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Balancing Within the Context of German Constitutionalism: The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Shift to Activism

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On the Limits of Constitutional Adjudication

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Abstract

The historical development of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and its progressive assumption of the role of “Guardian of the Constitution” through the interpretation of basic rights as objective principles of the total legal order represent a crucial movement in the contemporary constitutionalism. Particularly because of its inclination towards the definition and discussion of the main themes of social life, as if they were constitutional problems to be decided by the court, and the construction of instruments and interpretations, such as the principle of proportionality and the shift from subjective principles to objective principles, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is an important representative of the current worldwide judicial activism. The historical context of an emerging constitutional court after the Second World War and the consequent process of democratization where there was a vacuum of political legitimacy led to the transference of the discussion of many social themes to this court, raising thereby serious questions about a possible encroachment on the other institutional powers. In this respect, the transformations in German constitutional culture, the reactions of relevant part of constitutional scholarship, and the perception of the problems originating from this movement expose the connections between balancing and judicial activism, and demonstrate how constitutional democracy deals with the dilemmas of a process of juridification of politics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the previous chapter.

  2. 2.

    In this respect, it is notorious the interpretation of this principle with the triadic structure (suitability, necessity and proportionality in its narrow sense or balancing). An influential theory in this matter, which will be the main source for the analysis here of the rationality of balancing, is Robert Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights. See the fourth chapter.

  3. 3.

    Bernhard Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” in Festschrift – 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. Peter Badura and Horst Dreier (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001).

  4. 4.

    Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 248.

  5. 5.

    Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1994), 100.

  6. 6.

    See Evelyn Ellis, The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart, 1999); Søren Schønberg, “The Principle of Proportionality's Many Faces: a Comparative Study of Judicial Review in English, French, and EU Law,” in Justitia, ed. Søren Schønberg (København: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forl, 2000); Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study (London: Kluwer Law Internat, 1996); Oliver Koch, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003); Enzo Cannizaro, Il Principio della Proporzionalità nell' Ordinamento Internazionale (Milano: Giuffrè, 2000); Sadursky Wojciech, Rights Before Courts: a Study of Constitutional Courts in the Post-Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).

  7. 7.

    The principle of proportionality is nowadays the basis for constitutional adjudication in Israel, and is deployed continuously through the adoption of the three-step proportionality test. See, for this purpose, Hamdi v. Commander of Judea and Samaria (1982), United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village (1995), Ben-Atiyah v. Minister of Education, Culture & Sports (1995).

  8. 8.

    In Canada, the expansion of the principle of proportionality could be seen especially after the enactment of the Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in 1982, whose §1 establishes that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The Charter’s extensive catalogue of rights, as Sweet remarks, is structured in a way that invites the deployment of the principle of proportionality (See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionality, Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Stone-Sweet+-+Proportionality+Balancing?exclusive=filemgr.download&file _id=101159& showthumb=0 (accessed July 14, 2009)). Nowadays, Canada adopts, similarly to Germany, the three-step proportionally test (suitability, necessity, and proportionality in its narrow sense), but, unlike Germany, the stress is usually on the examination of necessity, instead of the proportionality in its narrow sense. See, for this purpose, R. v. Oakes, Supreme Court of Canada, [1986], S. C. J. No. 7. An interesting analysis of the principle of proportionality in comparison with the United States can be seen in Vicki C. Jackson, “Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on ‘Proportionality’, Rights and Federalism,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (1999): 583 ff.

  9. 9.

    In South Africa, after the end of the apartheid regime and the introduction of an interim Constitution in 1993, which established the judicial review by the South Africa’s Constitutional Court, the principle of proportionality gained a very strong diffusion. In the permanent Constitution of 1996, the principle of proportionality received the constitutional status, as a “standard operating procedure for adjudicating limits on rights” (Sweet, Constitutionality, Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 29), although not applied with the same systematization and analytical basis as in Germany. See, for this purpose, State v. Makwayane (1995).

  10. 10.

    See Ruben Sánchez Gil, El Principio de Proporcionalidad (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México, 2007).

  11. 11.

    See Miguel Carbonell, El Principio de Proporcionalidad en el Estado Constitucional (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2007); Carlos Bernal Pulido, El Principio de Proporcionalidad y los Derechos Humanos (Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2003).

  12. 12.

    We will examine the development of this principle in Brazil in the next chapter.

  13. 13.

    For an interesting analysis of the deployment of the principle of proportionality in Australia, showing the differences and possible conflicts in this reality, see Jeremy Kirk, “Constitutional Guarantees, Characterization and the Concept of Proportionality,” Melbourne University Law Review 21, no. 1 (1997).

  14. 14.

    In the United States, the deployment of a variant of the principle of proportionality, specifically balancing, can be seen mainly in four different scenarios, all of them related to the premise of the existence of a conflict between competing interests: (1) in the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, as we could observe in the case Ewing v. California, (538 U.S., 11, 20, 2003) which sustained the existence of a proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment applicable to non-capital sentences. In this opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ expresses a broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into account all of the justifications for penal sanctions” (Justice Scalia, 126); (2) in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, as we can observe in Tenessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1; 105, 1985), when the Court held that “to determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‘we must balance the nature and quality of intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion’” (Opinion – Justice White). This case, particularly, shows how balancing deals with, on the one hand, governmental interests and, on the other, individual’s private sphere; (3) in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as we can observe in City of Boerne v. Flores (512 U.S. 507, 1997) or Eldred v. Aschcroft (537 U.S. 186, 218, 2003); (4) in the interpretation of the First Amendment (See F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters (468 U.S. 364, 1984)). A very critical and interesting analysis of balancing in the United States can be found in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,” Yale Law Journal 96, no. 5 (April 1987): 943–1005. For a comparative study of methodologies adopted in Europe and the United States, including the deployment of a “balancing approach,” see Daniel Halberstan, "Desperately Seeking Europe: On Comparative Methodoloy and the Conception of Rights," International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 1 (2007): 166–182.

  15. 15.

    According to Gerald L. Neuman, the principle of proportionality in the United States does not exactly correspond to its usual concept, and it is not prominent in adjudication and doctrine. His words:

    “The concept of proportionality does not lack paralells in U.S. constitutional law. Basically, it is a form of balancing of interests (Güterabwägung) common to both systems, and articulated with a tripartite structure. But balancing is not regarded in U.S. constitutional doctrine as an element of the rule of law, and it is not applied to interferences with all constitutional rights. Some degree of appropriateness (Geeignetheit) might be viewed as an aspect of nonarbitrariness required by the rule of law, but necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense are not.”

    “Moreover, this is not merely a peculiarity of constitutional doctrine. Even with regard to nonconstitutional debates about the rule of law in the United States, proportionality (or balancing) does not figure prominently as a feature. Procedural conceptions of the rule of law do not identify proportionality as an essential characteristic of law, and substantive conceptions of the rule of law may invoke human rights constraints without specifying proportionality as a necessary structural feature of rights” (Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutional Conception of the Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaatsprinzip of the Grundgesetz, http//papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=195368 (accessed July 14, 2009)).

  16. 16.

    As Schlink remarks, in the history of German constitutionalism, the principle of proportionality was applied, until mid-1950, particularly in the Administrative and “Police” law (Polizeirecht) and required only the examination of the legitimacy of the goal and the suitability and necessity of the means to realize it. Nowadays, its deployment reaches not only the constitutional and administrative law but also conflicts between organs, civil (especially with the Drittwirkung theory), criminal (particularly in the evaluation of the punishment) and European law. Moreover, it is also deployed not only when there is an excess of the interference with the private’s sphere (Übermaßverbot), but also when the state remains passive and causes a severe encroachment on the individual (Untermaßverbot). See Bernhard Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” in Festschrift – 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. Peter Badura and Horst Dreier (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001): 445.

