Abstract
The problem of what procedural autonomy is and the limits of the so-called procedural autonomy of the Member States is a matter that the doctrine has examined at least since the judgement of the ECJ in the Rewe case.
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Notes
- 1.
Judgement of the ECJ of 16 December 1976. Case 33/76. Rewe. European Court reports 1976 Page 01989. This ruling has been often reiterated by the Court in its subsequent jurisprudence. For an indication of the main decisions in this regard, see F. Grévisse, J.C. Bonichot, Les incidences du droit communautaire sur l’organisation et l’exercice de la fonction juridictionnelle dans les Etat membres, p. 298, note n. 2.
- 2.
Here, I prefer to refer to the expression of ‘principles and criteria’ in order to avoid inadequately using the concept of principle. On this topic see the observations by H. Lecheler, Der Beitrag der allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze zur Europäischen Integration, p. 338 ff.
- 3.
S. note n. 31.
- 4.
On this point, see Chapter 4, para. 4.3.
- 5.
See, among others, R. Adam, in R. Adam, A. Tizzano, Lineamenti di diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 16 ff.; R. Alonso García, Sistema Jurídico de la Unión Europea, p. 76 ff.; C. Blumann, L. Dubouis, Droit institutionnel de l’Unione européenne, p. 314 ff.; G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 101 ff.
- 6.
In this sense, J.V. Louis, Th. Ronse, L’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, p. 17.
- 7.
V. Michel, 2004: Le défi de la répartition des compétence, p. 31.
- 8.
On the intrinsic implications of the concept of legal basis, see J.V. Louis, Th. Ronse, L’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, p. 17 ff.; R. Alonso García, Sistema Jurídico de la Unión Europea, p. 87 ff. and the jurisprudence mentioned there. Here it is only reminded, incidentally, that the matter related to the identification of the legal bases of the action is a fundamental question for EU law. Also because -as in the case of Arts. 114 and 115, TFEU (95 and 94, TEC) – to the different legal bases correspond different procedures for the adoption of norms that, in turn, have important practical consequences. On this aspect, see the recent work by J. Ziller, Bases juridiques et compétences en droit de l’Union européenne.
- 9.
The new provision of Art. 298 TFEU states that “1. In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration.
2. In compliance with the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment adopted on the basis of Article 336, the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish provisions to that end”. It can therefore be used as a legal basis only for the adoption of procedural rules referring to the EU administration.
- 10.
For this reason, I do not share the thesis of C.N. Kakouris, Do the Member States possess Judicial Procedural “Autonomy”?, in particular p. 1395 ff., who, from a literal understanding of the passage of the Rewe judgement already mentioned in para. 2.1. (in the absence of community rules), deduces the existence of a EU competence over this matter, without specifying however the legal basis referred to. In this sense, G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 101, note n. 28, notes that the legal basis has in this sense a ‘constitutional’ nature.
- 11.
In this sense, J. Kokott, Europäisierung des Verwaltungsprozessrechts, p. 338 ff. On this point, see also the recent comments by G. Greco, Illegittimità comunitaria e pari dignità degli ordinamenti, p. 507 f.
- 12.
On a specific comment on these provisions see, among others, F. Caruso, Art. 94 TCE; Id., Art. 95 TCE.
- 13.
I refer here to the Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, recently modified by Directive 2007/66/EC of 11 December 2007, aimed at improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts (in Official Journal of the European Union L 335/31, 20.12.2007), which will be considered in Chap. 4, para. 4.4.
- 14.
See in particular Judgement of the ECJ of 5 October 2000. Case C-376/98. Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. European Court reports 2000 Page I-08419, para. 83 of the grounds, where it is stated that ‘… the measures referred to in Article 100a(1) of the Treaty are intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. To interpret that article as meaning that it vests in the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would not only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but would also be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 EC) that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it.’ From this point of view the shifting of Art. 94 TEC in Art. 115 TFEU and of Art. 95 in Art. 114 TFEU has been made with the clear purpose of recalling the fact, that the provision of Art. 94 was the exception and that of Art. 95 the rule (and not viceversa!).
- 15.
On this subject, see among others, R. Alonso García, Sistema Jurídico de la Unión Europea, p. 80 ff.
- 16.
Instead, regarding the ‘executive’ competences recognized to the Commission by the EU jurisprudence, as well as on the implicit competences regarding international agreements, see N. Bassi, Principio di legalità e poteri amministrativi impliciti, p. 49 ff.
- 17.
