Abstract
When looking at modern epistemology, one might come to the conclusion that the prospects for a solid realism are not so good. Two main sources for this common assessment can be identified: (1) First of all, Logical Positivism has initiated a new phase in the recent history of philosophy that was first and foremost characterized by a commitment to science. It has become evident, however, in the development of this tradition that the early hopes for a new foundation of a strong epistemic realism were soon disappointed: Tendencies toward internalism, constructivism, pragmatism, antirealism, or even cultural relativism were established. The most important steps in this development will be analyzed in the first part of the chapter: The working hypothesis in the short sketch of the historical development of epistemology is that a certain ultimately Cartesian and antievolutionary dualism plays the decisive role in the formative period of modern realism. It is this same dualism that leads from realism to more skeptical positions. By taking this Cartesian opposition for granted, modern realism again turns from empiricism to internalism or linguistic idealism. The main argument against realism will be examined and rejected: the defense of a coherent realism is only then impossible if one accepts the dualism of mind and world in the first place. But in this case most arguments against realism become a powerless tautology.
(2) Secondly, it will be argued that this implicit dualistic terminology plays also a decisive role in the interpretation of the results of the modern science of cognition. Many modern approaches to cognition begin with the claim that cognition is essentially a biological phenomenon. These views are therefore at first glance intrinsically antidualistic. But also in this domain one can trace back a shift from more realistic to more constructivist or relativistic paradigms. It will be shown that it is not surprising that the “biologization of reason” has led to two radically different interpretations: a realistic one and a more constructivistic one. It will be argued that also in these approaches the dualistic and eventually antievolutionary opposition is in fact ultimately decisive for the general philosophical and epistemological conclusions. The main point, however, is that any Evolutionary Epistemology simply cannot answer the basic problems concerning objectivity in knowledge. A positive solution is a vicious circle, the negative solution entails a self-contradiction. If one follows this line of thought then it becomes evident that only one of the interpretations can be a research paradigm that is both fruitful and does not undermine itself.
(3) The last part of the chapter following Millikan (1984, 2004), Thompson (2007), Lorenz (1973), Goodson (2003), Proust (1999) and Noë (2004), therefore focuses on a very short sketch of how the combination of a philosophical realism and an evolutionary conception of the phenomenon of cognition could be spelled out in such a way that one does not fall into the traps of either dualism or self-contradiction.
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- 1.
For a detailed analysis of the connection of the modern scientific world view and the main tenets of Logical Positivism, see Spahn (2007, 23ff.). For a critique of the main tenets of both scientistic and anti-scientistic epistemologies, see 48ff.
- 2.
See Dummett (1963), a paper that started the debate about “antirealism”.
- 3.
See Spahn and Tewes (2011) for an overview of the impact that the dualism between mind and world has in the philosophical debate about the theory of evolution. Naturalism it seems faces two main challenges: the qualia-problem and the problem that ethics cannot easily be naturalized.
- 4.
Nagel (1986, esp. Chaps. V and VI) motivates his defense of a new realism with the correct observation that within the recent philosophy a tendency toward idealism and internalism prevails: “There is a significant strain of idealism in contemporary philosophy, according to which what there is and how things are cannot go beyond what we could in principle think about” (Nagel 1986, 9).
- 5.
This insight is actually almost a tautology, but we will have to deal with its bewitching consequences later more in detail.
- 6.
Think for example on the criticism of a strong adaptationism and the modern emphasis of internal constraints for any evolutionary and cognitive achievement.
- 7.
Also the basic tenets of the reconciliation of realism and idealism follow some basic, eventually Hegelian, insights. For the debate on modern realism and skepticism in comparison to Hegel’s answer to skepticism, see Spahn (2011).
- 8.
One might be surprised that Lorenz’ book is included. Indeed, it is “pretty old” since empirical sciences have made a lot of progress. But the conceptual order and clarity of this book is still unsurpassed.
- 9.
For a more detailed account, see Spahn (2007, 16–31).
- 10.
See also the very early critical essay (Rorty 1972, 3–18).
- 11.
On the other hand, Putnam, of course, wants at the same time to refute the idea that we are just brains in a vat (Putnam 1981). Just how to combine the tenets of internalism and externalism remains the crucial task.
- 12.
See also Spahn (2010) for a critical analysis of the debate between Nagel and Davidson.
- 13.
This point is elaborated in Rorty (1979, 89) against Putnam and Davidson: “No phenomenal terms can describe the phenomenon–noumenon relation, and we have no other terms”.
- 14.
- 15.
For a more detailed analysis of the idealist trap, see Spahn (2010).
- 16.
One crucial point is the distinction between the aspect of an “independent existence” of the world and the idea that it is “transcendent to knowledge in its structure”. Searle clearly sees the difficulties in using the dualistic metaphors of “inside” and “outside” for the relation of mind and world: (Searle 1983, 37). For the senses, but not for language and thinking, he therefore likes to use the word “presentation” instead of “representation” (Searle 1983, 44).
- 17.
- 18.
See Spahn (2010).
- 19.
A very impressing sketch of such a “transcendental semantics” can be found in Braßel (2005).
- 20.
This idea also seems to be the driving force behind Hegel’s early discussion of ancient and new skepticism; see Spahn (2011).
- 21.
See also Maturana’s famous definition that life is cognition in Maturana (1980[1970]).
- 22.
Thompson following Varela speaks of “sense-making” (Thompson 2007, 147). Thompson in his thoughtful “philosophy of the organism” also refers to Kant’s ideas that get expanded in Hegel’s philosophy of biology; also Hegel sees the connection of the structure of organisms and the process of “sense-making” (Spahn 2007, 194; Brandom 2004).
- 23.
Also Millikan exploits biological concepts to build her theory of Intentionality (Millikan 1984, 17–50).
- 24.
This point is also made by Hösle (1988).
- 25.
- 26.
One presupposes the objectivity of science (i.e., a product of thought) in order to argue in favor of a trust in thinking; see Hösle (1988).
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
This point that any skeptical interpretation of science relies on our cognitive ability is made against the “grand illusion” claims in modern theories of perception by Ludwig (2006).
- 30.
See also Ruth Millikan’s (2004, 158f) emphasis on the ability to misrepresent things which is crucial for any real capacity for having representations.
- 31.
- 32.
Donald (2001) emphasizes among other aspects the role that language plays to get hold of the content of memory to have an even more free and flexible way to deal with things you have learned.
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Acknowledgment
I like to thank Christian Tewes, Annett Wienmeister, and André Wunder (University of Jena) for many fruitful and inspiring discussions. I like to thank Duane Lacey (United Arab Emirates University) for correcting my English.
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Spahn, C. (2011). Prospects of Objective Knowledge. In: Welsch, W., Singer, W., Wunder, A. (eds) Interdisciplinary Anthropology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11668-1_3
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