  17. 17.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit.”

  18. 18.

    Balancing is theoretically understood as the third element of the principle of proportionality, whose deployment takes place after the legal provision under examination succeeds in the examination of suitability and necessity.

  19. 19.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” Merkur 692 (December 2006).

  20. 20.

    See, for example, Brazilian constitutional reality in the next chapter.

  21. 21.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “The Journey into Activism,” Cardozo Law Review 17 (1996).

  22. 22.

    See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel.”

  23. 23.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “Open Justice in a Closed Legal System?,” Cardozo Law Review 13 (1992): 1716.

  24. 24.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “The Dynamics of Constitutional Adjudication,” in Habermas on Law and Democracy, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1998), 373.

  25. 25.

    According to Habermas, the legal doctrine adopts nowadays this ideal of basic rights as principles of a total legal order in different perspectives:

    “This specifically German doctrine of basic rights focuses primarily on a few key ideas. These include the ‘reciprocal effect’ or (Wechselwirkung) between ordinary legal statutes and fundamental rights (which remain inviolable only in their ‘essential content’ or Wesengehalt); the ‘implicit limits on basic rights’, which hold even for those basic individual rights, such as the guarantees of human dignity, that impose affirmative duties on the state (the so-called sujektiv-öffentliche Rechte); the ‘radiating effect’ (Austrahlung) of basic rights on all areas of law and their ‘third-party effect’ (Drittwirkung) on the horizontal rights and duties holding between private persons; the state’s mandates and obligations to provide protection, which are tasks the Court derives from ‘objective’ legal character of basic rights as principles of the legal order; and finally, the ‘dynamic protection of constitutional rights’ and the links in procedural law between such rights and the ‘objective’ content of constitutional law” (Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 247).

  26. 26.

    The principle of proportionality developed first in police and administrative law, in the form of the now labeled principle of necessity (Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit) and also the principle of suitability (Grundsatz der Geeignetheit), at the end of 19th century, when the liberal idea that the state can only limitedly intervene in private freedom sphere according to a delimited goal gained force, and when the control over administrative acts by an administrative higher court could be more independently carried out. From this period onwards, the examination of the binary means/goals, in reference to the less harmful means to achieve a goal, began to be deployed, even though without the definition of a criterion to evaluate this intensity. After the Second World War, the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense, such as nowadays conceived, began to be used because of the new dilemmas derived from a more active role of judicial review, and many laws, particularly in the field of police law, started to describe it. Doctrine and the courts’ precedents took, nonetheless, a long time before establishing a clear distinction among the different elements of the principle of proportionality in its broad sense. Furthermore, it is interesting to remark that all this evolution was practically not followed by judicial reflection or even by constitutional scholarship’s criticism. See, for a comprehensive analysis of the historical development of the principle of proportionality, Lothar Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit (Göttingen: Otto Schwartz & CO, 1981), 1–42.

  27. 27.

    Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 248.

  28. 28.

    The terminology in constitutional doctrine and in the BVG is not uniform. The principle of proportionality can be deployed as a broader principle encompassing the principles of suitability, necessity and proportionality in its narrow sense, as here stressed, but it can also have a different meaning. Sometimes, the term “principle of proportionality” is applied simply to the principle of necessity or the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense. In other cases, the term prohibition of excess (Übermaßverbot) is used as synonym for the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense, principle of necessity, or to designate the principle of proportionality in its broad sense. Balancing, likewise, is not a harmonious term, but it is used more specifically as a correspondence to the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense. In this book, it will be used: the principle of proportionality in its broad sense encompassing the three elements (suitability, necessity, and proportionality in its narrow sense). This last one we will also call balancing.

  29. 29.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993): 729.

  30. 30.

    See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtsprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel, 1125.”

  31. 31.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 734.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., 729.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., 725.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 733.

  35. 35.

    Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 246.

  36. 36.

    See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtsprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1125.

  37. 37.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 734.

  38. 38.

    According to Peter Häberle, this dualism can be seen – apart from the evident situations, such as the claim to the BVG’s “self-restraint” or the appointment of the Justices to the constitutional court – in the practice of decision-making, as we can observe in the methods of interpretation followed by the question about the political consequences of the decision or in the investigation of the binding effects of constitutional decisions. There are also these dealings with law and politics in the admission of an appeal, in the definition of a principle, in the tactics and strategies used in the constitutional process, and in the specification of the intensity of the facts (See Peter Häberle, “Grundprobleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,” in Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, ed. Peter Häberle (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 4–5).

  39. 39.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 722.

  40. 40.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 246.

  41. 41.

    This chapter will only briefly discuss the triadic structure of the principle of proportionality. For the central focus of this book refers to the rationality of balancing, particularly this element will be subject of more detailed analysis in the fourth chapter, using, for this purpose, Robert Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights as the main source.

  42. 42.

    Rupprecht von Krauss was the one who coined, in 1953, for the first time, the term principle of proportionality in the narrow sense (Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren Sinn) by distinguishing it from the principle of necessity (even though then labeled principle of proportionality), which he identified with the principle of suitability. He mentioned that the proportionality in the narrow sense refers to a relationship between two or more measured quantities. For him, the new constitutional order is regarded as a proportional analysis order. He also attempted to treat this principle as a constitutional principle (See Rupprecht von Krauss, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in seiner Bedeutung für die Notwendigkeit des Mittels in Verwaltungsrecht (Hamburg: Appel, 1955)). In 1961, in turn, Peter Lerche developed a clear distinction, albeit connected, between the principle of necessity and the principle of proportionality. For him, they have distinct contents. Whereas the first refers to the premise that, among different possibilities that suitably can reach the goal, we have to choose the one that causes less encroachment on the private sphere, the second relates to the balancing between means and goals. He also sustained the constitutional status of the principle, as a consequence of the modern welfare state and the directive constitution (dirigierende Verfassung). See Peter Lerche, Übermaß und Verfassungsrecht: zur Bindung des Gesetzgebers an die Grundsätze der Verhältnismäßigkeit und der Erforderlichkeit (Goldbach: Keip, 1999).

  43. 43.

    See Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1994); Hans Hanau, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit als Schranke privater Gestaltungsmacht (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2004); Bernhard Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976). Schlink, nonetheless, concluded that balancing is not a rational response to adjudication. See item 2.5.

  44. 44.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” in Festschrift – 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. Peter Badura and Horst Dreier (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001): 446.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., 446.

  46. 46.

    Some authors have explicitly exposed this problematic situation in constitutional adjudication. See, for instance, Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit”; Helmut D. Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehung – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M; New York: Campus Verlag, 1979); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Walter Leisner, Der Abwägungsstaat: Verhältnismäßigkeit als Gerechtigkeit? (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997).

  47. 47.

    See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 208.

  48. 48.