Judgement of the ECJ of 4 April 1968. Case 34/67. Lück. European Court reports 1968, Page 00245, which I will consider in para. 2.3.
- 18.
See para. 2.1, above.
- 19.
Judgement of the ECJ of 16 December 1976. Case 45/76. Comet. European Court reports 1976 Page 02043.
- 20.
Judgement of the ECJ of 11 December 1973. Case 120/73. Lorenz. European Court reports 1973 Page 01471. In the same direction, see the decisions of the same date in Case 121/73, Markmann and 141/73, Loyrey, both of them in European Court reports 1973, respectively Page 01495 and Page 01527.
- 21.
See para. 2.5.
- 22.
S. note n. 31.
- 23.
See Judgement of the ECJ of 4 April 1968, Case 34/67. In the same vein see also Judgement of the ECJ of 19 December 1968. Case 13/68. Salgoil. European Court reports 1968, Page 00453. On this decision see the comments by R. Kovar, Droit communautaire et droit procédural national, p. 233 f.
- 24.
When a word search was made on the Eur-Lex site (that is better done in the German language, as in this case it is necessary to introduce only one word “Verfahrensautonomie” in the terms of the search) I found -on 4 February 2009 – only 26 decisions in which the ECJ has used this terminology. Moreover within these, in six cases, this expression has been used only by the parties or the Commission. Regarding the Conclusions of the Advocates-General, the use of this expression was also limited to only 57 cases. To this regard see the observations of Th. Von Danwitz, Europäisches Veraltungsrecht, p. 311.
- 25.
For the French version see Chap. 1, par. 1.1., note n. 5.
- 26.
See now explicitly in Art. 4.1. TFEU: “In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”.
- 27.
In Chap. 3.
- 28.
On this, see below on para. 2.7.
- 29.
On this point, see Chap. 3, para. 3.2.
- 30.
In this sense, I do not agree therefore with the suggestion by W. van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, p. 502, who proposes abandoning the term ‘procedural autonomy’ for that of ‘procedural competence.’
- 31.
As the ECJ reminded us in its opinion of 14 December 1991. Opinion 1/91. European Court reports 1991 Page I-06079, where it is stated, precisely, that ‘The essential characteristics of the Community legal order established as such are, in particular, its supremacy over the rights of the Member States and the direct effectiveness of a whole range of norms that apply to the citizens of those States as well as the States themselves.’ (para. 21).
- 32.
G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 173. Author’s translation. For a broader, rather recent study on several aspects pertaining to the direct effect, see the monographic volume by S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, p. 3 ff. See also R. Kovar, Immédiateté du droit communautaire, p. 4 ff.
- 33.
It was stated in Judgement of the ECJ of 5 February 1963. Case 26/62. van Gend & Loos. European Court reports 1963 Page 00001, that: ‘the wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which is not a positive but a negative obligation. This obligation, moreover, is not qualified by any reservation on the part of States which would make its implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure enacted under national law.’
- 34.
Judgement van Gend & Loos.
- 35.
For an in-depth study see -in addition to G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario; R. Alonso García, Sistema Jurídico de la Unión Europea and, more generally, the text books on EU law – the interesting works by S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, Chap. III, p. 127 ff., and by O. Porchia, I principi dell'ordinamento europeo. La cooperazione pluridirezionale, p. 70 ff.
- 36.
According to and for the purposes of Art. 288.2 TFEU (ex Art. 249.2, TEC), which does not mean, moreover, that all the provisions of a regulation are bestowed with direct effect.
- 37.
As has been clarified since the Judgement of the ECJ of 6 October 1970. Case 9/70. Grad. European Court reports 1970 Page 00825, para. 5 ff.
- 38.
For an in-depth study, see G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 180 ff.
- 39.
Judgement of the ECJ of 15 July 1964. Case 6/64. Costa v E.N.E.L. European Court reports 1964 Page 00585.
- 40.
A. Barav, Primauté, p. 855.
- 41.
Because, in the absence of primacy, it is void and, consequently, inexistent. In this sense, P. Pescatore, L’Ordre juridique des Communautés européennes, p. 227.
- 42.
For more details, see R. Alonso García, Sistema Jurídico de la Unión Europea, p. 218 ff.
- 43.
Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, in Official Journal L 395, 30/12/1989 P. 0033–0035 and Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of EU rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, in Official Journal L 076, 23/03/1992 P. 0014–0020, recently modified by the Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, in Official Journal of the European Union L 335, 20.12.2007 P.0031-0046. On the ‘old’ directives see in particular M. Protto, L'effettività della tutela giurisdizionale, p. 112 ff.
