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Gravity and Complementarity Stricto Sensu

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The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the International Criminal Court

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Abstract

According to the Lubanga PTC, Art. 17 provides for a twofold test distinguishing between complementarity stricto sensu pursuant to Art. 17 (1) (a)–(c), (2) and (3) on the one hand, and an additional gravity threshold pursuant to Art. 17 (1) (d) on the other. Thus, complementarity stricto sensu only becomes relevant if the respective case is of sufficient gravity in the first place. It seems therefore logical to examine gravity first and only then, if the gravity standard is satisfied, complementarity stricto sensu.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 19 in Chap. 4) para. 29: “The Chamber considers that the admissibility test of a case arising from the investigation of a situation has two parts. The first part of the test relates to national investigations, prosecutions and trials concerning the case at hand insofar as such a case would be admissible only if those States with jurisdiction over it have remained inactive in relation to that case or are unwilling or unable, within the meaning of article 17 (1) (a) to (c), 2 and 3 of the Statute. The second part of the test refers to the gravity threshold which any case must meet to be admissible before the Court. Accordingly, the Chamber will treat them separately”. (footnotes omitted).

  2. 2.

    Apart from Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 1) see also PTC I, Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo [24 February 2006], Decision concerning PTC I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04–01/06), para. 41 (“ … this gravity threshold is in addition to (…) the crimes included in articles 6 to 8 of the Statute …”). See also ICC-OTP, Report on activities (2006), at 6: “Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is a serious matter, the Rome Statute (…) clearly foresees and requires an additional consideration of ‘gravity’ …”. See also Guariglia, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 209, at 213 (“overarching consideration … analyzed before any decision to investigate …”). For further references see Ambos et al., Justicia y Paz (2010), para. 38 with fn. 352.

  3. 3.

    This is also the approach taken by the OTP. Thus, in the Iraq situation the Prosecutor reached a negative conclusion on “gravity”, and therefore found it unnecessary to elaborate on complementarity (Iraq response, Annex to the ICC-OTP, Update on communications (2006), at 9; available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (last visited 23 November 2009)). For a similar solution Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 79.

  4. 4.

    PTC I (n 2) para. 44. See also WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 21 et seq., 25 et seq.; El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 39; crit. now regarding situational gravity WCRO, Relevance of a situation (2009), 28 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Between mid 2003 and 2005 gravity played no role, see Schabas, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 229, at 229 et seq. Interestingly, it attracted either much attention in the negotiation history of the ICC Statute (Stahn, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 247, at 267).

  6. 6.

    ICC-OTP, Report on activities (2006), at 8. See also Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 73–4, para. 38; El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 39; WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 21 et seq.; Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 557.

  7. 7.

    ICC-OTP, Report on activities (2006), at 10: “The Office selected the DRC and Northern Uganda as the first situations because they were the gravest admissible situations under the Statute’s jurisdiction, and, after the referral, the Office confirmed that the Darfur situation clearly met the gravity standard. The Office will continue to adhere to the rigorous standard of gravity established in the Statute”.

  8. 8.

    Iraq response (n 3), at 8–9; Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 558–9; Schüller (2008) 21 HuV-I 73, at 77; Murphy (2006) 17 CLF 281, at 309 et seq.; see also Ambos, in Bohlander (ed.) 2007, 429, at 438–39.

  9. 9.

    Schabas, Introduction (2007), at 190; id. (2008) 6 JICJ 731, at 741; id., in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 229, at 240. Schabas further criticizes that the Prosecutor did not compare the total number of deaths in Iraq with the total in the DRC or Uganda nor did he compare the total number of deaths resulting from the crimes attributed to specific perpetrators with those blamed on the British troops in Iraq (ibid., at 747 and 240). Crit. also El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 40–1; Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 234 and passim.

  10. 10.

    See already Ambos, in Bohlander (ed.) 2007, 429, at 439; in a similar vein also crit. Schüller (2008) 21 HuV-I 73, at 78; McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 30, 32; Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 562.

  11. 11.

    Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, entry into force 23 April 2009. See also ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy (2010), para. 20; ICC-OTP, Report on activities (2006), at 6 and ICC-OTP, Report prosecutorial strategy (2006), at 5, referring to the scale and nature of the crimes, the manner of commission and the impact of the crimes. See also Seils, in Bergsmo (ed.) 55, at 57.

  12. 12.

    El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 43.

  13. 13.

    Iraq response (n 3), at 8.

  14. 14.

    Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo: Informal meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 24.10.2005, at 6; “Five minutes with Luis Moreno-Ocampo: An interview with the ICC Prosecutor”, Adele Waugaman (2006) XV International Affairs Review 2.

  15. 15.

    McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 35; Guariglia, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 209, at 214.

  16. 16.

    See on this issue Brunborg, in ICC-OTP, First public hearing (2003), 2.

  17. 17.

    See for the prioritization of qualitative criteria, i.e., the systematicity of the crimes, the social alarm caused and State involvement Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 229 et seq. arguing, essentially, that his qualitative approach would lend greater legitimacy to the Court and produce a greater impact in terms of deterrence and general prevention (“greater expressive value”, at 236). Yet, Heller’s approach, albeit certainly thought-provoking and allegedly principled, is from a theoretical perspective, apart from its practical implications, full of consequentalist assumptions and thus “more like a prudent concession to practical realpolitik, … than a strong, independent argument for what the ICC is really about, what it is truly for.” (Osiel, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 258).

  18. 18.

    Schabas, Introduction (2007), at 190; id. (2008) 6 JICJ 731, at 741, 747–48; id., in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 229, at 245–46; see also Ambos, in Bohlander (ed.) 2007, 429, at 439.

  19. 19.

    Draft OTP Regulations 9 Oct. 2007, Regulation 24 no. 2.

  20. 20.

    ICC-OTP, Criteria for selection (2006), para. 16.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Seils, in Bergsmo (ed.), 2009, 55, at 57; Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 230 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Guariglia, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 209, at 214. See also McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 35 referring to crimes resulting in death and rape.

  23. 23.

    SCSL, T.Ch. I, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao [8 April 2009] Sentencing Judgement (SCSL-04-15-T), paras. 179 et seq., 188 et seq., 204.

  24. 24.

    ICC-OTP, Criteria for selection (2006), para.17. See also McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 35; Guariglia, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, at 214.

  25. 25.

    Moreno Ocampo mentioned impact on various occasions (Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo: Informal meeting, supra n 14, at 6; ICC-OTP, Third Report Security Council (2006), at 2). The OTP also referred to the “nature, manner and impact” regarding the Haskanita attack in the Darfur situation (ICC-OTP, Eight Report Security Council (2008), para. 56).

  26. 26.

    A senior member of OTP, Senior App. Counsel Fabricio Guariglia, did not include impact in a recent paper (in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, at 212 et seq.); crit. also Seils, in Bergsmo (ed.) 2009, 55, at 59, former Head of the Situation Analysis Section of OTP (August 2004 to October 2008) and mainly responsible, inter alia, for the OTP selection paper which does not contain this criterion (ICC-OTP, Criteria for selection (2006), para. 12).

  27. 27.

    Schabas, Introduction (2007), at 742; also Hall, Suggestions concerning ICC prosecutorial policy and strategy (2003), 21; Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 560–1; Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 79; McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 35; Osiel, (2009) The Hague Justice Portal, at 2.

  28. 28.

    PTC I (n 2), para. 42 et seq. (46, 50–4, 63).

  29. 29.

