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Ad Exchanges: Research Issues

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Book cover Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5929))

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Abstract

An emerging way to sell and buy display ads on the Internet is via ad exchanges. RightMedia [1], AdECN [2] and DoubleClick Ad Exchange [3] are examples of such real-time two-sided markets. We describe an abstraction of this market. Based on that abstraction, we present several research directions and discuss some insights.

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References

  1. RightMedia, http://www.rightmedia.com/ More info at, http://www.rightmedia.com/right-media-101/

  2. AdECN. http://www.adecn.com/ . Whitepaper at, http://www.adecn.com/resources/ A True Exchange for Online Advertising.pdf. Presentation at, http://www.adecn.com/resources/AdECNPresentation.pps

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Google Inc.,  

    S. Muthukrishnan

Authors
  1. S. Muthukrishnan
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information and Systems, Sapienza University of Rome, Via Ariosto 25, 00185, Roma, Italy

    Stefano Leonardi

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Muthukrishnan, S. (2009). Ad Exchanges: Research Issues. In: Leonardi, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5929. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10840-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10841-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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