    Indeed, there is an environment where the BVG’s decisions are not really concerned with coming up with a systematized understanding of the principle of proportionality, its elements, and, foremost, its justification and raison d´être, and where the constitutional scholarship mostly upholds these characteristics, without entering into the most convoluted questions of this movement. For instance, how can balancing and the objective nature of basic rights behind it be compatible with the separation of powers? How can both be defended in a democratic regime where individuals respect each other as free and equals in their differences? Finally, how can both be compatible with the constitution? (See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 447) Evidently, this leads to a vicious circle: while the BVG deploys this principle almost as a natural and evident premise in judicial review, and the constitutional scholarship endorses this development, the BVG can continue to act without discussing more deeply the grounds and the methodology of the principle of proportionality, and balancing in particular; while the constitutional scholarship basically becomes fashioned by the BVG’s behavior, it can abstain from entering into those convoluted questions.

  49. 49.

    See. Lerche, Übermaß und Verfassungsrecht, 76. Peter Lerche, in the preface of the second edition, mentions that, even though he examined the principle of suitability, his analysis was not so emphatic, and this could be deemed an omission. See Ibid., X.

  50. 50.

    See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 59 ff.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., 219 ff.

  52. 52.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 461, 464–465.

  53. 53.

    The protection of the citizen’s minimal position varies from case to case, from area to area. For instance, in the case of property, the BVG pointed out the minimal position as what the personal job and effort can earn; in the area of profession, the BVG indicated the personal and economic existence; in the area of freedom of expression, the minimal position lies in the possibility of participation in the process of free communication, etc. In this realm, the question about the minimal position can lead to the protection of a minimal property or the protection of a certain role. See, for this purpose, Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht, 193–195.

  54. 54.

    See Item 2.5.

  55. 55.

    See Robert Alexy, “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation,” International Journal of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press and New York School of Law) 3, no. 4 (2005): 577.

  56. 56.

    See the fourth chapter.

  57. 57.

    Since the purpose of this book relates to the rationality of balancing, the principles of suitability and necessity will be merely superficially discussed.

  58. 58.

    The concept of limits of limits (Schranken-Schranken) in the realm of constitutional adjudication is linked to the principle of proportionality according to these premises: (1) the state’s followed goal must be followed as such; (2) the state’s appointed means must be appointed as such; (3) the deployment of the means must be suitable to reach the goal; (4) the deployment of the means must be necessary to reach the goal. A last criterion could be found in the realm of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense: the intervention in the private sphere and the aimed goal must lie in a proportional basis between them. See, for this purpose, Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte: Staatsrecht II (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2006), 64–66.

  59. 59.

    See Bernhard Schlink, “Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion,” Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (N.P. Engel Verlag), 1984: 457–459.

  60. 60.

    See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 44.

  61. 61.

    Lothar Hirschberg understands that, although most of the cases involving the deployment of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense still lies in the relationship between means and goals, with the expansion of the areas the principle now reaches, we could conclude that there are some fewer cases in which this connection is no longer visualized. See Ibid., 45 ff.

  62. 62.

    Lerche, Übermaß und Verfassungsrecht, 19, translation mine.

  63. 63.

    Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäβigkeit,” 453, translation mine.

  64. 64.

    Notwithstanding that it is an empirical examination, some difficulties could occur by reason of the very capacity to examine the facts. In this matter, for instance, we could point out how complicated it is to make a prognosis of whether a determined measure can indeed be suitable to achieve a certain result. In this regard, the analysis needs to take into account a very complex investigation of the possible capacity of prediction by whom practiced the activity at stake. The BVG has already indicated the difficulty of an accurate parliament’s prediction as an aspect to be considered in the principle of suitability. According to it, it is necessary to observe whether “the legislator, in his view, could assume that the measure would be suitable to reach the stated objective, or whether his prognosis for the assessment of the economic-political connections was then appropriate and justifiable” (BVerfGE 38, 61 (1974) – Leberpfennig, translation mine).

  65. 65.

    Schlink examines the elements of the principle of proportionality also by underlining the difference between prognoses and evaluations (Bewertungen). According to him, whereas prognoses refers to statements about the reality in the future based on the observation of the past and present, which allows to prove whether a determined knowledge is true or false (objective truth), evaluations correspond to subjective decisions concerning the analysis of the positive and negative consequences of a measure that are accepted or not by other evaluations. Whereas the first, therefore, refers to the legal rationality, the other is compatible with the rationality of politics. See, for this purpose, Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 455–456.

  66. 66.

    See BVerfGE 33, 171 – Honorarverteilung (1972); BVerfGE 39, 210 – Mühlenstrukturgesetz (1975); BVerfGE 90, 145 – Cannabis (1994), translation mine.

  67. 67.

    Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte: Staatsrecht II (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2006), 66, translation mine.

  68. 68.

    Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 453, translation mine.

  69. 69.

    Nonetheless, more than suitability, the principle of necessity also poses relevant questions. Bernhard Schlink, for instance, alleges that this principle can reach evaluative issues (not simply the prognosis of the mildest means in comparison with equal effective others), and, hence, on questions based on political arguments. Moreover, according to him, “to determine that a means is not necessary to reach a goal, because another mildest means exists, one must take into account the citizens’ evaluation as his truth, not find his own evaluation” (Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 456, translation mine). There is, accordingly, a difficulty in the qualification of which is the mildest measure, for the reference – the citizen’s evaluation – is not so predicable and can vary from context to context. After all, “different means burden different citizens differently” (Ibid., 457, translation mine). Similar thinking Lothar Hirschberg stresses when he mentions that, even though this issue is usually unproblematic, the definition of the mildest means causes relevant difficulties, especially when there is no previous definition of the addressees or the circle of addressees, and when, for different reasons, the situation brings about a conflict between the general and average consideration of the mildest measure and the particularities of the case (See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 69). True, in the definition of the mildest means, we could attempt to define an average parameter – and this is what should happen in the case of general rules – but even this investigation relies on empirical content that poses many difficulties.

  70. 70.

    See Lerche, Übermaß und Verfassungsrecht, 19, translation mine.

  71. 71.

    See note 175 supra.

  72. 72.

    See BVerfGE 38, 281; BVerfGE 40, 71; BVerfGE 49, 24, translation mine.

  73. 73.

    Some authors differentiate balancing or, more particularly, balancing of goods (Güterabwägung) from the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense. Since the focus here is on the question of rationality, particularly on Robert Alexy’s approach, and the BVG’s practice has not provided a clear distinction between them, both concepts will be identified. For an analysis of this distinction and the variations on this issue, see Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 89 ff.

  74. 74.

    Naturally, this conclusion does not mean that balancing is away from the concrete aspects of the case, but only that its focus is on the assessment of the conflictive goods or interests that the simple factual examination of which means is more suitable or necessary for a particular goal cannot solve. After all, every abstract examination, and more specifically the one relating to the elements of the case, is necessarily linked to the reality. The issue, therefore, relates to the focus of balancing.

  75. 75.

    Usually the constitutional scholars and the BVG’s decisions use the concepts of reasonableness (Zumutbarkeit) and proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeit) as synonyms. An unreasonable act, therefore, can have the meaning of a disproportionate act (or more specifically, disproportionate in the narrow sense). Moreover, the concept of reasonableness – and thus of an unreasonable act – can be used as a concept in which any kind of injustice can be placed. However, sometimes constitutional scholarship differentiates them: the reasonableness refers to an absolute intervention in the private sphere, and, as such, an unreasonable act is unacceptable. A disproportionate act, on the other hand, is unacceptable only in a relational basis, that is, in the observance of the goal. This point of view, nonetheless, misses the central argument that an unacceptable act cannot be absolutely conceived, at least when the position of basic rights – and their deprivation in particular cases – remains without danger of being disrupted, but rather refers to a concrete situation where the goal and the intervention will be evaluated according to all the aspects of the situation. Furthermore, this issue leads to the debate on the absolute and relative meaning of the idea of an “essential core” (Wesengehalt) of basic rights. See, for this purpose, Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 451–453. For an analysis of the debate on the concept of “essential core” and its connection with the principle of proportionality, see Manfred Stelzer, Das Wesesgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit (Wien; New York: Springer, 1991).