- 44.
In this sense, in particular, certain directives on consumers’ protection could be mentioned here. Particularly, Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, in Official Journal of the European Communities L 166, 11/06/1998 P. 0051-0055; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, in Official Journal L 095, 21/04/1993 P. 0029–0034; Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, in Official Journal of the European Communities L 271, 9/10/2002 P. 0016-0024. In this regard, see further G. Morbidelli, La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti nell’ordinamento comunitario, p. 35 ff. (Chapter on ‘La normativa comunitaria avente ad oggetto diretto istituti di tutela giurisdizionale’). See also the interesting reflections by K. Lenaerts, D. Gerard, Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: Judges in the Frontline, p. 336 ff.
- 45.
In this sense s. Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Warner delivered on 30 November 1976. Cases 33/76 and 45/76. Rewe and Comet decisions. European Court reports 1976 Page 01989, in particular p. 2005.
- 46.
The conclusion that primacy and procedural autonomy are not antithetical terms and that neither the direct effect plays a role here is also addressed in S. Prechal, Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons From Vam Schijndel, p. 685 f.
- 47.
The expression is taken from J. Mertens de Wilmars, L’efficacité des différentes techniques nationales de protection juridique contre les violations du droit communautaire par les autorités nationales et les particuliers, p. 381.
- 48.
On this matter, see among others J.-D. Mouton, Effet utile, p. 449 ff. and the case-law analyzed there.
- 49.
In this sense, J. Mertens de Wilmars, L’efficacité des différentes techniques nationales de protection juridique contre les violations du droit communautaire par les autorités nationales et les particuliers, p. 386. On this point, see the recent work by G. Martinico, L’integrazione silente. La funzione interpretativa della Corte di giustizia e il diritto costituzionale europeo, p. 81, who observes that the principle of direct effect means that it should be possible for the norm to be effectively applied and to produce the desired effects.
- 50.
In this sense, A. Tizzano, La tutela dei privati nei confronti degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, c. 23.
- 51.
And in this sense it exercises what some authors have defined as a ‘droit de regard’ over the national legal orders. S.A. Tizzano, La tutela dei privati nei confronti degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, c. 24.
- 52.
In para. 2.8.
- 53.
Precisely, in Rewe, para. 5 of the grounds, the ECJ states that ‘… in the absence of community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of community law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature’ (first Rewe criterion) and that the conditions laid down by the domestic norms should not make it ‘impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are obliged to protect.’ (second Rewe criterion).
- 54.
See for example S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, p. 315, who notes that the principle of effectiveness should be understood here as having a very different meaning in relation to that of effet utile and, hence, as a requirement for minimum effectiveness.
- 55.
The expression ‘obligation de résultat’ is taken from R. Kovar, Droit communautaire et droit procédural national, p. 234. The expression is picked up by A. Barav, La plénitude des compétences du juge national en sa qualité de juge communautaire, p. 9.
- 56.
In this sense, see also O. Dubos, Les juridictions nationales, juge communautaire, p. 252 ff., who refers to ‘effet utile maximum de la norme communautaire.’
- 57.
This analogy is brought to light already by R. Kovar, Droit communautaire et droit procédural national, p. 241. The idea has been picked up, more recently, by J. Cavallini, Le juge national du provisoire face au droit communautaire, p. 229 ff.
- 58.
Art. 288.3 TFEU (ex Art. 249.3 TEC). In this sense, I think that the observations made by certain authors, who affirm that within the EU legal order the procedural autonomy is -along with the uniformity and effectiveness requirements – an “objective” of the EU law, are completely misleading. Likewise, M. Accetto, S. Zleptnig, The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking Its Role in Community Law, p. 400 f.
- 59.
In this sense, see also O. Dubos, Les juridictions nationales, juge communautaire, p. 263 ff., who points out that ‘L’idée d’effet utile de l’effect direct comme fondement de l’encadrement de l’autonomie procédurale n’est certes pas explicite dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, mais elle est bien présente.’
- 60.
In next para. 2.7.
- 61.
As suggested moreover by W. van Gerven, Bridging the gap between Community and National Laws: towards a principle of homogeneity in the field of legal remedies?, p. 690 ff. (692). We come back to this point in the concluding remarks of Chap. 4, para. 4.7.
- 62.
See, in particular, the copious monographic work by S. Tarullo, Il giusto processo amministrativo. Studio sull’effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nella prospettiva europea.