    See Schüller (2008) 21 HuV-I 73, at 80; Schabas (2008) 6 JICJ 731, at 743; Schabas, Introduction (2007), 190, at 241 (“gravity in a vacuum”, “comparing apples with nothing”); WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 36 et seq. recommending a “sufficiently flexible” analysis (at 42) and taking into account exceptional circumstances as “the impact of victims, the manner in which the crimes were carried out, and the vulnerability of the victim population”; crit. in particular on the “social alarm” criterion Schüller (2008) 21 HuV-I 73, at 80–1; McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 36; Osiel, (2009) The Hague Justice Portal, at 6; WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 5, 39; El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 45 (“weird novelty”), who additionally points out (at 44) that these factors are illustrative and not exclusive; Murphy (2006) 17 CLF 281, at 288 et seq. (289); Smith (2008) 8 ICLR 331, at 340 et seq.; Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 551–2; crit. also Judge Pikis (infra n 32) para. 34; contrary Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 233 et seq. invoking this criterion as part of his qualitiative approach (supra n 17); against him Osiel, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 257. Crit. as to the quantitative approach Schabas (2008) 19 CLF 5, at 28 et seq.; Williams/Schabas, in Triffterer (ed.) 2008, Art. 17 mn. 28; Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 227 et seq. See also El Zeidy (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 905; Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 93 et seq. focusing on the international concern (“internationaler Belang”, at 98, 100) of the matter. Crit. on the gravity standard also Ohlin, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, at 185, 200 (“unclear what kind of legal threshold is established”). - On the difficult relation between OTP and Chambers in this matter see El Zeidy (2008) 19 CLF 35, at 51 et seq.

  30. 30.

    Situation in DRC [13 July 2006], Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for warrants of arrest, article 58” (ICC-01-04-169) [reclassified as public on 23.9.2008 pursuant to Situation in DRC, Decision on the unsealing of judgment of the Appeals Chamber issued on 13 July 2006, 22.9.2008 (ICC-01-04-538-PUB-Exp), paras.1–3], paras. 54 et seq. (68 et seq.); in the same vein, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, [4 March 2009] Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3) para. 48 with fn. 51

  31. 31.

    Cf. Guariglia, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 209, at 214–5; Schabas, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 229, at 243; calling for flexibility if using this criterion at all WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 43 et seq. (50–1); in a similar vein Seils, in Bergsmo (ed.) 2009, 55, at 56.

  32. 32.

    Situation in DRC (n 30) para. 73 et seq. (75). See also Seils, in Bergsmo (ed.) 55, at 56.

  33. 33.

    Situation in DRC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I (n 30), Separate and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 38 et seq. He focused on the ordinary meaning of the term and understands it as “weightiness” (para. 39) excluding cases “unworthy of consideration” by the Court, i.e. cases that are “insignificant in themselves” ; where the criminality on the part of the culprit is wholly marginal; borderline cases” (para. 40) and holds a crime to be insignificant if “the acts constituting the crime are wholly peripheral to the objects of the law in criminalising the conduct” (ibid.).

  34. 34.

    Prosecutor v . Milutinović et al., Trial judgement, Volume 3 of 4, 26.2.2009 (IT-05-87-T) para. 1147; Prosecutor v. Simić, Trial judgement, Sentence, 17.10.2002 (IT-95-9/2-S) para. 37; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Trial judgement, Sentence, 30.3.2004 (IT-02-61-S) para. 184.

  35. 35.

    Holá/Smeulers/Bijlevled (2009) 22 LJIL 79, at 86. See also Murphy (2006) 17 CLF 281, at 296 et seq.; WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 39 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC trial), Sentencing judgement, 19.7.2007 (SCSL-04-16-T) para. 11, 19; Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondawa (CDF trial), Judgement on the sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondawa, 9.10.2007 (SCSL-04-14-T) para. 33.

  37. 37.

    This part is based on the proposal developed by my doctoral student Ignaz Stegmiller (2009) 9 ICLR 547, at 561 et seq. For a dual use gravity see also McAuliffe deGuzman, ‘Gravity and the legitimacy of the ICC’, 2008, at 5–6; WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 7–8, 51 et seq. For an autonomous gravity concept in the sense of article 17 (1)(d) Judge Pikis (n 32) para. 29.

  38. 38.

    Apparently contrary to this view McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 32–33 argues that in case of a (Security Council or State) referral “the Prosecutor must initiate an investigation of any admissible case” and “is not free to decline to investigate” on the basis of a lack of (comparative) gravity while in case of acting proprio motu “he has complete discretion (…) as long as he abides by the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility”, i.e. the legal gravity threshold only plays a role in the latter case. Yet, this would mean that even less grave cases would have to be considered admissible if only they have been referred by a State or the Security Council. Art. 17 (1) (d) does not make this distinction. Apart from that, there is a general consensus that complementarity applies to all trigger mechanisms, including a Security Council referral (cf. Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 238 et seq.; Kleffner, ‘Complementarity’ (2008), at 165–66, 213 et seq.; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 188 et seq.; Bothe (2008) 83 Friedenswarte 59, at 67).

  39. 39.

    Crit. of such a broad discretion and thus of article 53 however Ohlin, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 185, at 201 et seq. arguing, on the basis of a dualist individualist-retributive and collective-security theory of International Criminal Law (201 et seq.) that the ICC and its Prosecutor must only act with regard to the former leaving collective security and policy issues to the UN-Security Council (207, 209).

  40. 40.

    For a both quantitative and qualitative interpretation of the term complementarity Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 188; for three visions of admissibility (complementarity) stressing correctly the respect for State sovereignty Burke-White/Kaplan, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 17, at 91 et seq.

  41. 41.

    See also Osiel, (2009) The Hague Justice Portal, at 4–5. This is the main criticism against Heller’s approach (supra n 17), see Osiel, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 256 et seq. pointing, in addition, to the risk of political manipulation inherent in this approach.

  42. 42.

    In this sense Heller’s approach (supra n 17) is helpful since it elaborates the argument of quantitatively small, but qualitatively important (= grave) situations, see Heller, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 234–35, 243, 249.

  43. 43.

    See supra n 11.

  44. 44.

    See already the discussion in the Int. Law Commission (“ILC”) in Yearbook of the ILC 1994, Volume I, Summary records of the meetings on the forty-sixth session, 2 May–22 July 1994 (A/CN.4/SER.A/1994) 25, para. 41, 27, para. 59; ILC Draft Statute 1994, at 32, 35–6. See also WCRO, Gravity threshold (2008), at 12 et seq.; McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 14–5.

  45. 45.

    For a general affirmation of gravity Cárdenas, ‘The admissibility test before the ICC under special considerations of amnesties and truth commissions’, in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 120. For general gravity in case of genocide Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 99; id., in Werle (ed.) 2006, 239, at 244; id., in Hankel (ed.) 2008, 127, at 138. For higher gravity of genocide and crimes against humanity vis-á-vis war crimes Schabas (2008) 19 CLF 5, at 25 et seq.

  46. 46.

    McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 45.

  47. 47.

    Out of this concern WCRO, Relevance of a situation (2009), 28 et seq. (31, 35–36) wants to limit the application of the gravity threshold to cases (35: “… ICC should not forgo prosecuting the relevant cases solely on the ground that the situation does not involve a wider range of cases that could be prosecuted by the Court.”). The same result can, however, be reached by a low threshold and/or the recourse to qualitative criteria in the sense of Heller’s approach (as discussed in supra n 42).

  48. 48.

    See also McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 45.

  49. 49.

    See also McAuliffe deGuzman, Gravity (2008), at 47.

  50. 50.

    Redepaz, Víctimas (2008), at 8.

  51. 51.

    Mario Iguarán, former Prosecutor General of Colombia, during the inaugural speech of the international conference “Justicia Transicional en Colombia, 4 años en el contexto de la Ley de Justicia y Paz”, Bogotá, 23 July 2009.