  76. 76.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 456.

  77. 77.

    See the sixth chapter.

  78. 78.

    Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 237.

  79. 79.

    Even though we sustain here the argument that balancing leads to the deployment of a political argument within the context of constitutional adjudication, one could argue that, notwithstanding that the realm of goods and interests is widely expanded in this situation, balancing must observe how every decision integrates the whole legal order, which refrains it from a political argumentation (See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 149). This conclusion, nonetheless, may not correspond to the BVG’s practice, for more and more its decisions become a case to case analysis rather disconnected from this concern for keeping coherent the constitutional reasoning grounded in the idea of preserving the legal order as a whole and its institutional background. Besides, as we will further examine, in the structure of balancing lies normally a very serious concept of rationality that mixes up arguments of policy and arguments of principle. See, for this purpose, the second part.

  80. 80.

    See BVerfGE 18, 353 (1965) – Devisenbewirtschaftungsgesetz; BVerfGE 35, 382 (1973) – Ausländerausweisung. BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973) – Lebach.

  81. 81.

    BVerfGE 90, 145 (1994) – Cannabis, translation mine.

  82. 82.

    See BVerfGE 18, 353 (1965) – Devisenbewirtschaftungsgesetz.

  83. 83.

    See Pieroth and Schlink, Grundrechte – Staatsrecht II, 66.

  84. 84.

    See BVerfGE 93, 1 (1995) – Kruzifix.

  85. 85.

    See BVerfGE 90, 145 (1994) – Cannabis.

  86. 86.

    See BVerfGE 24, 119 (1968) – Adoption I.

  87. 87.

    See BVerfGE 38, 105 (1974) – Rechtsbeistand.

  88. 88.

    See Hanau, Der Grundsatz der Verhältinismäßigkeit als Schranke privater Gestaltungsmacht, 97.

  89. 89.

    In the definition of a higher standard, we could remark the connection between balancing and the equality principle. Difficulties appear in the definition of a distinction between them. We could argue, for instance, that, whereas balancing refers to an assessment of goods or interests regarding a particular case, the equality principle, on the other hand, is linked to the premise of a comparison between cases in order to achieve equal solutions. Besides, they could provide distinct effects: whereas the court, in the assessment of a violation of the equality principle, could leave the solution open to the legislator (whether through the modification of the norm applied to the case, through the modification of the norm used as basis for comparison, or even through the modification of both), in the case of the deployment of balancing, the solution can only lead to the conclusion of whether the norm applied to the case is proportional and, thus, constitutional or not. According to this perspective, balancing provides an assessment of the individual case, which should walk in harmony with the equality principle grounded in a comparative perspective of cases that carry the idea of what is right for the particular context. This is the reason why “after the perception that the equality principle and the principle of proportionality (assessment of the individual case), like the most abstract legal approaches, contain the same elements merely disposed in a distinct arrangement, this observation [the idea that one can justify the other] can no longer cause surprise” (Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 127, translation mine). Both principles, according to this point of view, are expression of a command of differentiation (Differenzierungsgebot): the principle of proportionality as a guarantee of this command in the individual case; the equality principle as a guarantee in the comparison of cases. In any circumstance, as Hirschberg remarks, the problem lies in the definition of the final point – the material value – that is behind both principles, and, moreover, this is where the danger of arbitrary rulings appears. In addition, there is always the difficulty in defining the extension of the influence of comparative cases as well as in establishing a proportion of the goods at issue. For a detailed analysis of this approach, see Ibid., 111–132.

  90. 90.

    According to this principle, the goods must be proportionally distributed according to a prior defined criterion of differentiation.

  91. 91.

    By abstracting the differences among the individuals, this principle stems from the contractual premise: to give everyone what belongs to him.

  92. 92.

    For a defense of justice connected to the principle of proportionality, see Nils Jansen, Die Struktur der Gerechtigkeit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

  93. 93.

    According to the general guideline of this principle, an action is right if it promotes a useful benefit to the majority or happiness to the greatest number of people.

  94. 94.

    See Leisner, Der Abwägungsstaat: Verhältnismäßigkeit als Gerechtigkeit?, 46.

  95. 95.

    In the fourth chapter, a deeper analysis of balancing will be carried out through Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights.

  96. 96.

    Particularly here, we use Robert Alexy’s attempt to rationalize balancing through the stress on the principle of proportionality.

  97. 97.

    Jutta Limbach, “The Effects of the Jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court,” European University Institute, EUI Working Paper Law, 99/5, http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/ 1814/150/1/law99_5.pdf (accessed July 14, 2009), 22.

  98. 98.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 247.

  99. 99.

    Although the American constitutionalism played an important role in the history of German Constitutionalism, Fangmann stresses that the establishment of a constitutional court with large competences was a German initiative. According to him, “the decisive initiative for the edification of a special judicial review comes, nonetheless, from the Germans.” The establishment of judicial review, after all, was made in accordance with the will of the main political parties. Besides, notwithstanding that the influence of the United States was already strongly existent in the period of the Weimar Republic – and this, consequently, also influenced the period of the German Basic Law of 1949 – the idea of a centralized judicial review had no direct link with the American system. See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 226–27, translation mine.

  100. 100.

    Helmut Fangmann stresses firmly this connection between both periods, especially in the realm of judicial review. According to him, “Despite all differences between Bonn and Weimar, one cannot deny that the Basic Law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the today predominant state law literature, in strong extent, assumed and continued the formal and functional change of Weimar’s constitutional law. The introduced development in constitutional adjudication finds its continuation in the actual Bundesverfassungsgericht’s independence from the Constitution” (Ibid., 11, translation mine).

  101. 101.

