Abstract
Wireless routing protocols allow transmitting nodes to have some knowledge of the topology in order to decide when to forward a packet (via broadcast) and when to drop it. Since a routing protocol forms the backbone of any network, it is a lucrative target for attacks. Routing protocols for wired networks (such as S-BGP) are not scalable in an ad-hoc wireless environment because of two main drawbacks: (1) the need to maintain knowledge about all immediate neighbors (which requires a discovery protocol), and (2) the need to transmit the same update several times, one for each neighbor. Although information about neighbors is readily available in a fairly static and wired network, such information is often not updated or available in an ad-hoc wireless network with mobile devices. Consequently, S-BGP is not suitable for such scenarios. We propose a BGP-type wireless routing protocol for such networks that does not suffer from such drawbacks. The protocol uses a novel authentication primitive called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS).
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Saxena, A., Soh, B. (2010). A Scalable Wireless Routing Protocol Secure against Route Truncation Attacks. In: De Decker, B., Schaumüller-Bichl, I. (eds) Communications and Multimedia Security. CMS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6109. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13241-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13241-4_2
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