- 63.
In this sense, see for example, G. Raiti, La collaborazione giudiziaria nell’esperienza del rinvio pregiudiziale comunitario, p. 345 f.
- 64.
Although not shared, the reading proposed by M. Accetto, S. Zleptnig, The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking Its Role in Community Law, p. 385 ff., is peculiar in this regard. They argue instead that the requirement of effectiveness of the EU law coincides with the principle of effective judicial protection only at an initial stage.
- 65.
In this sense, see M. Protto, L'effettività della tutela giurisdizionale, p. 1 ff. (9). In substantially analogue terms also, R. Caranta, Effettività della garanzia giuisdizionale nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione e diritto comunitario: il problema della tutela cautelare, p. 2554 ff. (2559); Id., Diritto comunitario e tutela cautelare: dall’effettività allo “ius commune”, p. 353 ff.; E. Chiti, Misure cautelari positive e effettività del diritto comunitario, p. 338 ff.; N. Trocker, “Civil Law” e “Common Law” nella formazione del diritto processuale europeo, para. 7 ff. See also Masucci, La lunga marcia della Corte di Lussemburgo verso una tutela cautelare europea, p. 1158 ff. In this regard, see moreover the critical reflections by A. Adinolfi, La tutela giurisdizionale nazionale delle situazioni soggettive individuali conferite dal diritto comunitario, p. 41 ff., on the possibility of achieve a harmonization, through the jurisprudence, of the inherent aspects of the judicial protection of the subjective situations recognized by the EU law to the individuals.
- 66.
As pointed out also by S. Tarullo, Il giusto processo amministrativo. Studio sull’effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nella prospettiva europea, p. 50 ff. In this regard, see also the broad jurisprudential analysis of Th. Eilmansberger, The relationship between rights and remedies in EC Law: in search of the missing link, p. 1199 ff.
- 67.
D. De Pretis, La tutela giurisdizionale amministrativa in Europa fra integrazione e diversità, p. 29. In this sense, see also G. Morbidelli, La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti nell’ordinamento comunitario, p. 46.
- 68.
This is the case, for example, in the recent Judgement of the ECJ, 25 July 2008. Case C-237/07. Janecek. European Court reports 2008 Page I-06221.
- 69.
It is the situation at stake, for example, in Judgement of the ECJ of 23 February 1994. Case C-236/92. Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others. European Court reports 1994 Page I-00483, where with its third question the national judge posed the following problem before the ECJ ‘… Is a national court, when called on to protect “Community subjective rights” of individuals, under an obligation to disapply internal provisions -that are at variance with Community law – even where such “disapplication” may have disturbing effects on the Community public interest […]?’ In this same sense, in my opinion, the Judgement of the ECJ of 21 January 1999. Case C-120/97. Upjohn. European Court reports 1999 Page I-00223, should also be read.
- 70.
See decisions quoted in the above note. In relation to them, see also for a more detailed analysis on this aspect D. De Pretis, La tutela giurisdizionale amministrativa in Europa fra integrazione e diversità, p. 29 ff.
- 71.
On this point see M. Fromont, L’influence des droits française et allemande sur les conditions de recevabilité du recours en annulation devant la Court de justice des Communautés européens, p. 47 ff. See also J. Ziller, La dialectique du contentieux européen: le cas des recours contre les actes normatifs, p. 446 ff. (449); M. Burgi, Verwaltungsprozess und Europarecht, p. 51 ff. (52). S. Prechal, Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons From Vam Schijndel, p. 706 seems instead to conclude, based on the analysis of a number of decisions by the ECJ, that the EU system combines elements of both of the systems alluded to.
- 72.
In particular, in Chap. 3, para. 3.2.3.
- 73.
On this point, see R. Kovar, Voies de droit ouvertes aux individus devant les instances nationales en cas de violation des normes et décision du droit communautaire, p. 245 f. See also in particular M. Ruffert, Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View, p. 316; Ch. Callies, Kohärenz und Konvergenz beim europäischen Individualrechtsschutz. Der Zugang zum Gericht im Lichte des Grundrechts auf effektiven Rechtsschutz; para. V and the literature quoted there; Id., Feinstaub im Rechtsschutz deutscher Verwaltungsgerichte. Europarechtliche Vorgaben für die Klagebefugnis vor deutschen Gerichten und ihre dogmatische Verarbeitung, p. 2 ff. Also, M. Accetto, S. Zleptnig, The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking Its Role in Community Law, p. 392. Lastly, see P. Pescatore, Il rinvio pregiudiziale di cui all’art. 177 del Trattato CEE e la cooperazione tra la Corte ed i giudici nazionali, c. 43 ff.