    The existence of judicial review, with the power to invalidate legal statutes due to their material incompatibility with basic rights, is quite recent in Germany. Until the First World War, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the German Reich (Reichsgericht) were centered on the formal terms of a legal statute and did not exactly enter into the contents of the rule. The exceptions could be found in cases of ordinances issued by the government of the Reich, whereby, in virtue of not bringing conflict with the legislature and the monarch, the court could exercise a material judicial review or, which is particularly important here, the control over administrative and police acts (above all rights of freedom and property) by the administrative courts. This happened, above all, in the realm of the Prussian Higher Administrative Court (Preußischen Oberverwaltungsgericht) through the deployment of a preliminary version of the principle of proportionality (particularly the principle of necessity). In this case, we could remark the existence of a prelude to the later judicial review and the beginning of a comprehension of the Constitution as a superior law to be interpreted by courts in the control over administrative and police acts as well as already some relevant signs of the precursory deployment of the principle of proportionality. In the Weimar Republic, this situation changed somehow. First, the existence of a catalogue of rights in the Constitution of the German Reich of 1919, even though modifiable by ordinary statutes and initially deemed superfluous (due to the then existing idea of the supremacy of parliament, based on the democratic sovereignty, over the other powers), served as premise to introduce the material exam of the constitutionality of a legal statute. In this case, the establishment of the material review inverted the initial tendency to disregard basic rights as the basis of the legal order and promoted, instead, the conception of them as sacred and foundational for the German people. Second, there was a rich and notable development of the Jurisprudence and the state law doctrine, favored by the situation of a first historical democratic political context and all the crisis it brought about, which projected what Schlink called a “struggle over methods and aims” (See Bernhard Schlink and Arthur J. Jacobson, “Introduction – Constitutional Crises: The German and the American Experience,” in Weimar: a Jurisprudence of Crisis, ed. Arthur J Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink (Berkeley, CA: Univeristy of California Press, 2000), 3) and also established the viewpoint of basic rights as the center of the legal order and a defensive parameter of the status quo. We could observe this movement in the texts of Rudolf Smend, Carl Schmitt, Heinrich Triepel, Erich Kaufmann, Gerhard Leibholz, among others. Third, there was the beginning of a movement towards the comprehension of basic rights not only as subjective rights but, mostly, as objective principles embodying social relationships and values, which could be adopted in judicial review as arguments to protect the bourgeoisie against state intrusions. Fourth, there was the understanding, derived from an anti-positivism and anti-parliamentarianism that flourished at that time, that basic rights are also to be observed by the parliament. Fifth, there was the expansion of the deployment of methods and criteria, especially a preliminary version of the principle of proportionality in administrative and police activities, which enhanced the instruments for judicial review. See, for this purpose, Michael Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” Ratio Juris 16, no. 2 (June 2003): 266–80; Schlink and Jacobson, Weimar: a Jurisprudence of Crisis; Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit; GUSY, Christoph. Richterliches Prüfungsrecht: Eine verfassungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, 74–89.

  102. 102.

    According to Michael Stolleis, notwithstanding that we could observe some developments in the realm of material judicial review in the Weimar Republic, at the beginning of this period, they could not be overestimated, because, apart from the fact of some legal provisions and courts were not implemented, there was not indeed a canon of review. Other particularities that mitigate a certain belief in the existence of a real material judicial review in the beginning of the Weimar Republic is the fact that neither the public opinion nor the public law were ready for this transformation. There was also a certain “anti-individualistic” mood that lessened the desire for the existence of legally protected rights of individuals, and the conception that the law was the will of a higher authority still prevailed. However, these facts, after 1925, radically changed. The causes were: (1) the idea of a material judicial review could serve as a check upon the risk of a parliamentary absolutism, protecting hence the interests of the bourgeoisie; (2) the concept of basic rights, especially property and equality, as the bastion against the parliament and also as a system of values above the law; (3) the economic crises caused by the inflation of 1923–24 that threatened the republic, the property and the status quo of the bourgeoisie; (4) the disbelief in the legislature; (5) the political, academic and methodological expansion of an anti-positivism approach; (6) an anti-socialist and anti-parliamentary approach that could be defended by means of basic rights (See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 273–78). In any case, it was still missing the idea of basic rights as principles to be enforced by judicial review.

  103. 103.

    This characteristic could be clearly observed in the creation of the previous Constitutional Courts of the Länder in the immediate period before the Basic Law of 1949. According to most Constitutions of the Länder, judicial review had to be carried out exclusively by these Constitutional Courts (Verfassungsgerichten). See, for this purpose, Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 221.

  104. 104.

    This idea of basic rights as the center of the legal order only gained supporters after 1924. Between 1919 and 1924, basic rights were still conceived more as political declarations without legal force. However, after the economic crisis of 1923–24 (among other factors, see note 251 supra), basic rights began to be regarded as inviolable and as a system of values unifying the legal order, as well as a mechanism to control the parliament (See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 273). In the practice of judicial review, this change could also be seen in 1924, when, for the first time, one court declared a law to be against the Constitution because of violation of basic rights. See Christoph Gusy, Richteliches Prüfungsrecht: Eine verfassungsgeschchtliche Untersuchung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 82; Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 10.

  105. 105.

    See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 278. Schlink, however, instead of sustaining the dualism between values and rights, adopts the dualism between the concept of rights as subjective rights and one of rights as objective principles. For this purpose, see Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 711–736. This aspect, at any rate, will be shortly examined.

  106. 106.

    According to Lothar Hirschberg, until the end of the Second World War, the principle of proportionality in broad sense was acknowledged only in the figure of the principle of necessity (Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit) as well its counterpart principle of suitability (Grundsatz der Geeignetheit), although it was generically called the principle of proportionality. See Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 14.

  107. 107.

    See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 278; Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 724–725.

  108. 108.

    See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 273.

  109. 109.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 233.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 10.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., 8.

  112. 112.

    See Schilnk, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 723.

  113. 113.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs –und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 220–221.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., 222.

  115. 115.

    Ibid., 222, 226.

  116. 116.

    See notes 250 and 251 supra.

  117. 117.

    See Stolleis, “Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,” 279.

  118. 118.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 224.

  119. 119.

    See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931).

  120. 120.

    See Fangmannm, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 230.

  121. 121.

    See Gottfried Dietze, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Develpment in Postwar Germany,” Virginia Law Review 42, no. 1 (January 1956): 8.

  122. 122.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 233.

  123. 123.

    See Heinz Laufer, “Politische Kontrolle durch Richtermacht,” in Verfassung, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Politik: Zur verfassungsrechtlichen und politischen Stellung und Funktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. Mehdi Tohidipur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 94.

  124. 124.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 224.

  125. 125.

    Ibid., 229.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., 228.

  127. 127.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 247.

  128. 128.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition”; Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte.

  129. 129.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 237.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., 237.

  131. 131.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 720–721.

  132. 132.

    See Dietze, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in Postwar Germany,” 8.

  133. 133.

    See, for instance, the appearance of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional norms, which derives from the premise of the existence of supra-positive norms to be used in adjudication. For this purpose, see Dietze, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in Postwar Germany.”

  134. 134.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 231.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., 238, translation mine [“Superverfassungssystem”].

  136. 136.

    Ibid., 239.

  137. 137.

    Ibid., 234–235.

  138. 138.

    This characteristic differs from the initial period of the Weimar Republic, when the idea that the parliament is bound to the basic rights did not prevail, as long as the parliament could limit basic rights through infra-constitutional norms. See Dieter Grimm, “Die Entfältung der Freiheitsrechte,” in Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Geschichte, Aufgabe, Rechtssprechung, ed. Jutta Limbach (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2000), 57.

  139. 139.

    See Christian Hillgruber and Christophh Goos, Verfassungsprozesrecht (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2004), 14.

  140. 140.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehung – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 15.

  141. 141.

    See, for instance, the recent example of the parliament and the federal government waiting for a BVG’s definition of the possibility of online searches of individual’s computer as stated by the Nordheim-Westphalia Constitutional Protective Law (Verfassungsschutzgesetz). See Elke Luise Barnstedt, “Judicial Activism in the Practice of German Federal Constitutional Court: Is the GFCC an Activist Court?,” Juridica International II (2007): 38.

  142. 142.

    See Hillgruber and Goos, Verfassungsprozessrecht,14.

  143. 143.

    See Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs – und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 236.

  144. 144.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 246.

  145. 145.

    This subject will be examined in the next section.

  146. 146.

    Schlink, “Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion,” 463, translation mine.

  147. 147.

    See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1125.

  148. 148.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition.”

  149. 149.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 247.

  150. 150.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 713.

  151. 151.

    See Erhard Denninger, “Freiheitsordnung – Wertordnung – Pflichtordnung,” in Verfassung, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Politik: Zur verfassungsrechtlichen und politischen Stellung und Funktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. Mehdi Tohidipur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 168.