  52. 52.

    See Pizarro, http://www.verdadabierta.com/web3/reconciliacion/45-reparaciones-a-victimas/231-la-hora-de-las-victimas?format=pdf.

  53. 53.

    Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, Forensis (2008), at 26 (“el homicidio común o simple que explica cerca del 60% del total de muertes violentas en el país ha disminuido. Pero el homicidio agravado entre el cual encontramos las masacres y ejecuciones extrajudiciales de colombianos como resultado del conflicto social y la confrontación armada, del narcotráfico y la acción de otros agentes violentos de estructuras delincuenciales organizadas, se incremento”., translation by the author).

  54. 54.

    Ibidem, at 25.

  55. 55.

    See Otero, Cifras del conflicto (2007).

  56. 56.

    See internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC), http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/CB6FF99A94F70AED802570A7004CEC41?OpenDocument (last visited 28 December 2009).

  57. 57.

    AI, Leave us in peace (2008), at 38.

  58. 58.

    See Otero, Cifras del conflicto (2007), 109.

  59. 59.

    Figure provided by Comité Interinstitucional de Justicia y Paz, Matriz (2009).

  60. 60.

    See AI, Leave us in peace (2008), at 40.

  61. 61.

    See Landmine Monitor Report 2007.

  62. 62.

    See Constitutional Court (n 8 in Chap. 1), sección 6.2.2.1.7.6. (“delitos más graves”), 6.2.2.1.7.11 (“delitos que la humanidad entera ha considerado de la mayor gravedad”), 6.2.2.1.7.20. (“múltiples y graves delitos”, “terror”), 6.2.2.1.7.24. (“delitos, inclusive tan graves como masacres, secuestros masivos, asesinatos y desapariciones…”), 6.2.2.1.7.29, 6.2.2.2.5. and 6.2.3.1.5.4. (“delitos de suma gravedad”), 6.2.3.3.4.3. (“grave criminalidad”); Supreme Court, supra n 16, V 2.6. (“graves atentados a la humanidad”), V 3.5. (“graves violaciones a los derechos humanos”).

  63. 63.

    Constitutional Court [21 March 2003] judgment T-249, MP Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, at 16.3. (“Los hechos punibles que revisten dicha gravedad, serán aquellos que impliquen graves atentados contra los derechos humanos y el derecho internacional humanitario y una severa puesta en peligro de la paz colectiva”.; translation by the author).

  64. 64.

    Ibid., at 17 (“altera significativamente el mínimo orden de la civilización y supone la ignorancia de los principios fundadores del orden social dominante”; translation by the author).

  65. 65.

    Procuraduría General, Desmovilización y reinserción (2008), at 128 (“autores de graves daños a la integridad personal, las masacres, ejecuciones selectivas”; translation by the autor).

  66. 66.

    IACHR, Report demobilization (2004), para. 59, 66, 11.

  67. 67.

    HRW, Breaking the Grip? (2008), 131; AI, Targeting Civilians (2008), 25.

  68. 68.

    To be distinguished from relative (discretionary) gravity only applicable in relation to article 53, see supra Sect. 5.1.2.

  69. 69.

    See supra n 22 et seq. in Chap. 1 and main text.

  70. 70.

    See Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.), 2009, at 51 (para. 21), 70–1 (para. 36).

  71. 71.

    Supra n 19 in Chap. 1 and main text.

  72. 72.

    See infra n 242 et seq. with main text.

  73. 73.

    Cf. Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 116; also Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 70–1; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 104 et seq. Contrary apparently Gómez Pardo (2009) Revista Debate Interamericano 123, at 141 without however analyzing article 17 properly.

  74. 74.

    See also Stegmiller, Complementarity thoughts (2010) 21 CLF (forthcoming). For a twofold text merging the first two requirements into one El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 161.

  75. 75.

    See Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 29 et seq. (para. 8).

  76. 76.

    Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 31 (para. 8).

  77. 77.

    Cf. Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 105 (“(…) effective prosecution, and the purpose of ending impunity, would clearly be significantly undermined if cases in which States remained completely inactive were inadmissible”) and 115 (“complete inaction on the national level would thus allow the ICC to take up a case without having to enter into an assessment of the admissibility criteria in Article 17 (1) (a) to (c)”).

  78. 78.

    Prosecutor v. Lubanga (n 2) para. 29 with fn. 19.

  79. 79.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 105.

  80. 80.

    See also ICC-OTP, Complementarity in practice (2003), paras. 17–8: “[…] First, the most straightforward scenario is where no State has initiated any investigation (the inaction scenario). In such a scenario, none of the alternatives of articles 17 (1) (a)–(c) are satisfied and there is no impediment to admissibility. Thus, there is no need to examine the factors of unwillingness or inability; the case is simply admissible under the clear terms of Article 17”. See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 199 et seq. (201); Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 104–05, 342; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 106, 161, 230, 318; Schabas (2008) 19 CLF 5, at 7–8; Williams/Schabas, in Triffterer (ed.) 2008, article 17, mn 23; Stahn (2008) 19 CLF 87, at 105–6; Carnero Rojo (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 833; Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 72 para. 37; crit. however Schabas (2008) 6 JICJ 731, at 757.

  81. 81.

    Cf. Seils/Wierda, ICC and conflict mediation (2005) 1, 6; see also Burke-White (2008) 49 HarvIntLJ 53, at 78; regarding the Darfur investigation see Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 219–20.

  82. 82.

    See, for instance, ICC-OTP, Eight Report Security Council (2008), para. 13: “All three Prosecution cases remain admissible. There are no proceedings in the Sudan against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, against Omar Al Bashir, or against the three rebel commanders of the Haskanita attack”. See also Sheng, (2006) 1249 bepress Legal Series 1, at 5; Schabas, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 229, at 236–37.

  83. 83.

    Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 19 in Chap. 4), para. 41. See on this case Smith (2008) 8 ICLR 331, at 335–36; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 228 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Prosecutor v. Kony et al. (supra n 2 in Part II), para. 44.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., para. 49 et seq. (52). For a discussion of the Ugandan situation see Burke-White/Kaplan, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 17, at 79 et seq., 103 et seq. It is important to note in this respect that the Amnesty Act 2000 (Laws of Uganda vol. XII ch. 294, available at www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/documents/2000_Jan_The_Amnesty_Act.doc (last visited 7 October 2009) is in fact a blanket amnesty since it is granting full immunity from prosecution to any LRA rebel who “renounces and abandons involvement in the war or armed rebellion” (sect. 4 (1)) and this abandoning of the fighting is an inherent condition of any amnesty deal.

  86. 86.

    See already Ambos, in Bohlander (ed.) 2007, 429, at 448; see also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 161.

  87. 87.

    Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, Motifs (n 20 Chap. 4), paras. 21, 81.; Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui [25 September 2009], Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June on the Admissibility of the Case (ICC-01704-01/07 OA 8), para. 73 et seq., 96–7, 111–13.

  88. 88.

    Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 72 (para. 37).

  89. 89.

    See for a discussion Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 54 et seq. (para. 24 et seq.) distinguishing between blanket (inadmissible) and conditional (potentially admissible) amnesties. For a similar approach with five criteria to evaluate amnesties Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 451 et seq.; also Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 171–72, 182 arguing that “self-issued amnesties” cannot block admissibility; Olásolo, in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, at 268 et seq.

  90. 90.

    Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 75–76, para. 40; see also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 322; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 264; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 160; Burke-White/Kaplan, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 17, at 104 (regarding Uganda); Olásolo, in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, at 270.

  91. 91.

    For the a priori-a posteriori distinction see Olásolo, Triggering procedure (2005), at 149–50, 166; id., in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, 260–61.

