Abstract
Macroscopic outcomes in a social system resulting from interactions between individuals can be quite different from anyone’s intent. For instance, empirical investigations [1] have shown that most colored people prefer multi-racial neighborhoods, and many white people find a certain fraction of other races in their neighborhood acceptable. So one could think that integrated neighborhoods should be widely observed, but empirically this is not true. One rather finds segregated neighborhoods, i.e. separate urban quarters, which also applies to people with different social and economic backgrounds.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
W.A. Clark, M. Fossett, Understanding the social context of the Schelling segregation model. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 105, 4109–4114 (2008)
M. Fossett, Ethnic preferences, social distance dynamics, and residential segregation: theoretical explorations using simulation analysis. J. Math. Socio. 30, 185–274 (2006)
O.D. Duncan, B. Duncan, Residential distribution and occupational stratefication. Am. J. Sociol. 60, 493–503 (1955)
S.F. Reardon, G. Firebaugh, Response: Segregation and social distance – a generalized approach to segregation measurement. Sociol. Methodol. 32, 85–101 (2002)
T.C. Schelling, Dynamic models of segregation. J. Math. Socio. 1, 143–186 (1971)
T.C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior. (Norton, New York, 1978)
D.S. Massey, American apartheid: segregation and the making of the underclass. Am. J. Sociol. 96, 329–357 (1990)
J. Yinger, Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination. (Russell Sage Found, New York 1995).
M. Macy, A.V.D. Rijt, Ethnic preferences and residential segregation: Theoretical explorations beyond Detroit. J. Math. Socio. 30, 275–288 (2006)
D. Helbing, T. Platkowski, Drift- or fluctuation-induced ordering and self-organization in driven many-particle systems. Europhys. Lett. 60, 227–233 (2002)
D. Helbing, T. Vicsek, Optimal self-organization. N. J. Phys. 1, 13.1–13.17 (1999)
D. Helbing, W. Yu, Migration as a mechanism to promote cooperation. Adv. Compl. Syst. 11, 641–652 (2008)
D. Helbing, W. Yu, The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 3680–3685 (2009), and Supplementary Information to this paper.
P.F. Cressey, Population succession in Chicago: 1898–1930. Am. J. Sociol. 44, 59–69 (1938)
M.A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560 (2006)
A. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. (Basic Books, New York 1984)
A.S. Griffin, S.A. West, A. Buckling, Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria. Nature 430, 1024–1027 (2004)
J. Von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1944)
D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory. (MIT Press, Cambridge 1991)
A. Diekmann, Volunteer’s dilemma. J. Confl. Resolut. 29, 605–610 (1985)
A. Flache, R. Hegselmann, Do irregular grids make a difference? Relaxing the spatial regularity assumption in cellular models of social dynamics. J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul. 4(6) (2001)
P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, Replicator dynamics. J. Theor. Biol. 100, 533–538 (1983)
M.A. Nowak, R.M. May, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826–829 (1992)
C. Hauert, M. Doebell, Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature 428, 643–646 (2004)
S. Hoogendoorn, P.H.L. Bovy, Simulation of pedestrian flows by optimal control and differential games. Opim. Control Appl. Mech. 24, 153–172 (2003)
M.H. Vainstein, J.J. Arenzon, Disordered environments in spatial games. Phys. Rev. E 64, 051905 (2001)
M.H. Vainstein, A.T.C. Silva, J.J. Arenzon, Does mobility decrease cooperation? J. Theor. Biol. 244, 722–728 (2006)
E.A. Sicardi, H. Fort, M.H. Vainstein, J.J. Arenzon, Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 256, 240–246 (2009)
J.M. Epstein, Generative Social Science. (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006)
N. Rajewsky, L. Santen, A. Schadschneider, M. Schreckenberg, The asymmetric exclusion process: Comparision of update procedures. J. Statist. Phys. 92, 151 (1998)
B.A. Huberman, N.S. Glance, Evolutionary games and computer simulations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 90, 7716–7718 (1993)
H.P. Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998)
M.W. Macy, Learning to cooperate: stochastic and tacit collusion in social exchange. Am. J. Sociol. 97, 808–843 (1991)
M.W. Macy, A. Flache, Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 99, 7229–7236 (2002)
S. Wolfram, Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata. (World Scientific Publication, Singapore 1986)
B. Chopard, M. Droz, Cellular Automata Modeling of Physical Systems. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998)
E.R. Berlekamp, J.H. Conway, R.K. Guy, Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays. Academic Press, New York, (1982)
D. Helbing, I. Farkas, T. Vicsek, Simulating dynamical features of escape panic. Nature 407, 487–490 (2000)
S. Kirkpatrick, D. Sherrington, Infinite-ranged models of spin-glasses. Phys. Rev. B 17, 4384–4403 (1978)
J.J. Hopfield, Neural networks and physical systems with emergent collective computational abilities. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 79, 2554–2558 (1982)
D.H. Ackley, G.E. Hinton, T.J. Sejnowski, A learning algorithm for Boltzmann machines. Cogn. Sci. 9, 147–169 (1985)
D. Helbing, Pattern formation, social forces, and diffusion instability in games with success-driven motion. Eur. Phys. J. B 67, 345–356 (2009)
D. Helbing, A mathematical model for the behavior of individuals in a social field. J. Math. Sociol. 19, 189–219 (1994)
S. Meloni, et al., Effects of mobility in a population of Prisoner’s Dilemma players. arXiv::0905.3189
C. Roca, Cooperation in Evolutionary Game Theory: Effects of Time and Structure. Ph.D. thesis, (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Mathematics) (2009)
E.W. Burgess, Residential segregation in American cities. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 140, 105–115 (1928)
H. Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities Washington. Federal Housing Administration (Washion DC, 1939)
M. Lim, R. Metzler, Y.B. Yam, Global pattern formation and ethnic/cultural violence. Science 317, 1540–1544 (2007)
N.B. Weidmann, D. Kuse, WarViews: Visualizing and animating geographic data on civil war. International Studies Perspectives 10, 36–48 (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Yu, W., Helbing, D. (2010). Game Theoretical Interactions of Moving Agents. In: Kroc, J., Sloot, P., Hoekstra, A. (eds) Simulating Complex Systems by Cellular Automata. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12203-3_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12203-3_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12202-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12203-3
eBook Packages: Physics and AstronomyPhysics and Astronomy (R0)