- 74.
On this aspect, see moreover what was already stated by the ECJ in its jurisprudence in van Gend & Loos (Judgement of the ECJ of 5 February 1963, Case 26/62), where it is affirmed that: ‘the vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States.’ See also the ever pertinent reflections of S. Cassese, Il sistema amministrativo europeo e la sua evoluzione, p. 773, on the ‘iron triangle’ that is established between citizens, Commission and ECJ.
- 75.
G. Morbidelli, La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti nell’ordinamento comunitario, p. 46. In the same vein see moreover also O. Dubos, Les juridictions nationales, juge communautaire, p. 308 ff.; S. Morettini, L’effettività del diritto comunitario ed il processo amministrativo negli Stati membri, para. 4.3; as well as S. Tarullo, Il giusto processo amministrativo. Studio sull’effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nella prospettiva europea, p. 51, who points out that ‘it is not difficult to see that the principle of effectiveness of community law flashes in the background of the decisions of the Court of Justice also when it refers to the effectiveness of the judicial protection.’ (Author’s translation). On this point, see however, the conclusions by S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, p. 345 ff.
- 76.
In this regard, see the decision Unibet of 2007 that will be addressed in Chap. III, para. 3.1.
- 77.
S. Art. 19.1, alinea 2, TEU, and Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
- 78.
On this point, see F. Picod, Article I–29, p. 385 ff., 394 f. See also the observations of M.P. Chiti, La giurisdizione, p. 357 f.
- 79.
See J.-D. Mouton, Effet utile, p. 451.
- 80.
In para. 2.5.
- 81.
Judgement of the ECJ of 10 April 1984. Case 14/83. von Colson. European Court reports 1984 Page 01891, para. 15 of the grounds.
- 82.
In this sense, see J.-D. Mouton, Effet utile, p. 451, and the relevant jurisprudential references quoted there.
- 83.
Judgement of the ECJ of 10 April 1984. Case 14/83, para. 15.
- 84.
See in particular, Judgement of the ECJ of 13 November 1990. Case C-106/89. Marleasing. European Court reports 1990 Page I-04135, para. 9 of the grounds.
- 85.
See on this aspect, for all, the recent paper by G. Gaja, L'esigenza di interpretare le norme nazionali in conformità con il diritto comunitario, p. 133 ff. See also G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 191 ff.; S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, p. 211 ff. as well as A. Adinolfi, The Judicial Application of Community Law in Italy, p. 1335 ff. To this regard see the recent Judgement of the ECJ 16 July 2009. Case C-12/08. Mono Car Styling. European Court reports 2009 Page 00000, concerning the possibility to offset the lack of horizontal direct effect with the duty of consistent interpretation.
- 86.
As is well known, with this judgement the ECJ has extended it also to the so-called third pillar. See Judgement of the ECJ of 16 June 2005. Case C-105/03. Pupino. European Court reports 2005 Page I-05285, para. 43 of the grounds. On this decision, see E. Herlin-Karnell, An exercise in effectiveness?, p. 1181.
- 87.
As pointed out by G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 193.
- 88.
Judgement of the ECJ of 5 October 2004. Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01. Pfeiffer. European Court reports 2004 Page I-08835, para.s 114 and 115 of the grounds. See also the previous jurisprudence. See as well, more recently, Judgement of the ECJ of 4 July 2006. Case C-212/04. Adeneler. European Court reports 2006 Page I-06057.
- 89.
Judgement of the ECJ of 18 July 2007. Lucchini. Case C-119/05. European Court reports 2007 Page I-06199, which will be extensively analyzed in Chap. 3, para. 3.4.
- 90.
As already observed by R. Kovar, Droit communautaire et droit procédural national, p. 251 ff. more than thirty years ago.
- 91.
In Chap. 3, para. 3.3.
- 92.
As already anticipated, it is placed in a ‘subservient function’ in relation to the requirement of effectiveness of the EU substantive law. In this sense see, lastly, the reflections by R. Kovar, L’interprétation des droits nationaux en conformité avec le droit communautaire, p. 381 ff., 386.
- 93.
Para. 2.10.
- 94.