  92. 92.

    See also Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 601 with fn. 50; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 264; Werle, in Müller et al. (eds.) 2009, 791, at 804; Olásolo, in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, at 271 et seq.

  93. 93.

    Constitutional Court [20 January 2003] judgment C-004, MP. Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, para. 26.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. Supreme Court [31 July 2008] Rad. 28503, MP Javier Zapata Ortiz; id. [23 September 2008] Rad. 29298, MP María del Rosario González de Lemos; id. [19 July 2009] Rad. 30451, MP Yesid Ramírez Bastidas; id. [21 September 2009] Rad. 32022, MP Yesid Ramírez Bastidas.

  95. 95.

    See already supra n 39 et seq. in Chap. 3 and main text and Ambos et al., Justicia y Paz (2010), para. 319.

  96. 96.

    Interview with Luis González, Bogotá, 13 August 2009.

  97. 97.

    See http://www.verdadabierta.com/web3/justicia-y-paz/1588-ila-ley-del-silencio-semana (“por sustracción de materia”; last visited 8 October 2009).

  98. 98.

    Supreme Court, supra n 41 in Chap. 3 (Concepto de la Corte, 10. Fundamentos para emitir concepto desfavorable a la solicitud de extradición).

  99. 99.

    See http://www.verdadabierta.com/web31/justicia-y-paz/extraditados/1695-cartas-de-don-berna-y-de-el-mellizo-desde-estados-unidos (last visited 8 October 2009); http://www.verdadabierta.com/web31/justicia-y-paz/versiones/1705-mancuso-suspende-confesiones-en-justicia-y-paz (last visited 8 October 2009).

  100. 100.

    See supra n 24 in Chap. 1 and main text.

  101. 101.

    Supra n 25 in Chap. 1 and main text.

  102. 102.

    For the same result Olásolo, in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, at 282.

  103. 103.

    At first sight, the text does not point in either direction. However, no open wording – like “including” – was used that would have clarified an open nature, and, moreover, the word “considers” has been interpreted as deliberately limiting the criteria to the mentioned factors, Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 606; Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 72–3; Gropengießer/Meißner (2005) 5 ICLR 267, 282; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 104.

  104. 104.

    Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 74 para. 39; see also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 429–30 (discussing amnesty).

  105. 105.

    See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 334–35; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 266–67 criticizing the respective lacuna of article 17 in case of clemency measures without retroactive effect as to the validity of the conviction.

  106. 106.

    See Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 73, para. 38.

  107. 107.

    El Zeidy (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 931; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 118–9; Meyer (2006) 6 ICLR 549, 554; van den Wyngaert/Ongena, in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones (eds.) 2002, 705, at 724 et seq.

  108. 108.

    I made this point less forcefully earlier in Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 74, para. 39. For this reason it is, for example, of secondary importance if the investigation must be completed (see Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 117) or, with regard to para. (1)(c), the local remedies be exhausted (ibid., at 124–25).

  109. 109.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 600–1 with fn. 48; Kleffner, in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, at 79, 82.

  110. 110.

    HRW, Benchmarks (2007), 4 et seq. requires, apart from credible, impartial and independent investigation and prosecution and penalties that reflect the gravity of the crimes also the rigorous adherence to international fair trial standards. The trial conditions are however irrelevant for the question of admissibility, cf. recently Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, Motifs (n 20 Chap. 4), paras. 83 et seq. (84).

  111. 111.

    See already Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 74, para. 39.

  112. 112.

    This temporal aspect has apparently been overlooked by Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 159 et seq. who distinguishes too artificially between investigation and prosecution and therefore applies Art. 17 (1) (a) too schematically to an amnesty.

  113. 113.

    Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 77.

  114. 114.

    On these see Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 40 et seq. (para. 12 et seq.).

  115. 115.

    On the criteria that such an effective TRC must fulfill see Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 40 et seq. (46) (para. 13 et seq. [16]).

  116. 116.

    The question is left open by Robinson (2003) 14 EJIL 481, at 499–500, but his general flexible approach indicates that he takes the “slightly broader approach” discussed by himself; undecided also Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 602 and El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 315; for Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 211 punishment must be “an option”.

  117. 117.

    See for a definition Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 203.

  118. 118.

    Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 697; Scharf (1999) 32 CornJIntL 507, at 525; Bartelt (2005) 43 AVR 187, 206; Majzub (2002) 3 MelbJIntL 247, 267; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 180.

  119. 119.

    Meyer, (2006) 6 ICLR, at 565.

  120. 120.

    See also Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 177, 183; for a judicial investigation also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 315.

  121. 121.

    In this sense also Gavron (2002) 51 ICLQ 91, at 111 arguing that “to bring someone to justice” is to be interpreted in the legal, not wider moral sense. Stricter even Holmes, in Lee (ed.) 1999, 41, at 77: “Statute’s provisions on complementarity are intended to refer to criminal investigations”. In the same vein Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 268 et seq. (270).

  122. 122.

    A good example is a Commission of Inquiry as the Israeli Kahan Commission established to investigate the responsibility of Israeli government and military officials, including the then Minster of Defense Ariel Sharon, for the atrocities committed in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in September 1982 since it had, pursuant to the Israeli Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968 (reprinted in English in (1983) 22 ILM, at 658), the authority to recommend criminal prosecution.

  123. 123.

    See also Seibert-Fohr (2003) 7 MPUNYB 553, at 569 and Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 697, 711 arguing against the requirement of a criminal investigation since it is not expressly contained in Art. 17. In a similar vein Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 58–9, 101; id., in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 129; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 180–81. Too restrictive Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 76 requiring investigations within the framework of criminal proceedings; also Schomburg/Nemitz, in Schomburg/Lagodny/Gleß/Hackner (eds.) 2006, 1730 against an upward ne bis in idem effect (towards international courts).

  124. 124.

    In this sense also Seibert-Fohr (2003) 7 MPUNYB 553, at 569 linking the investigation to the prosecution requirement; also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 203; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 269 and Gropengießer/Meißner (2005) 5 ICLR 267, at 287 arguing that “proceedings which do not have the quality of a criminal proceeding cannot rule out prosecution by the Court” (emphasis added); similarly Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 137 stressing the need of criminal prosecutions after the TRC’s work has been finished; conc. (modifying his earlier position) Robinson, (2003) 14 EJIL, at 144–5 (possibility of a criminal prosecution after investigation).

  125. 125.

    See also Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 711–12.

  126. 126.

    Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 58; id., in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 117, 119; Murphy (2006) 3 Eyes on the ICC 33, at 44. See also Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 710; Seibert-Fohr (2003) 7 MPUNYB 553, at 588; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 203.

  127. 127.

    See supra n 78 and main text.

  128. 128.

    See already Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 76, para. 41.

  129. 129.

    See also Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 712.

  130. 130.

    Cf. Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 58, 101; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 205; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 268–69.

  131. 131.

    Robinson, (2003) 14 EJIL, at 500; see also Stahn (2005) 18 LJIL 425, at 463.

  132. 132.

    Conc. as to the investigation requirement Valiñas, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 281.

  133. 133.

    Supra n 48 and main text.

  134. 134.

    See Chap. 3.

  135. 135.

    See El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 163; also OTP, Complementarity (2003), para. 55, 56, which however, as the rule, propose to impose the burden on the party raising a specific issue (para. 54).

  136. 136.

    Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 53–4 (but later, at 55–6, arguing for the deletion of Rule 51); Burke-White/Kaplan, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 17, at 110.

  137. 137.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 163; OTP, Complementarity (2003), paras. 54 and 56 indicating examples of a shifting of the burden.

  138. 138.

