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Plaintext-Awareness of Hybrid Encryption

  • Shaoquan Jiang
  • Huaxiong Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5985)

Abstract

We study plaintext awareness for hybrid encryptions. Based on a binary relation R, we define a new notion of PA2 (or R-PA2 for short) and a notion of IND-CCA2 (or R-IND-CCA2 for short) for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We define a relation R DEM from the description of data encryption mechanism (DEM). We prove two composition results, which holds with or without (public) random oracles.
  • a. When KEM, with R DEM -PA2 and R DEM -IND-CCA2 security, composes with a one-time pseudorandom and unforgeable (OT-PUE) DEM, the resulting hybrid encryption is PA2 secure. OT-PUE is weak and even unnecessarily passively secure and can be realized by a one-time pad encryption followed by a pseudorandom function.

  • b. If KEM is R DEM -IND-CCA and DEM is passively secure and unforgeable, the hybrid encryption (KEM, DEM) is IND-CCA2 secure.

As an application, we show that DHIES, a public key encryption scheme by Abdalla et al. [1] and now in IEEE P1361a and ANSI X.963, is PA2 secure. As another application, we prove that a hash proof system based hybrid encryption is PA2. Consequently, this especially implies that the concrete Kurosawa-Desmedt hybrid encryption (CRYPTO04) is PA2.

Keywords

Random Oracle Random Oracle Model American National Standard Institute Decryption Oracle Deniable Authentication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shaoquan Jiang
    • 1
  • Huaxiong Wang
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringUniversity of Electronic Science and Technology of China 
  2. 2.School of Physical and Mathematical SciencesNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

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