On this aspect, see O. Dubos, Les juridictions nationales, juge communautaire, p. 269 ff. For a detailed study, see also A. Adinolfi, La tutela giurisdizionale nazionale delle situazioni soggettive individuali conferite dal diritto comunitario, p. 43 ff.; A. Biondi, The European Court of Justice and certain national procedural limitations: not such a tough relationship, p. 1274 ff.; T. Tridimas, Enforcing Community Rights in National Courts: Some Recent Development, p. 38 ff.
- 95.
On the problems related to this type of assessment see the critical observations of A. Biondi, The European Court of Justice and certain national procedural limitations: not such a tough relationship, p. 1274 ff.
- 96.
Judgement of the ECJ of 1 December 1998. Case C-326/96. Levez. European Court reports 1998 Page I-07835, para. 41.
- 97.
Para. 43 and 44 of the grounds in Levez. To this regard, see also Judgement of the ECJ of 10 July 1997. Case C-261/95. Palmisani. European Court reports 1997 Page I-04025.
- 98.
In this sense, see the last part of Levez, para. 42 of the grounds. For a detailed study, see T. Tridimas, Enforcing Community Rights in National Courts: Some Recent Development, p. 39 ff.
- 99.
In this vein, G. Greco, Illegittimità comunitaria e pari dignità degli ordinamenti, p. 513, who speaks of ‘vertical’ equivalence in the sense that the protection of the EU positions that can be fairly claimed by the Member States cannot be ‘stronger or, any case, more favourable than that accorded by the community law itself’ (p. 513). In this sense, according to this author, a ‘vertical’ equivalence may subsist in the sense of ‘equivalence as a result of the comparison between nationals and community regimes and remedies.’ (p. 515). Author’s translation.
- 100.
In this sense, see R. Caranta, Judicial protection against Member States: a new Jus Commune takes shape, p. 726, who, without mentioning the issue of equal rank of the legal orders, refers to a ‘vertical ius commune’ (‘ius commune verticale’). In a rather critical tone, P.J. Wattel, Köbler, Cilfit and Welthgrove: we can’t go on meeting like this, in the para. with the suggestive title ‘Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones’, p. 184 ff. See also S. Morettini, L’effettività del diritto comunitario ed il processo amministrativo negli Stati membri, para. 3.1.1, who speaks about a requirement of coherence of the systems based on ‘political and judicial reasons.’
- 101.
In this sense, I cannot understand the reasoning of A. Negrelli, Il primato del diritto comunitario e il giudicato nazionale: un confronto che si poteva evitare o risolvere altrimenti, p. 1236.
- 102.
As is underlined by M.P. Chiti, Le peculiarità dell’invalidità amministrativa per anticomunitarietà, p. 501 f.; Id., Diritto amministrativo europeo, p. 569.
- 103.
C. Kilpatrick, The Future of Remedies in Europe, p. 8. In this sense see also the observations of R. Caranta, Judicial protection against Member States: a new Jus Commune takes shape, p. 721 ff., who refers to the use of a ‘double standard’ (p. 724). On the same line of reasoning see also S. Prechal, N. Shelkoplyas, National Procedures, Public Policy and EC-Law. From Van Schijndel to Eco Swiss and Beyond, p. 611.
- 104.
G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 190 (Author’s translation) and see futher the copious case law on this topic quoted there (note n. 284 ff.)
- 105.
In regard to the preliminary reference procedure see, for all, the well-known essay by P. Pescatore, Il rinvio pregiudiziale di cui all’art. 177 del Trattato CEE e la cooperazione tra la Corte ed i giudici nazionali, c. 26 ff. See also, for a more recent analysis, F. Sorrentino, L’art. 177 del Trattato di Roma nel rapporto tra ordinamento comunitario e ordinamenti interni, p. 737 ff.; A. Arnull, The Evolution of the Court’s Jurisdiction under Art. 177 EEC, p. 129 ff.; C. Barnard, E. Sharpston, The Changing Face of Article 177 References, p. 1113 ff. Further, see the monographic volume by G. Raiti, La collaborazione giudiziaria nell’esperienza del rinvio pregiudiziale comunitario.
- 106.
Namely, the national norms that either reproduce the text of a EU norm or refer directly to it even regarding a situation with no relevance for the EU law. For an in-depth analysis see the interesting paper by M.E. Bartoloni, La competenza della Corte di giustizia ad interpretare il diritto nazionale “modellato” sulla normativa comunitaria, p. 311 ff.
- 107.
