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Analysis of an Automated Auction with Concurrent Multiple Unit Acceptance Capacity

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 6148))

Abstract

In this paper, we present a model of automated English auctions where there are multiple units of identical items, the acceptance capacity of the auction, that will be concurrently sold at each auction. This illustrates the situation, for instance, where the auctioneer may need to concurrently sell multiple units of identical items at each auction, and buyers may bid to win the unit by increasing the lowest value of the bids which have been received by the auctioneer from the bidders. At this situation the auctioneer needs to estimate the revenue he can obtain from the auction and wants to make decisions to reach optimality. First, we present a main model of the auction, and derive the solution of probability distribution for the model. Using the derived solution we yield closed form expressions for expected income rate, and formulate optimization problems for the seller’s optimal decision waiting time and optimal lot size determination. After that, a model of the automated English auctions with a reserved price is considered. Some numerical examples illustrating the above then follows.

Apr 06 2010, for ASMTA’10 Conference.

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Kim, G., Gelenbe, E. (2010). Analysis of an Automated Auction with Concurrent Multiple Unit Acceptance Capacity. In: Al-Begain, K., Fiems, D., Knottenbelt, W.J. (eds) Analytical and Stochastic Modeling Techniques and Applications. ASMTA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6148. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13568-2_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13568-2_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13567-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13568-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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