  152. 152.

    See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 246.

  153. 153.

    This is the terminology used by Peter Häberle. For him, the institutional comprehension of basic rights is connected to the claim to an active duty of judicial review to reinforce social values, thereby transforming individual freedom into an institutional one whereby norms and facts are understood according to their correlative relationships. See Peter Häberle, Die Wesengehaltsgarantie des Artikel 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz: zugleich ein Beitrag zum Institutionellen Verständnis der Grundrechte und zur Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1983), 119.

  154. 154.

    See BVerfGE 27, 1; BVerfGE 34, 269; BVerfGE 49, 24; BVerfGE 98, 169.

  155. 155.

    This argument stems from the interpretation of art. 19 (2) of the Basic Law: “In no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its essential content.” See BVerfGE 7, 377 (411) – Apotheken-Urteil (1958).

  156. 156.

    The argument of “essential content” has two possible interpretations: the absolute one, according to which every basic right has a nucleus that cannot by any means be violated. The other – the relative one – links directly this argument to the deployment of the principle of proportionality, and particularly balancing. The BVG has already deployed both. See, for this purpose, Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 267 ff; Stelzer, Das Wesesgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit.

  157. 157.

    See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 75.

  158. 158.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 714.

  159. 159.

    See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 76.

  160. 160.

    See Denninger, “Freiheitsordnung – Wertordnung – Pflichtordnung,” 166–167.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., 169, translation mine.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., 169.

  163. 163.

    See, for instance, Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte. See the fourth chapter.

  164. 164.

    See Schlink, “Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion,” 461.

  165. 165.

    According to Bernhard Schlink:

    “However, we can show that the construction of systems of interindividual preferences, when they should orient towards the interested and affected individuals, regularly miscarry. In decision-making and in the game theory, as well as in the normative economics, it is extensively proved that the enclosed interindividual value or utility units and standards, required for the construction of a system of interindividual preferences, fail. Certainly, the advantage and disadvantage of certain events or conditions for the individual and for the society can be, under financial and temporal viewpoints, measured and compared. But time and money are only insufficient arithmetical units and standards for individual and interindividual value and utility; money and time are for different individuals of distinct value and also for a balancing, perhaps, between freedom of expression and state security totally useless. In the examination of the proportionality in the narrow sense, only the examiner’s subjectivity takes effect and leads to incidental evaluation of the deployment of basic rights as if they were more or less valuable” (Schlink, “Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion,” 462, translation mine).

  166. 166.

    See Jürgen Seifert, “Verfassungsgerichtliche Selbstbeschränkung,” in Verfassung, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Politik: Zur verfassungsrechtlichen und politischen Stellung und Funktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. Mehdi Tohidipur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 128.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., 125–126.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., 125.

  169. 169.

    Schlink,“German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.

  170. 170.

    BVerfGE 7, 198 (15.01.1958). This case involved the discussion of the claim to a boycott raised by Erich Lüth, a famous German movie critic, against a film directed by Veit Harlan, the well-known moviemaker of the film Jud Süß, a Nazi film that incited strong violence against the Jewish people. Harlan and the movie company, by sustaining moral damage grounded in the §826 BGB, filed a lawsuit against Lüth, which was judged in favor of the plaintiff by the State Court of Hamburg. Against this decision, Lüth filed a constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) grounded in the freedom of speech (art. 5 (I) 1 of the Basic Law) in the BVG, which reversed the decision in favor of Erich Lüth.

  171. 171.

    The idea of an order of values (Werteordnung) is previous to the Lüth case (See, for instance, BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956); BVerfGE 6, 32 (1957)), but it gained a special treatment after this case, when a dogmatics of basic rights in this matter was clearly established.

  172. 172.

    BVerfGE 7, 198. Translated by Institute for Transnational Law. The University of Texas at Austin. http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=1477 (accessed July 19, 2009).

  173. 173.

    BVergGE 7, 198. Translated by Institute for Transnational Law.

  174. 174.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 718.

  175. 175.

    BVerfGE 7, 198. Translated by Institute for Transnational Law.

  176. 176.

    See BVErfGE 12,1 (1960); BVerfGE 13, 46 (1961); BVerfGE 13, 97 (1961); BVerfGE 17, 232 (1964); BVerfGE 23, 191 (1968); BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968); BVerfGE 25, 256 (1968); BVerfGE 27, 1 (1969); BVerfGE 27, 18 (1969); BVerfGE 28, 243 (1970); BVerfGE 30, 1 (1970); BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971); BVerfGE 31, 58 (1971); BVerfGE 32, 98 (1971); BVerfGE 33, 23 (1972); BVerfGE 33, 1 (1972); BVerfGE 33, 303 (1972); BVerfGE 30, 173 (1973); BVerfGE 34, 269 (1973); BVerfGE 35, 79 (1973); BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973); BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974); BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); BVerfGE 42, 95 (1976); BVerfGE 47, 327 (1978); BVerfGE 49, 24 (1978); BVerfGE 49, 89 (1978); BVerfGE 53, 30 (1979); BVerfGE 53, 366 (1980); BVerfGE 58, 208 (1981); BVerfGE 63, 131 (1983); BVerfGE 76, 1 (1987); BVerfGE 81, 278 (1990); BVerfGE 83, 130 (1990); BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993); BVerfGE 90, 145 (1994); BVerfGE 98, 169 (1998); BVerfGE 98, 265 (1998); BVerfGE 102, 347 (2000); BVerfGE 105, 279 (2002); BVerfGE 105, 313 (2002); BVerfGE 107, 104 (2003); BVerfGE 108, 282 (2003); BVerfGE 109, 279 (2004).

  177. 177.

    BVerfGE 27, 1 (1969), translation mine. See also BVerfGE 6, 32 (1957).

  178. 178.

    See BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973); BVerfGE 98, 169 (1998).

  179. 179.

    See BVerfGE 33, 23 (1972).

  180. 180.

    See BVerfGE 53, 366 (1980).

  181. 181.

    See BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958).

  182. 182.

    BVerfGE 7, 377 (1958).

  183. 183.

    BVerfGE 35, 79 (1973).

  184. 184.

    Indeed, as Bernhard Schlink remarks:

    “Whatever the composition and procedures of university bodies might have been – whether, for example, the university senate consisted only of professors, or instead, equal numbers of professors, assistants, students, and technical personnel – the decisive factor regarding academic freedom was whether the individual professors could freely determine the subjects, methods, and goals of their research and lessons within the framework of their teaching duties. If they could not, if there were intrusions into their academic freedoms, the intrusions were not mitigated because they were decreed by a body composed solely of professors, as opposed to only one-third or one-fourth professors” (Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 719).

  185. 185.

    See BVerfGE 35, 79 (1973).

  186. 186.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 719–720.

  187. 187.

    See BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975).

  188. 188.

    This norm stated that, if a doctor were responsible for the abortion procedure, there would be no crime if done before the first twelve weeks of conception, and if done later, it was still legal provided that it followed some requirements.

  189. 189.

    Another interesting case in which the BVG laid down a transitional agreement can be seen in BVerfGE 99, 341 (1999) – Testierausschluß Taubstummer.

  190. 190.

    See BVerfGE 39, 1 (204).

  191. 191.