Judgement of the ECJ of 18 October 1990. Joined cases C-297/88 and C-197/89. Dzodzi. European Court reports 1990 Page I-03763, para. 36 ff. of the grounds. In the same direction, see Judgement of the ECJ of 8 November 1990. Case C-231/89. Gmurzynska-Bscher. European Court reports 1990 Page I-04003, para. 24 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 17 July 1997. Case C-28/95. Leur-Bloem. European Court reports 1997 Page I-04161, para. 32 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 17 July 1997. Case C-130/95. Giloy. European Court reports 1997 Page I-04291, para. 28 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 16 June 1998. Case C-53/96. Hermès. European Court reports 1998 Page I-03603, para. 32 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 11 January 2001. Case C-1/99. Kofisa. European Court reports 2001 Page I-00207, para. 32 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 15 January 2002. Case C-43/00. Andersen. European Court reports 2002 Page I-00379, para. 18 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 16 March 2006. Case C-3/04. Poseidon. European Court reports 2006 Page I-02505, para. 16 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 14 December 2006. Case C-217/05. Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio. European Court reports 2006 Page I-11987, para. 20 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 11 December 2007. Case C-280/06. Philip Morris. European Court reports 2007 Page I-10893, para. 21 of the grounds.
- 108.
See, for all, the very harsh critique of H. Rasmussen, Remedying the Crumbling EC Judicial System, p. 1082 f.
- 109.
Judgement of the ECJ of 8 November 1990, Case C-231/89, para. 24.
- 110.
This expansion presents a number of problematic aspects as has been often pointed out in the Conclusions of the Advocates General in the decisions quoted above. On this point see also T. Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, p. 9 ff., 34 ff.; Contra see moreover C. Barnard, E. Sharpston, The Changing Face of Article 177 References, p. 1127 ff.
- 111.
In this regard, to my mind come spontaneously the words of Jean Monnet at the end of his Mémoires, published in 1976 ‘But time goes by, and Europe is still in a position in which it has already been… We cannot stop when around us the whole world is moving. Did not I say quite clearly that the Community we created is not an end in itself? It is a transformation process that continues, one from which our national forms of life emerged during an earlier historical phase. As our provinces yesterday, so today our people must learn how to live together under common rules and institutions freely accepted, if they want to achieve the desired progress and continue to dominate their destiny. The sovereign nations of the past are no longer the place where we can solve the current problems. And the Community itself is only a step towards the forms of organization of the world of tomorrow.’ (p. 461). Author’s translation.
- 112.
It is in this perspective that the well-known essay of 1995 by W. van Gerven, Bridging the gap between Community and National Laws: towards a principle of homogeneity in the field of legal remedies?, p. 679 ff., should be read (and could also be appreciated). He concludes with a reference which should not leave any doubt about his ‘ideological choice.’ In fact, he refers to the founders of the modern comparative law and to their idea of creating a ‘common law of mankind.’ And he concludes: ‘Although it remains an enterprise with dubious chance of success, it must be tried over and over again, at least once in the lifetime of every new generation or lawyers. Let us try it again’ (p. 702).
- 113.
On this point, see the essay by G. Greco, Il diritto comunitario propulsore del diritto amministrativo europeo, p. 88 f., where he speaks in this regard of an ‘induced juridical effect’ (‘effetto giuridico indotto’) of the EU norms.
- 114.
As the directives on public procurement procedures, for example, to which we will come back in Chap. 4. For other examples see in para. 2.4., note n. 45.
- 115.
As is admitted moreover by the most extremist authors. See, for example, J.S. Delicostopoulos, Towards European Procedural Primacy in National Legal Systems, p. 599 ff. (605).
- 116.
That is, as has been repeatedly reaffirmed, they should be interpreted in such a way as to allow the pursuit of the purpose intended in the EU norm of substantive law, in relation to which the procedural autonomy of the Member States is in a subservient function.
- 117.
See in this regard Chap. 3, para. 3.5.
- 118.
We will come back to this point in the concluding remarks of Chap. 4, para. 4.7.
- 119.
J. Mertens de Wilmars, L’efficacité des différentes techniques nationales de protection juridique contre les violations du droit communautaire par les autorités nationales et les particuliers, p. 392. On this point, see also the observations of J.P. Jacqué, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, p. 580 ff.
- 120.
