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Quantum Readout of Physical Unclonable Functions

  • Boris Škorić
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6055)

Abstract

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are physical structures that are hard to clone and have a unique challenge-response behaviour. In this paper we propose a new security primitive, the quantum-readout PUF (QR-PUF): a classical PUF which is challenged using a quantum state, and whose response is also a quantum state. By the no-cloning property of unknown quantum states, attackers cannot intercept challenges or responses without noticeably disturbing the readout process. Thus, a verifier who sends quantum states as challenges and receives the correct quantum states back can be certain that he is probing a specific QR-PUF without disturbances, even in the QR-PUF is far away ‘in the field’ and under hostile control. For PUFs whose information content is not exceedingly large, all currently known PUF-based authentication and anti-counterfeiting schemes require trusted readout devices in the field. Our quantum readout scheme has no such requirement.

We show how the QR-PUF authentication can be interwoven with Quantum Key Exchange (QKE), leading to an authenticated QKE protocol between two parties with the special property that it requires no a priori secret shared by the two parties, and that the quantum channel is the authenticated channel, allowing for an unauthenticated classical channel.

Keywords

Quantum State Entangle State Quantum Channel Authentication Protocol Challenge State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Boris Škorić
    • 1
  1. 1.Eindhoven University of Technology 

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