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Improving the Integrated European Impact Assessment?

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The European Impact Assessment and the Environment

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Abstract

Based on an institutional analysis of the incentive situation of desk officers, the DG’s leading officers as well as the Impact Assessment Board, the Inter-Service Steering Group (now called the IASC) and interest groups this chapter develops hypotheses on the functioning of impact assessments and their quality. Checked against the literature and 30 impact assessments conducted by various Directorate Generals of the EU Commission we argue that quality control should be as independent as possible, that de facto blocking rights of the quality control board are necessary and that desk officers must be moved towards quantification and monetarisation of impacts also in the environmental realm in order to balance economic, social and environmental impacts in a transparent way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/proposals_en.htm.

  2. 2.

    See also section “References in the EC Treaty” on this and on the significance of the principle of precaution.

  3. 3.

    See European Community (2002).

  4. 4.

    See European Commission (2000).

  5. 5.

    Calliess (2007, Art. 6, margin number 12 with further references).

  6. 6.

    Krämer (2003, p. 9); Calliess (2007, Art. 6, margin number 13 with further references).

  7. 7.

    This is the main criterion for the application of the proportionality principle; for its link to economic analysis see Bizer (1999), Führ (2003, p. 218).

  8. 8.

    See also Calliess (2007, Art. 174, margin number 4 ff.)

  9. 9.

    European Commission (2000, loc. cit., p. 3).

  10. 10.

    ECJ, C-157/96, National Farmer’s Union i.a., ECR 1998, I-2211 (cited NFU verdict), para. 63 and ECJ, C-180/96, United Kingdom/Commission, ECR 1998, I-2265 (cited: BSE verdict), para. 99.

  11. 11.

    Calliess (2007, Art. 174 EC Treaty, margin number 26 ff.)

  12. 12.

    Calliess (2007, Art. 174 EC Treaty, margin number 29 with further references.)

  13. 13.

    On this wording see Ossenbühl (1986).

  14. 14.

    ECJ, Case T-13/99 (Pfizer Animal Health./. Council), ECR 2002, II-3305, para. 143. According to the Communication of the Commission, loc. cit., p. 3, the precautionary principle should be used “particularly in those cases in which due to an objective scientific assessment, there are justified reasons for concern that the possible dangers for the environment and the health of people, animals or plants are not acceptable or could be incompatible with the high level of protection of the Community”.

  15. 15.

    ECJ, Case T-13/99 (Pfizer Animal Health./. Council), ECR 2002, II-3305, para. 146.

  16. 16.

    ECJ, Case T-13/99 (Pfizer Animal Health./. Council), ECR 2002, II-3305, para. 151.

  17. 17.

    ECJ, Case T-31/07 (DuPont./. Council), ECR 2002, II-3305, para. 137.

  18. 18.

    Cf. ECJ, Case C-236/01 (Monsanto Agricultura Italia i.a.), ECR 2003, I-0000, para. 106; ECJ, Case C-95/01 (Greenham and Abel) of 5.2.2004 = DVBl 2004, p. 818, 820; ECJ, Case C-192/01 (Commission./. Denmark, ECR 2003, I-0000, para. 49.

  19. 19.

    European Commission (2000, loc. cit., p. 18). ECJ, Case T-70/99 (Alpharma Inc.), ECR 2002, II-03495, points 145, 152.

  20. 20.

    ECJ, Case C-284/95, Safety Hi-Tech, ECR 1998, I-4301, para. 49; ECJ Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc., ECR 2002, II-03495, para. 152; ECJ, Case T-13/99 (Pfizer Animal Health./. Council), ECR 2002, II-3305, para. 152.

  21. 21.

    The level of requirements for the establishment of the level of protection (risk assessment) should, however, not be confused with the requirements vis-a-vis the measures to achieve this level of protection (risk management).

  22. 22.

    European Commission (2008b, Chap. 1, p. 3).

  23. 23.

    European Commission (2008b, Chap. 5.1, p. 21).

  24. 24.