    See already Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 76 para. 42 with further references; in the same vein El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 236; Bothe (2008) 83 Friedenswarte 59, at 65.

  139. 139.

    See Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 161, 342 suggesting the “effectiveness of the national proceedings” as an overall criterion.

  140. 140.

    See on the drafting process of the OTP policy paper Dicker, Session 1: Transcript, in ICC-OTP, First public hearing (2003). On the subjective–objective approach also Wu Wei, Rolle des Anklägers (2007), 73. On some States’ opposition to subjective elements Holmes, in Lee (ed.) 1999, 41, at 49; El Zeidy (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 899. Crit. on the term’s substance Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 115–16.

  141. 141.

    Cf. Holmes, in Lee (ed.) 1999, 41, at 50; id., in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones (eds.) 2002, 667, at 674; see also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 163 et seq. (166); id., (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 900; Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 110.

  142. 142.

    Holmes, in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones (eds.) 2002, 667, at 674; Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 605; Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 110–11; id., in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) at 168–9; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 164–5; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 52. On possible standards also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 218 et seq.

  143. 143.

    It does not refer to the preceding “unwilling or unable”, cf. El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 165; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 216 with fn. 701. The French version of the Statute expresses this more unequivocally (“véritablement à bien”), see Morel, Complémentarité (2005), 99–100; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 115. The (non authentic) German version speaks similarly of “die Ermittlungen oder die Strafverfolgung ernsthaft durchzuführen”.

  144. 144.

    IACtHR, for example Paniagua Morales et al [8 March 1998] Judgement, paras. 173; see also IACtHR, Zambrano-Vélez vs. Ecuador [4 July 2007] Judgement, para. 123; Escué-Zapata vs. Colombia [4 July 2007] Judgement, para. 106. Extensively on applicable human rights standards in this context Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 219 et seq.; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 175 et seq.

  145. 145.

    In a similar vein van der Wilt/Lyngdorf (2009) 9 ICLR 39 et seq. arguing that the ECHR’s case law on the duty to properly investigate flagrant human rights violations and its concrete assessment of state practice serves as useful guideline as to these or other States’ unwillingness or inability. See also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 167 implying incorrectly however that the said human rights jurisprudence explicitly defines the term “genuine”.

  146. 146.

    Seibert-Fohr (2003) 7 MPUNYB 553, at 570.

  147. 147.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 216.

  148. 148.

    Cf. Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 218.

  149. 149.

    For a general analysis see Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 613 et seq.; for a similar distinction Seils/Wierda, ICC and conflict mediation (2005), at 6; see also Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 138 et seq.; for a concrete proposal and analysis of inability criteria with regard to the DRC see Burke-White (2005) 18 LJIL 559, at 576 et seq. who suggests (at 576) four criteria “to judge the effectiveness of judicial systems in states recovering from a total or substantial judicial collapse”, namely availability of experienced and unbiased judicial personnel, a viable legal infrastructure, adequate operative law and a sufficient police capability. For Arsanjani/Reisman, in Sadat/Scharf (eds.), 2008, 325, at 329, inability exists if “the system (…) in unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or (is) otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”.

  150. 150.

    See Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 257–8, 314; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 104; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 168; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 191; see for further references Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 76 para. 42 with fn. 376; contrary, Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 117; also Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 42–3, 57 (but confusing).

  151. 151.

    Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 116; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 134.

  152. 152.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 258, 290 (as to “unjustified delay”).

  153. 153.

    See Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 109–10.

  154. 154.

    For a discussion see Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 253 et seq.

  155. 155.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 275.

  156. 156.

    See Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 106–07.

  157. 157.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 107.

  158. 158.

    Arbour/Bergsmo, in van Hebel/Lammers/Schukking (eds.), 1999, 129, at 131 (“devious intent”); Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 115–6; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 316; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 43. For Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 135, the purpose-requirement resembles dolus directus and he refers to State intention in the sense of Art. 16 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility (135–36).

  159. 159.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 137–38. See also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 170 pointing out that the drafters introduced “shielding” as an objective criterion.

  160. 160.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 175.

  161. 161.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 135; Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 609–10; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 261–2; Bekou, in Ulrich (ed.) 2005, 61, 73–4; Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 84; Evans (2005) 1 Human Rights Law Commentary 1, at 2–3; Gavron (2002) 51 ICLQ 91, at 111; Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 120 (“[…] une des tâche les plus ardues du Procureur”); Bothe (2008) 83 Friedenswarte 59, at 65.

  162. 162.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 252, 259, 262; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 136–7.

  163. 163.

    For a thorough discussion see Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 262 et seq.

  164. 164.

    Holmes, in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones (eds.) 2002, 667, at 675.

  165. 165.

    See for a discussion infra Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2.3.3 with n 275 et seq. In this context see Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 266–67.

  166. 166.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 136; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 194–195 (considering however that amnesties are rather a case of unavailability in the sense of article 17 (3), see infra n 279). Against blanket amnesties in this context also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 175 (“clear-cut example” of shielding); Stahn (2005) 3 JICJ 695, at 714; Gropengießer/Meißner (2005) 5 ICLR 267, at 285.

  167. 167.

    Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 137 (“sentence … manifestly insufficient in light of the gravity of the crime(s) in question and the form of participation of the accused”), yet also pointing to the “large margin of appreciation” with regard to sentencing. See also with regard to Uganda’s regime of alternative sentences Burke-White/Kaplan, in Stahn/Sluiter (eds.) 2009, 17, at 106, 111.

  168. 168.

    On this distinction Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 260 mentioning explicitly an inferior penalty as a form of partial shielding.

  169. 169.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia [30 July 2002] Judgment C-578, MP Cepeda Espinosa, sect. 4.1.2.1.7: “… que son producto de decisiones que no ofrezcan acceso efectivo a la justicia”. (“which are product of decisions which do not offer an effective access to justice”).

  170. 170.

    For a flexible approach also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 424 et seq. (426, 463 et seq.); too strict Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 117, 164, 183, 184; id., in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 130.

  171. 171.

    Seibert-Fohr (2003) 7 MPUNYB 553, at 570; on this transitional justice dilemma see also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 420 et seq., 429 et seq., 463 et seq.

  172. 172.

    But see Gavron (2002) 51 ICLQ 91, at 111–2.

  173. 173.

    Stricter Cárdenas, in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 131 arguing that impunity as certain “collateral damage” must be considered part of the purpose.

  174. 174.

    See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 260.

  175. 175.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 610; see also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 168, 316; id. (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 901.

  176. 176.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 290.

  177. 177.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 610–1; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 289; see also Holmes, in Lee (ed.) 1999, 41, at 54; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 181; id. (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 900; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 45; Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 121.

  178. 178.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 610–1; see also Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 122; Bekou, in Ulrich (ed.) 2005, 61, at 74; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 140 et seq.; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 183 et seq.

  179. 179.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 187–88.

  180. 180.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 188 et seq.

  181. 181.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 194; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 195; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 45.

  182. 182.

    See also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 194.

  183. 183.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 183, 317.

  184. 184.

    Cf. Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 119–20.

  185. 185.

    See Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 140; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 182, 184; Bekou, in Ulrich, (ed.) 2005, 61, at 75; van der Wilt/Lyngdorf (2009) 9 ICLR, at 60.

  186. 186.

    Cf. Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 300, 308–09.

  187. 187.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 612; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 47; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 300 et seq. Examining the jurisprudence in more detail, see Van der Wilt/Lyngdorf (2009) 9 ICLR, at 51 et seq.; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 145 et seq.; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 196 et seq.

  188. 188.

    ECtHR, Findlay v. United Kingdom [25 February 1997] Judgement (22107/93), para. 73 (“First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”); Pullar v. United Kingdom [10 June 1996] Judgement (22399/93) para. 30.

