Abstract
This paper proposed a new bilateral model supporting cooperative behavior. It is inspired by cooperation in hunting [34,38] and food sharing of female vampire bats [56,57,58]. In this paper, it is postulated, that low bounding of food capacity (fast saturation) in conjunction with a high demand of food energy (fast starving without food) strongly supports cooperative behavior. These postulations are integrated within the proposed model as an extension of the prisoner dilemma [10,11,49].
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Buettner, R. (2010). Cooperation in Hunting and Food-Sharing: A Two-Player Bio-inspired Trust Model. In: Altman, E., Carrera, I., El-Azouzi, R., Hart, E., Hayel, Y. (eds) Bioinspired Models of Network, Information, and Computing Systems. BIONETICS 2009. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 39. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12808-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12808-0_1
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