    It is interesting to remark that, in the dissenting opinion, the other members of the court, based on the concept of self-restraint, criticized the majority opinion. They even sustained that self-restraint applies when the court issues directives for the positive development of the social order through constitutional review. Their words:

    “The authority of the Federal Constitutional Court to annul the decisions of the legislature demands sparing use, if an imbalance between the constitutional organs is to be avoided. The requirement of judicial self-restraint, which is designated as the “elixir of life” of the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, is especially valid when involved is not a defense from overreaching by state power but rather the making, via constitutional judicial control, of provisions for the positive structuring of the social order for the legislature which is directly legitimatized by the people. The Federal Constitutional Court must not succumb to the temptation to take over for itself the function of a controlling organ and shall not in the long run endanger the authority to judicially review constitutionality” (BVerfGE 39,1. Translated by Robert E. Jonas and John D. Gorby. The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 9, 605 ff).

  192. 192.

    BVerfGE 39,1. Translated by Robert E. Jonas and John D. Gorby. The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 9, 605 ff.

  193. 193.

    BVerfGE 39,1. Translated by Robert E. Jonas and John D. Gorby. The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 9, 605 ff.

  194. 194.

    It is interesting to verify that, especially in the main controversial cases, the dissenting opinion remarks the abuse of the boundaries defined by the principle of judicial self-restraint. See BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); BVerfGE 114, 121 (2005).

  195. 195.

    See BVerfGE, 88, 203 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch II.

  196. 196.

    See BVerfGE, 88, 203 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch II.

  197. 197.

    See BVerfGE 57, 295 – Rundfunkentscheidung (1981).

  198. 198.

    See BVerfGE 49, 89 – Kalkar I (1978); BVerfGE 81, 310 – Kalkar II (1990), and BVerfGE 53, 30 – Mülheim-Kärlich (1979).

  199. 199.

    See BVerfGE 85, 191 – Nachtarbeitsverbot (1991).

  200. 200.

    In this decision, which refers to the Basic Treaty of 1972 (Grundlagenvertrag) between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) concerning the recognition, for the first time, of their respective sovereignties, the BVG even indicated the constitutional boundaries and the scope the federal government and the parliament had to observe in future agreements, always with the purpose of making clear that, by no means, the precept of reunification could be jeopardized. See BVerfGE 36, 1 – Grundlagenvertrag (1973).

  201. 201.

    See BVerfGE 46, 160 – Schleyer (1977).

  202. 202.

    See BVerfGE 99, 216 – Familienlastenausgleich II (1998); BVerfGE 98, 265 – Bayerisches Schwangerenhilfegesetz (1998).

  203. 203.

    See BVerfGE 86, 390 – Schwangeren – und Familienhilfegesetz I (1992).

  204. 204.

    See BVerfGE 90, 145 – Cannabis (1995). See the first chapter.

  205. 205.

    See BVerfGE 75, 40 – Privatschulfinanzierung I (1986).

  206. 206.

    See BVerfGE 56, 54 – Fluglärm (1981).

  207. 207.

    See BVerfGE 79, 174 – Straßenverkehrslärm (1988).

  208. 208.

    See BVerfGE 114, 1 – Schutzpflicht Lebensversicherung (2004).

  209. 209.

    See BVerfGE 105, 303 – Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz (2002).

  210. 210.

    See BVerfGE 87, 363 – Sonntagsbackverbot (1992).

  211. 211.

    See BVerfGE 115, 118 – Luftsicherheitsgesetz (2005).

  212. 212.

    See, for instance, the Appellentscheidung, according to which the BVG declares that a norm is still constitutional, but, if no modification in its contents is carried out by the parliament, it can declare its unconstitutionality. See, for example, BVerfGE 108, 82 – Biologischer Vater (2003).

  213. 213.

    See, for instance, the Cannabis case examined the first chapter.

  214. 214.

    According to Bernhard Schlink, even though the “Bundesverfassungsgericht has interpreted defensive rights to be service rights, and inferred from these rights entitlements to government support and distribution of positions, means, and opportunities,” it “has, consistently, dampened the practical consequences of its decisions on government. It has never demanded that the government release additional budgetary funds to cover these entitlements, but has only required equal distribution of already available means” (Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 721).

  215. 215.

    See Leisner, Der Abwägungsstaat: Verhältnismäßigkeit als Gerechtigkeit?, 232.

  216. 216.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.

  217. 217.

    Limbach, “The Effects of the Jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court,” 22.

  218. 218.

    Häberle, “Grundprobleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,” 4, translation mine.

  219. 219.

    Winfrieed Steffani, “Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Demokratischer Entscheidungsprozess,” in Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, ed. Peter Häberle (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 386, translation mine.

  220. 220.

    See Thomas Clemens, “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Rechts – und Verfassungsstaat: Sein Verhältnis zur Politik und zum einfachen Recht; Entwicklungslinien seiner Rechtssprechung,” in Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: ein Gericht im Schnittpunkt von Recht und Politik, ed. Michael Piazolo (Mainz-München: Hase & Koehler, 1995), 17–19.

  221. 221.

    See Michael Piazolo, “Zur Mittlerrolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in der deutschen Verfassungsordnung – eine Einleitung,” in Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: ein Gericht im Schnittpunkt von Recht und Politik, ed. Michael Piazolo (Mainz-München: Hase & Koehler, 1995), 10.

  222. 222.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 465.

  223. 223.

    See Piazolo, “Zur Mittlerrolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in der deutschen Verfassungsordnung – eine Einleitung,” 11.

  224. 224.

    See Ulrich Ramp, Hüter der Verfassung oder Lenker der Politik (München: Grin Verlag, 2003), 3.

  225. 225.

    In Maus’s interpretation of the German development of constitutional adjudication through the psychoanalytical concept of superego, the main problem in this way to politics is the inversion of the democratic procedure. The realm of freedom, which is the basic principle of self-government and sovereignty of people, becomes an outcome of decision-making. “The foregoing realm of individual freedom converts itself then into a case to case manufactured product of judicial decision activity” (Ingeborg Maus, "Justiz als gesellschaftliches Über-Ich: Zur Funktion von Rechtsprecung in der ‘vaterlosen Gesellschaft," in Sturtz der Göter? Vaterbildeer im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Werner Faulstisch and Gunter Grimm (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), 128, translation mine). The popular confidence and the “infantilism” with respect to the expectancy that the BVG will correct the very procedure of public deliberation (Ibid., 129), as if it were the revelation of justice, demonstrate that the field of social mobilization is jeopardized by this need for an external control or, in better words, by this anxiety about what the superego will express. Public autonomy is undermined by a heteronymous definition of what is good for society, which delegates the pursuit of consensus to the court. The arbitrary quest for an “order of values” (“Wertordnung”), as the character of the Constitution, and for “morally enriched concepts” (Ibid., 142, translation mine) is a sign of this process of transference of social issues to the court by overcoming the public autonomy, thereby opening it to arbitrary and incoherent definitions of what is good for society. This could be observed in different adopted criteria, for instance, the ones based on efficiency – the principle of proportionality, as here examined, could be brought to this scenario – on social acceptance, on traditional values, among others that are not directly stated by the Constitution, whereas the immediate constitutional norms are simply disregarded. “The written constitutional guarantees of freedom are placed thereby under the reserve of unwritten idiosyncrasies of economic and political apparatus” (Ibid., 142, translation mine) What remains, in this context, is a judicial system acting in accordance with different interests but the subjective guarantees of the Constitution. The Constitution loses its connection with democracy as a document institutionalizing procedures and basic guarantees, which ensure the exercise of social and political mobilization, and becomes a moral text of values – a Bible or Koran – from which the BVG can deduce the correct values for society (Ibid., 131). The respect for the Constitution becomes a theology of the Constitution (Grundgesetztheologie) (Ibid., 143). Judicial review, accordingly, functions by this double-sided process: the social BVG’s deification, for it claims this guardianship, and the deification of the Constitution, for it becomes an “order of values.” For this purpose, see Ibid., 121–149.