  189. 189.

    ECtHR, Langborger v. Sweden [22 June 1989] Judgement (11179/84) para. 32; Findlay v. United Kingdom (n 184), para. 73.

  190. 190.

    Findlay v. United Kingdom (n 184), para. 73 (“First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”); Pullar v. United Kingdom (n 184), para. 30.

  191. 191.

    Prosecutor v. Furundžija [21 July 2000] Appeal’s judgement (IT-95-17/1) para. 189.

  192. 192.

    Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 46.

  193. 193.

    On the criteria of “effectiveness” see already the reference in supra n 112.

  194. 194.

    See Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 78 (para. 43); also Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 181.

  195. 195.

    Cf. Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 143, 149–50.

  196. 196.

    Carnero R. (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 835.

  197. 197.

    See already supra n 120 and main text.

  198. 198.

    Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 22–23 (para. 2) with further references. See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 433 et seq., 446 et seq.

  199. 199.

    See Ambos, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, at 78 (para. 43) with further references.

  200. 200.

    See for a convincing critique of this “due process thesis” Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, at 260 et seq. See also Carnero R. (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 836 et seq. (852 et seq.); Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 192 et seq.

  201. 201.

    Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, 258–9; also Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 127 et seq.; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 169; contrary Carnero R. (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 837–8, 852 considering a literal interpretation “not decisive” and stressing the ambivalent meaning of “justice” as “trial” (process) or “accountability” (resulting).

  202. 202.

    For a more detailed interpretation and discussion see Carnero R. (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 838 et seq., 840 et seq. concluding that the drafting history clearly shows that the drafters favoured the intervention of the ICC only when the unfair domestic proceedings was intended to shield the person from justice (852). See also Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, at 262–3, 270 et seq.; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 193.

  203. 203.

    Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, at 272–3; Carnero R. (2005) 18 LJIL 829, at 849; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 193.

  204. 204.

    See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 221.

  205. 205.

    See also Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 193; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 152 (“blind spot vis-à-vis unfair proceedings”).

  206. 206.

    See also Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 612–13; Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 193–4, 196; Van der Wilt/Lyngdorf (2009) 9 ICLR, at 63–64, 67 et seq.; Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, at 257, 261–62.

  207. 207.

    See Heller (2006) 17 CLF 255, at 279–80 with a further reform proposal for article 14.

  208. 208.

    See for this, clearly untypical interpretation Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 131 et seq.

  209. 209.

    Cárdenas, Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 113; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 290; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 168, 236.

  210. 210.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 252.

  211. 211.

    Cf. Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 252.

  212. 212.

    See for a discussion of these reasons Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 309 et seq.

  213. 213.

    See also El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 170.

  214. 214.

    Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 195–6.

  215. 215.

    El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 170.

  216. 216.

    See Constitutional Court (n 8 in Chap. 1) (Consideraciones de la Corte VI.3.3.).

  217. 217.

    In this sense Valiñas, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 283 et seq. (286) discusses Law 975 under “restorative-guided alternative forms of justice” and recognizes that it serves “certain restorative interests”.

  218. 218.

    Judiciary Control Council, Administrative Chamber, figures available at: http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj_portal/assets/INFORME%20SAP%202.doc (last visited 8 October 2009) and http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj_portal/assets/INTERVENCION%20%20DEL%20DR.%20TORRES%20COMISION%20PRIMERA.pdf (last visited 8 October 2009).

  219. 219.

    See Rivera/Barreto, Impunidad (without date), at 11.

  220. 220.

    The case includes about 1,400 cases of violence against trade unions and their members. The cases have been filed by various trade unions due to the lack of action by the Government. They include, inter alia, cases of murder, death threats, disappearances and kidnappings. Arising from Case No. 1787, the Special Unit for Human Rights and IHL of the Office of the Prosecutor General has been assigned a total of 1,354 cases; see HRW, US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2009)

  221. 221.

    Figures available at: www.usleap.org/files/MSPSentencesMarch08.doc (last visited 8 October 2009).

  222. 222.

    Juidiciary Control Council, Resumen del Informe al Congreso (2007), available at: http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj_portal/assets/Resumen%20Informe%20al%20Congreso%202007.doc (last visited 8 October 2009).

  223. 223.

    Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (n 32 in Chap. 1); see also supra n 69 in Chap. 2 and main text.

  224. 224.

    See Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (n 32 in Chap. 1), para. 163. On the conspiracy offence see supra n 19 in Chap. 1 and main text.

  225. 225.

    Supreme Court [31 July 2009] Rad. 31539, MP Augusto Ibánez Guzmán.

  226. 226.

    Supreme Court (n 29 in Chap. 3), Consideraciones de la Corte, 5. El caso concreto: “(…) la Sala de Decisión de Justicia y Paz, no ejerció el control material (…). Nada resolvió sobre las inquietudes de los representantes de las víctimas, señalando que un pronunciamiento previo al respecto implicaría un anticipo al juicio de tipicidad planteado por la Fiscalía. Así, dejó huérfana de sustento material la diligencia, impidiendo que su objeto central y finalidades fuesen cumplidos (…)”.

  227. 227.

    See Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (n 50b in Chap. 2).

  228. 228.

    Supreme Court, supra n 46 et seq. in Chap. 2 and main text.

  229. 229.

    Supra Chap. 3 (vi) with n 28 and main text.

  230. 230.

    See Fundación Social, Trámite de la ley de justicia y paz (2006), at 114–15.

  231. 231.

    Constitutional Court [25 April 2006] Judgment C-319, MP Alvaro Tafur Galvis; id. [18 May 2006], C-370 (n 8 in Chap. 1); id. [24 May 2006] C-400, MP Alfredo Beltrán Sierra; id. [31 May 2006] C-426, MP Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto; id. [7 June 2006] C-455, MP Jaime Araújo Rentería; id. [14 June 2006] C-476, MP Alvaro Tafur Galvis; id. [12 July 2006] C-531, MP Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra; id. [25 July 2006] C-575, MP Alvaro Tafur Galvis; id. [9 August 2006] C-650, MP Alvaro Tafur Galvis; id. [16 August 2006] C-670, MP Rodrigo Escobar Gil; id. [23 August 2006] C-719, MP Jaime Araújo Rentería; id. [7 February 2007] C-080, MP Rodrigo Escobar Gil; id. [4 December 2008] C-1199, MP Nilson Pinilla Pinilla.

  232. 232.

    CCJ, Boletín No. 4 (2006).

  233. 233.

    See Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (n 32 in Chap. 1) para. 204, with regard to the obligation of the Victims Trust Fund to pay economic and symbolic reparations ordered by the Higher Tribunal for Justice and Peace; see also Supreme Court (n 16 in Chap. 1) (Rad. 26945), where the Court rejects the application of Art. 71 Law 975 despite the provision set out in art 2 of Decree 4436 of 11 December of 2006 which refers to Art. 71.

  234. 234.

    Supreme Court [21 September 2009], Rad. 32022, MP Espinoza Perez.

  235. 235.

    Supreme Court [3 December 2009], Rad. 32672, section 11.3.

  236. 236.

    Supreme Court (n 75 in Chap. 2) (Rad. 28492), Consideraciones; id. (n 11 in Chap. 2) (Rad. 29472), Consideraciones. See also supra n 10 in Chap. 2 and main text.

  237. 237.

    Supreme Court (n 11 in Chap. 2) (Rad. 29472), Consideraciones. On the grounds for exclusion see supra n 12–15 in Chap. 2 with main text.

  238. 238.

    Supreme Court (n 11 in Chap. 2) (Rad. 29472), Consideraciones.; see also Art. 8 (1) of Decree 4760 of 2005.

  239. 239.

