
  • Zhili Sun
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 43)


There is a growing interest in providing communications to “Challenged” environments which have been hitherto isolated and disconnected due to the lack of communications infrastructure. These are regions which lie at the edge of the current Internet. Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the three major security requirements of any secured system or network. This paper presents our work on Denial of Service mitigation in Delay-and Disruption-Tolerant Networks. We propose three examples of a light-weight bundle authenticator (DTN-cookie) based on XOR and HMAC operations to thwart DoS attacks that lead to resource exhaustion.


DTN Denial of Service Protocol Security 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Godwin Ansa
    • 1
  • Enyenihi Johnson
    • 1
  • Haitham Cruickshank
    • 1
  • Zhili Sun
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Communications Systems ResearchUniversity of SurreyGuildfordUK

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