  226. 226.

    Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 119. See also Rudolf Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1928).

  227. 227.

    Böckenforde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, 130.

  228. 228.

    Ibid., 131.

  229. 229.

    Ibid., 131–132.

  230. 230.

    Ibid., 132, translation mine.

  231. 231.

    Ibid., 133.

  232. 232.

    See the fourth chapter.

  233. 233.

    Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, 185.

  234. 234.

    Ibid., 186.

  235. 235.

    Ibid., 189/190.

  236. 236.

    Ibid., 190.

  237. 237.

    Ibid., 191.

  238. 238.

    Ibid., 194.

  239. 239.

    Ibid., 194.

  240. 240.

    Ibid., 195.

  241. 241.

    Ibid., 199.

  242. 242.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.

  243. 243.

    Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1133.

  244. 244.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.

  245. 245.

    As Schlink remarks, this is a process, whose outcomes are still in progress. See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1132–1133.

  246. 246.

    The stare decisis (“to stand by things decided”) means that prior court’s decisions are to be regarded as precedent for future decisions. Even though it does not mean a strict observance of the past, the court should hold the previous decisions, and, if a modification reveals necessary, it should establish strong arguments, not disrupting thereby the harmony and the longstanding interpretation of a particular issue. In American constitutionalism, this mechanism can be clearly verified in the continuous attempt, in decision-making, to bring the main arguments of similar prior cases to the decision of a particular issue at stake.

  247. 247.

    Bernhard Schlink brings a very interesting analysis of this loss of any mechanism of coherence in BVG’s decisions. See, for this purpose Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1132.

  248. 248.

    Ibid., 1133.

  249. 249.

    Ibid., 1132, translation mine [“(Es) befreit sich von jeder Selbsbindung”].

  250. 250.

    Schlink points out some examples of this process, which, even though still exceptions, did not occur before. See, for this purpose, Ibid., 1125–1128.

  251. 251.

    Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1133, translation mine.

  252. 252.

    Ibid., 1134.

  253. 253.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 730.

  254. 254.

    Ibid., 727.

  255. 255.

    Ibid., 730.

  256. 256.

    Schlink compares the historical development of constitutional scholarship with other disciplines in Germany in order to show that a different critical approach could be adopted. According to him, “above all, however, it is the relationship between legal scholarship and decision making in other German legal disciplines that proves that the relationship which now exists between constitutional scholarship and the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht could be different. Neither the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof in civil and criminal matters nor those of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht are canonized in a form comparable to the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht” (Ibid., 731).

  257. 257.

    Ibid., 730.

  258. 258.

    Schlink even compares the German constitutional scholarship with that of the United States. According to him: “Theory, as other social, cultural, and intellectual disciplines teach, can maintain an extremely critical distance from practice. For example, in the American legal and constitutional order, the United States Supreme Court maintains a position similar to that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in German society. Yet American constitutional scholarship challenges the Supreme Court more frontally, and if not less respectfully, than at least less gently” (Ibid., 731).

  259. 259.

    Ibid., 731.

  260. 260.

    Ibid., 734.

  261. 261.

    Schlink also links this characteristic to the scholar’s interests in positions on the BVG. According to him, “various constitutional scholars have acted as advisors or representatives in cases before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, as loyal compilers and systematizers of its decisions, even as possible candidates for future positions on the court. Constitutional scholarship would like to participate in power, and it realizes that the courtiers are rewarded for their service to the royal court by being allowed to influence it” (Ibid., 734).

  262. 262.

    Ibid., 735.

  263. 263.

    Ibid., 727.

  264. 264.

    Bernhard Schlink mentions that, although the deployment of the equality principle still leaves questions unsolved and is not a real substitute for the examination brought by the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense – indeed, it can even lead to the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense –, the equality principle can answer fundamental questions that the principles of suitability and necessity could not achieve. See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 459.

  265. 265.

    Ibid., 460. See also Pieroth and Schlink, Grundrechte – Staatsrecht II, 67–68.

  266. 266.

    Bernhard Schlink establishes, in his proposal for a method for balancing in the realm of dogmatics of basic rights (dogmatics of the social state), a critical position on the deployment of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense as a balancing of particular and public goods and interests. His focus lies in the principles of suitability and necessity with larger amplitude and the continuous protection of citizen’s minimal position, whose basis shapes a “method of balancing as dogmatics of basic rights” that works in the realm of rights of freedom. The central premises of his thinking are: (1) the idea that the balancing model is not a reification or a division between state and society, but rather a model for argumentation open to different arrangements between state and society; (2) the balancing model does not “deny the possibility of a conciliation between the individual and the society, the citizen and the state,” but this conciliation is a “task of the political system”; (3) in the balancing model, the stress is, more than on the idea of an assessment of public and private interests and goods, on a wider reception of the principles of suitability and necessity (See Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht, 219). Moreover, Schlink, as he points out in another text, thinks that, in the realm of constitutional adjudication, the idea that the deployment of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense is indispensable is not entirely true (See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 458–460).

  267. 267.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 460–462.

  268. 268.

    Schlink argues that, unlike the control over administrative and judiciary acts, there is no constitutional authorization for the control over parliamentary acts, especially when the BVG replaces parliamentary political rulings with its own. For this reason, Schlink defends that the proportionality control should focus on the analysis of the legitimacy of the relationship between means and goals as well as on the principles of suitability and necessity (Ibid., 462). A more detailed examination of a possible methodology in this area is found in Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsgercht.

  269. 269.

    Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 462, translation mine.

  270. 270.

    Ibid., 461.

  271. 271.

    Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 735.

  272. 272.

    Ibid., 735.

  273. 273.

    See Schlink, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit,” 456.

  274. 274.

    Schlink, “Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion,” 464, translation mine.

  275. 275.

    Ibid., 464, translation mine.

  276. 276.

    Friedrich Müller, Juristische Methodik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 63, translation mine.

  277. 277.

    Ibid., 63.

  278. 278.

    Friedrich Müller introduces a hermeneutical structural legal methodology centered upon the concretization of norms, which can afford, according to him, a relevant analysis for the practical area of the activity of case-related concretizations as well as “complement the structural analysis of concretization procedures through a structural model of concretization.” See Ibid., 284 ff, translation mine.

  279. 279.

    Ibid., 67.

  280. 280.

    Ibid., 67.

  281. 281.

    Ibid., 69.

  282. 282.

    Ibid., 67, translation mine.

  283. 283.

    Ibid., 68.

  284. 284.

    Ibid., 68, translation mine.

  285. 285.

    Ibid., 68.

  286. 286.

    Ibid., 69.

  287. 287.

    See the second part.

  288. 288.

    See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 713.

  289. 289.

    See Ibid.

  290. 290.

    See the fourth chapter.

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  1. Faculdade de Direito, University of Brasília, Campus Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte, Brasília - DF, Brazil, 70.919-970

    Professor Juliano Zaiden Benvindo (Faculty of Law)

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Benvindo, J.Z. (2010). Balancing Within the Context of German Constitutionalism: The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Shift to Activism. In: On the Limits of Constitutional Adjudication. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2_2

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