    Constitutional Court (n 8 in Chap. 1) (Consideraciones de la Corte, 6.2.4.3.1.3.).

  240. 240.

    See Art. 32 (1) Law 975.

  241. 241.

    For a detailed critical analysis of this framework see Ambos et al., Justicia y Paz (2010), para. 73 et seq.

  242. 242.

    With regard to the imputation of the crimes committed by members of illegal armed groups as war crimes or crimes against humanity, see CitPax, Imputación de crímenes internacionales (2009).

  243. 243.

    See supra Chap. 3 espec. (iv)–(vi).

  244. 244.

    Supra Chap. 3 (vii) n 39 et seq. with main text.

  245. 245.

    See infra n 254 with main text.

  246. 246.

    For a critical analysis in this respect, see International Human Rights Law Clinic Berkeley, Truth Behind Bars (2010).

  247. 247.

    See supra n 22 et seq. in Chap. 1, 12 et seq. in Chap. 3 and 68 in this Chap., always with main text.

  248. 248.

    See Art. 324 no. 17 para. 3 CCP as quoted supra n 26 in Chap. 1.

  249. 249.

    See supra n 13 in Chap. 1 with main text.

  250. 250.

    See Supreme Court [18 October 2005] Rad. 24311, MP Alfredo Gómez Quintero; id. [18 October 2005] Rad. 2431), MP Marina Pulido de Barón; id. [27 October 2005] Rad. 24526, MP Alfredo Gómez Quintero.

  251. 251.

    See Constitutional Court, Judgement C-370 (n 229).

  252. 252.

    Part I Chap. 2.1.

  253. 253.

    See already Chap. 3 (iii) with n 19 et seq.

  254. 254.

    Interview with a demobilized paramilitary member, Bogotá, 16 August 2009.

  255. 255.

    These blocks operated in the departments of Guajira, Magdalena, Atlántico and Cesar in the North of Colombia.

  256. 256.

    See Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Proceso de Paz (without date).

  257. 257.

    See Huber, ¿Qué quieren las víctimas? (2009).

  258. 258.

    According to the Special Unit for Justice and Peace of the Office of the Prosecutor General, 24,304 demobilized persons have fully been identified and their criminal records have been examined (FGN-UJP, Oficio 012896 (2009), at 8 and 19). One must not overlook, however, that in many cases complaints have not been filed by victims for fear of reprisals or the complaints do not indicate the responsible persons.

  259. 259.

    See for example the case of the former military commander Rito Alejo del Rio Ríos, accused of links to paramilitary groups (Supreme Court [11 March 2009] Rad. 30510, MP Yesid Ramírez Bastidas).

  260. 260.

    To be distinguished from the investigations by other units than UJP against the demobilized members themselves, see supra Chap. 3 (ii) with n 17.

  261. 261.

    FGN-UJP, Aplicación Ley 975 (2009).

  262. 262.

    See Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, Observatorio (2009).

  263. 263.

    In such cases, the Prosecutor of the ICC, according to the positive complementarity principle, should try to encourage a State to prosecute cases in an adequate way; see Ryngaert, in Ryngaert (ed.), 2009, 146, at 171.

  264. 264.

    Holmes, in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones (eds.) 2002, 667, at 677; Wei, Rolle des Anklägers (2007), at 74; Evans, (2005) 1 Human Rights Law Commentary 1, at 4; Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 129; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 152–53; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 222.

  265. 265.

    See El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 227 with references for both positions.

  266. 266.

    Arsanjani/Reismann, in Sadat/Scharf (eds.) 329; OTP, Complementarity, supra n 77 in Chap. 5, para. 49; El Zeidy (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 903; Philips (1999) 10 CLF 61, at 79. – For the practically little relevant question if the qualifier “total or substantial” also refers to unavailability see Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 153.

  267. 267.

    “Judicial system” must be understood broadly, see Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 154.

  268. 268.

    For a discussion see Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 326 et seq.

  269. 269.

    Cárdenas, in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 125; id., Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 126; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 314–5 (“could arguably be temporary, albeit not too brief, […]”).

  270. 270.

    Cf. Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 154, 160.

  271. 271.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 614; Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 86; Greppi, in Politi/Gioia (eds.) 2008, 63, at 64.

  272. 272.

    Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 196; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 48; Ellis (2002) 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 215, 238 et seq.

  273. 273.

    For “relevant facts and evidence” see ICC-OTP, Complementarity in practice (2003), para. 50.

  274. 274.

    Arsanjani/Reismann, in Sadat/Scharf (eds.), at 330–1; Hoffmeister/Knoke (1999) 59 ZaöRV 785, at 798; Philips (1999) 10 CLF, at 79; Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 132; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 224 et seq., Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 48–9.

  275. 275.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 316; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 226.

  276. 276.

    Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 614; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 316.

  277. 277.

    Hall, Suggestions concerning ICC prosecutorial policy and strategy (2003), at 17; El Zeidy (2002) 32 MichJIntL 869, at 903–04; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), 32–3; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 48–9; differentiated Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 315–6.

  278. 278.

    Wouters/Verhoeven, in Ankumah/Kwakwa (eds.) 2005, 133, 138.

  279. 279.

    Cf. Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 155; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 225.

  280. 280.

    Crit. of the lack of clarity Morel, Complémentarité (2005), at 133.

  281. 281.

    Cf. Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 155, 160.

  282. 282.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 316–7.

  283. 283.

    In contrast Cárdenas, in Kleffner/Kor (eds.) 2006, 115, at 124; id., Zulässigkeitsprüfung (2005), at 128 argues – based on the authentic Spanish version of article 17 (3) (“al hecho de que carece ”) – that a system is only unavailable when it is non-existent. See also Burke-White (2008) 19 CLF 59, 74 (“lack of judicial infrastructure”); contrary, Hall, Suggestions concerning ICC prosecutorial policy and strategy (2003), at 17; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 226–7.

  284. 284.

    See ICC-OTP, Complementarity in practice (2003), para. 49 with fn. 15: “It is suggested that the term ‘unavailability’ should be given a broad interpretation, so as to cover the various ‘inability’ scenarios in the latter part of Article 17(3) and to cover typical cases of inability”. See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 317–8; Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 153 (“any unavailability”) and Meißner, Zusammenarbeit (2003), at 87 arguing that a functioning judiciary exists but it cannot deal with the particular case for normative or factual reasons.

  285. 285.

    For a detailed discussion see Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 319 et seq.; see also Benzing (2003) 7 MPUNYB 591, at 614: “capacity overload”; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 227–8; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 49.

  286. 286.

    This argument has been recently developed by van der Wilt/Lyngdorf (2009) 9 ICLR, at 39 et seq. arguing that the ECHR’s case law on the duty to properly investigate flagrant human rights violations and its concrete assessment of state practice serves as useful guideline as to these or other States’ unwillingness or inability. See also Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 222 et seq., 318.

  287. 287.

    Cf. Gropengießer/Meißner (2005) 5 ICLR 267, at 282 et seq.; Kreicker, in Eser/Sieber/Kreicker (eds.) 2006, at 305.

  288. 288.

    In this sense O’Shea, Amnesty (2002), at 126 arguing that a failure to prosecute based on amnesty would amount to an inability to prosecute owing to the unavailability of the state’s national judicial system; for inability due to a blanket amnesty also Burke-White (2005) 18 LJIL 559, at 582; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 322 (law not “at disposal”); Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 160–61. See also Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 195 arguing that “amnesties have to be subsumed in general under the notion of unavailability, since it would contradict the whole purpose of an amnesty if it could easily be lifted in a concrete case” and concluding with regard to Sudan (at 223) that immunity “leads to unavailability”. See also Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 106 (regarding amnesty) 157–58 (“statutory limitations”, “bar to carrying out the proceedings”); El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 227.