For an in-depth analysis see, among others, M. Blanquet, L’article 5 du Traité CEE. Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des Etat membres de la Communauté européenne, p. 1 ff.; A. Hatje, Artikel 10 (Verpflichtung der Mitgliedstaaten), p. 314 ff.; C. Iannone, Art. 10 TCE, p. 219 ff.; M. Rossi, W. Kahl, Grundsatz der loyalen Zusammenarbeit (Art. 10 EGV), cpv. 1 ff.; M. Zuleeg, Art. 10: Verpflichtungen der Mitgliedstaaten, p. 668 ff. See moreover A. Bleckmann, Art. 5 EWG-Vertrag und die Gemeinschaftstreue, p. 483 ff. For a recent study on some of the implications of this principle see lastly O. Porchia, I principi dell'ordinamento europeo. La cooperazione pluridirezionale, p 5 ff.
- 121.
The expression is borrowed from J. Mertens de Wilmars, L’efficacité des différentes techniques nationales de protection juridique contre les violations du droit communautaire par les autorités nationales et les particuliers, p. 392.
- 122.
R. Quadri, Articolo 5 CEE, p. 51.
- 123.
See C. Nizzo, L’art. 5 del Trattato CE e la clausola generale di buona fede nell’integrazione europea, p. 381 ff. (382).
- 124.
Costantinesco is doubtful about the correctness of this construction. See V. Costantinesco, L’art. 5 CEE. De la bonne foi à la loyauté communautaire, p. 104. On this point see however A. Tizzano, La tutela dei privati nei confronti degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, p. 20, as well as the recent reflections of C. Nizzo, L’art. 5 del Trattato CE e la clausola generale di buona fede nell’integrazione europea, note n. 19.
- 125.
Among the first, see Judgement of the ECJ of 10 December 1969. Joined cases 6 and 11–69. Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. European Court reports 1969 Page 00523, para.s 16 and 17 of the grounds; Judgement of the ECJ of 7 February 1973. Case 39–72. Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. European Court reports 1973 Page 00101, para. 25 of the grounds. On this point see A. Bleckmann, Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshof zur Gemeinschaftstreue, p. 653 ff.; M. Zuleeg, Art. 10: Verpflichtungen der Mitgliedstaaten, p. 672 ff.
- 126.
So C. Iannone, Art. 10 TCE, p. 219 ff. (220). Author’s translation. See the case law on this topic quoted there. In the same sense, see C. Nizzo, L’art. 5 del Trattato CE e la clausola generale di buona fede nell’integrazione europea, p. 381 ff.
- 127.
In this sense see A. Tizzano, La tutela dei privati nei confronti degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, p. 17.
- 128.
In this sense see C. Iannone, Art. 10 TCE, p. 221.
- 129.
As explicitly pointed out by P. Mengozzi, L’applicazione del diritto comunitario e l’evolversi della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia nella direzione di una chiamata dei giudici nazionali ad assicurare una efficace tutela dei diritti da esso attribuiti ai cittadini degli stati membri, p. 32 f. In this perspective, therefore, the positions of certain scholars, who affirm the ECJ’s identification as a ‘Supreme Court of the Union,’ should be considered very carefully. In this sense, T. Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, p. 36. On this point, see also the reflections of K. Lenaerts, T. Corthaut, Towards an Internally Consistent Doctrine of Invoking Norms of EU Law, p. 502 f.
- 130.
The expression ‘manipulative’ is transposed from the language used with respect to a certain type of judgements of the Italian Constitutional Court. On this point see, for all, R. Romboli, Il ruolo del giudice in rapporto all’evoluzione del sistema delle fonti ed alla disciplina dell’ordinamento giudiziario, passim.
- 131.
As in fact is noted by R. Kovar, L’interprétation des droits nationaux en conformité avec le droit communautaire, p. 394, ‘La Cour convient qu’une juridiction nationale ne peut pas être obligée d’en venir à une interprétation contra legem.’ On this point, see the observations of S. Amadeo, Norme comunitarie, posizioni giuridiche soggettive e giudizi interni, p. 219 ff.
- 132.
Some authors trace the obligation of consistent interpretation back to the principle of sincere cooperation. See, in particular, G. Tesauro, Diritto comunitario, p. 219; A. Hatje, Artikel 10 (Verpflichtung der Mietgliedstaaten), p. 323 ff.; J.V. Louis, Th. Ronse, L’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, p. 147. See also V. Atripaldi, Leale cooperazione comunitaria ed obbligo degli stati al riesame degli atti amministrativi definitivi contrari al diritto comunitario, p. 886 f.
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Galetta, DU. (2010). The Procedural Autonomy of the Member States from the Viewpoint of the Principles and Criteria Regulating the Relations Between National Law and EU Law. In: Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost?. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12547-8_2
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