    European Commission (2008b, Chap. 5.1, p. 23).

  25. 25.

    European Commission (2008b, Chap. 5.2, p. 29).

  26. 26.

    European Commission (2008b), Chap. 5.4 refers at page 35 to the “set of indicators to monitor the implementation of the EU sustainable development strategy (SEC (2005) 161 final)”, developed by the Commission.

  27. 27.

    With respect to the overall procedure the new draft guidelines do not differ from the current guidelines.

  28. 28.

    European Commission (2008b), Chap. 2.2, p. 7 calls the Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) now the Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG).

  29. 29.

    See the IAB rules of procedure in the annex “Rules of Procedure of the Impact Assessment Board (‘Board’)”.

  30. 30.

    See Bizer and Gubaydullina (2007).

  31. 31.

    ibid.

  32. 32.

    See Führ et al. (2007), also Führ and Bizer (2007).

  33. 33.

    We should make clear that some legislative proposals are also pushed by national experts. These national experts come from ministries and administrations of the member states and sometimes from private enterprises. They work for 2–4 years in a DG. These national experts are strongly influenced by the respective home unit they come from as they will return after their work in the DG back to their home organisations. An additional group of agents are consultants.

  34. 34.

    There are many possibilities to define regulatory quality indicators. See Radaelli and Francesco (2004).

  35. 35.

    These hypotheses were: (1) The incentives for elaborated and demanding analytical methods for assessing environmental consequences are even low for the desk official of the DG Environment, and even more so for the desk official of other DG’s, (2) Cost-benefit analysis or monetisation of environmental effects will be the exception rather than the rule, (3) Assessments of environmental consequences in policy areas other than environmental policy will be of lower quality than from the DG Environment.

  36. 36.

    These hypotheses were: (4) The IAB will not even remark upon obvious deficits of the assessment of environmental consequences, (5) The IAB will in most cases not give detailed recommendations for the methods of assessing environmental consequences, (6) The IAB provides only little quality control and is insufficient to bring about a better assessment of environmental consequences.

  37. 37.

    See the Impact Assessment Report SEC (2005) 1133.

  38. 38.

    Apparently, environmental NGO’s are not participating in consultations of DGs other than environmental. Why this is so will be an important point to discuss in the workshop (see section “Discussion Points for the Workshop”).

  39. 39.

    In this light, the new guidelines might bring about clarifications of certain issues, but certainly do not sufficiently change the incentive situation of the relevant agents. But as there can be no empirical evidence about the new guidelines, this should be discussed at the workshop.

  40. 40.

    See Annex no. 10 of European Commission (2008b).

  41. 41.

    See Clinton (1993).

  42. 42.

    For an overview: Pearce et al. (2006).

  43. 43.

    See at http://www.red-externalities.net/.

  44. 44.

    In addition: robustness, transparency and practicability.

  45. 45.

    All details given are in European Commission (2008a, Chap. 2.4, p. 9)

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Acknowledgement

We are grateful for the support of Yvonne Eggert and Martin Breßlein in preparing this chapter.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Society for Institutional Analysis (sofia), University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany

    Kilian Bizer

  2. Society for Institutional Analysis (sofia), University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany

    Sebastian Lechner

  3. Society for Institutional Analysis (sofia), University of Applied Sciences Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Martin Führ

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  1. Kilian Bizer
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  2. Sebastian Lechner
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  3. Martin Führ
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Correspondence to Kilian Bizer .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Professur für Wirtschaftspolitik und, Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, Göttingen, 37073, Germany

    Kilian Bizer

  2. Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Professur für Wirtschaftspolitik und, Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, Göttingen, 37073, Germany

    Sebastian Lechner

  3. FH Darmstadt, Haardtring 100, Darmstadt, 64295, Germany

    Martin Führ

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Bizer, K., Lechner, S., Führ, M. (2010). Improving the Integrated European Impact Assessment?. In: Bizer, K., Lechner, S., Führ, M. (eds) The European Impact Assessment and the Environment. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11670-4_1

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