  289. 289.

    Kleffner (2003) 1 JICJ 86, 89; id., Complementarity (2008), at 156–7; El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 227; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 49 et seq.; Bekou, in Ulrich (ed.) 2005, 61, at 78. – An example provides the ICTR decision in the case of Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza: though not in the context of the ICC Statute, the ICTR had to decide on a comparable issue when the Norway requested a referral of the just mentioned case to its authorities based on rule 11bis ICTR RPE. Since Norway had not implemented the crime of genocide into its national criminal law, the ICTR’s Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that Norway lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae over the crimes as charged in the indictment, and consequently “Bagaragaza’s alleged criminal acts cannot be given their full legal qualification under Norwegian criminal law, and the request for the referral to the Kingdom of Norway falls to be dismissed” (Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza [19 May 2006] Decision on the Prosecution’s motion for referral to the Kingdom of Norway, ICTR-2005-86-R11, para. 16).

  290. 290.

    Arsanjani/Reismann, in Sadat/Scharf (eds.), at 329 et seq.; Philips (1999) 10 CLF, at 79; Holmes, in Lee (ed.) 1999, 41, at 48.

  291. 291.

    Arsanjani/Reismann, in Sadat/Scharf (eds.), at 331 et seq.

  292. 292.

    Burke-White (2005) 18 LJIL 559, at 579.

  293. 293.

    Pichon (2008) 8 ICLR 185, at 197; Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 319 et seq. (321), 336; Razesberger, Complementarity (2006), at 51, 153 et seq.; in the result also Kleffner, Complementarity (2008), at 119 et seq. (123); for a different interpretation stressing the difference between ordinary and international crimes El Zeidy, Complementarity (2008), at 290 et seq.; similarly (albeit too superficial) Sedman, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 265–66.

  294. 294.

    Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 323 (limiting factual obstacles to external ones).

  295. 295.

    Cf. Stigen, Relationship (2008), at 329–30.

  296. 296.

    See already supra n 237 with main text.

  297. 297.

    Inter alia the CNRR and the Regional Commissions for Property Restitution (Comisiones Regionales para la Restitución de Bienes).

  298. 298.

    Inter alia the UJP, three Pre-Trial Chambers and a Trial Chamber for Justice and Peace in the Higher Tribunals of Barranquilla, Medellín and Bogotá, a specialized Unit for Justice and Peace in the Procuraduría and two special units of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo).

  299. 299.

    See e.g. for Acción Social, supra n 64 in Chap. 2.

  300. 300.

    See FGN-UJP, Oficio 012896 (2009), at 17.

  301. 301.

    See http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/GCRP/Presentaciones_Renteria/CR_Justicia_2019(27_oct_08).pdf (last visited 9 October 2009).

  302. 302.

    See the map drawn by the FGN-UJP, Sub-Unidad de Búsqueda de Desaparecidos, available at: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/EXH/imagenes/mapa-de-colombia.jpg (last visited 23 November 2009); FGN, Informe de Gestión (2009), at 109; id., ‘20 grupos satélites de la Policía Judicial’, available at: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Despachos.htm (last visited 9 October 2009).

  303. 303.

    See the nationwide presence of the CNRR through its 12 regional offices, available at: http://www.cnrr.org.co (last visited 9 October 2009). Also, between 2006 and 2009, the UJP has organized events for victims in 352 municipalities, which were attended by 70,957 persons (cf. FGN-UJP, Aplicación Ley 975 (2009)).

  304. 304.

    See supra n 25 in Chap. 3.

  305. 305.

    See para. 3 of the interpretative declaration of 5 August 2002 to Art. 17 ICC Statute: “Concerning article 17 (3), Colombia declares that the use of the word ‘otherwise’ with respect to the determination of the State’s ability to investigate or prosecute a case refers to the obvious absence of objective conditions necessary to conduct the trial”. (available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/909EEAAE157FBD43412566E100542BDE?OpenDocument, last visited 9 October 2009).

  306. 306.

    Constitutional Court (n 165) (V.4.3.2.1.5. La regulación del principio de complementariedad).

  307. 307.

    See also Castillo/García Villegas/Soledad Granada, in García Villegas (ed.) 2008, 168 (“Sin embargo, la violencia no ha impedido el funcionamiento de un sistema judicial que, cuando se compara con los de otros países latinoamericanos, tiene una sorprendente autonomía respecto del sistema político y una notoria estabilidad institucional.”).

  308. 308.

    Chapter 3 (ii) with n 17.

  309. 309.

    Iguarán (n 51).

  310. 310.

    During the free version hearings 32,909 crimes have been confessed (among them 26,163 homicides and 2,282 cases of forced disappearance) involving 47,054 victims; 14,612 of the confessed crimes, involving more than 16,000 victims, have been described in more detail (among them 9,214 homicides and 1,278 forced disappearances) (cf. FGN-UJP, Aplicación Ley 975 (2009)).

  311. 311.

    Comité Interinstitucional de Justicia y Paz, Matriz (2009).

  312. 312.

    Cfr. Burbidge (2008) ICLR 8, 557, at 586 (“Nevertheless the process is beginning to produce some results. It is difficult not to be impressed by a visit to the Fiscalia’s Justice and Peace web-site where the photographs of all the paramilitary accused are displayed. The calendar throughout 2007–2008 is thick with public hearings in which the accused have their appointments to make a full confession.”).

  313. 313.

    See supra Chap. 3 (vii) with n 44 and in this Chap. n 94 et seq. with main text (in this Chap.).

  314. 314.

    Since the extradition of the paramilitary commanders in May 2008, only a few cases have slowly advanced, e.g. those of Salvatore Mancuso, Diego Murillo Bejerano (aka don Berna), Ramiro Vanoy (aka Cuco Vanoy) and Guillermo Pérez Alzate (aka Pablo Sevillano), see Caracol, Extradición de paramilitares estancó sus procesos judiciales en Colombia, 13 de mayo de 2009, available at: http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=811096 (last visited 9 October 2009).

  315. 315.

    Concerning the case load of the Special Unit for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Prosecutor General, see FGN, Informe de Gestión (2009), at 112.

  316. 316.

    FGN-UJP, Aplicación Ley 975 (2009).

  317. 317.

    According to police figures 51.921 GAOML members have demobilized (among them approx. 16.000 members of guerilla groups), see Policía Nacional de Colombia, Desmovilizados colectivos e individuals (2009).

  318. 318.

    Ibid.

  319. 319.

    Namely the commanders of the blocks of Cundinamarca, Montes de María, Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada, Autodefensas Campesinas de Puerto Boyacá, Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio, Frente Julio Peinado Becerra, Frente Héroes de los Llanos y el Guaviare and Élmer Cárdenas; see http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Audiencias.asp (last visited 9 October 2009)

  320. 320.

    Salvatore Mancuso (Catatumbo and Cordoba blocks), Ramiro “Cuco” Vanoy (Minerso block) and Guillermo Perez Alzate (Libertadores del Sur block).

  321. 321.

    The most advanced cases are those of Wilson Salazar Carrascal (n 32 in Chap. 1, n 311) and Gian Carlo Gutiérrez Suárez (main text after n 220), i.e. cases of mere foot soldiers (patrulleros).

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  1. University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, 37073, Göttingen, Germany

    Professor Dr. jur. Kai Ambos (Head Department for Foreign and International Criminal Law Chair for Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law and International Criminal Law Judge at the Provincial Court (Landgericht) Göttingen)

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Ambos, K. (2010). Gravity and Complementarity Stricto Sensu . In: The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the International Criminal Court. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11273-7_5

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