Abstract
In this chapter, the conceptual analysis developed in the previous chapter is applied to the following countries: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. In particular, we discuss the conformity of the actual design of these OECD countries’ health care financing schemes with the economic arguments for mandatory cross-subsidies and for mandatory coverage. We observe that several countries (e.g. Australia, Belgium, France and Israel) opted for the introduction of universal mandatory coverage for a comprehensive and uniform package of services. As discussed in Chap. 2 this measure is not per se necessary and proportionate to achieve an affordable access to (the coverage of) health care services for vulnerable groups. Alternatively, governments could rely either on the two-option scheme or the single-option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles. Although the latter scheme is likely to be preferable from an economic perspective, it is not implemented in any of the considered countries. Only the Netherlands and Switzerland come close to this scheme given that they have implemented a single-option scheme with traditional deductibles (fixed amounts) for curative health care services. However, the fixed deductible levels may be too high for low-income people and too low for high-income individuals. In addition, long-term care services are covered by a universal single-option scheme with mandatory income-related copayments in the Netherlands (AWBZ). As far as the two-option scheme is concerned, it is implemented in Germany and Ireland. Nevertheless, the high-option scheme for low-income people seems to be too broad in Germany and too small in Ireland.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
These studies are consistent with the literature (Newhouse 1993b). It has to be acknowledged that the overall price-elasticity, which equals −0.14 for the six types of care in van Vliet (2004), is in the middle of the range reported by the RAND study. This indicates that according to the RAND experiment individuals are on average more sensitive to price-variations for the different types of care than the Dutch privately insured.
- 2.
However, the RAND study used high copayments rates that seem unthinkable in the context of most countries considered here.
- 3.
For long-term care (e.g. nursing home care), the Netherlands implemented a universal single-option scheme (i.e. AWBZ) with mandatory income-related copayments.
References
Buchner, F., & Wasem, J. (2003). Needs for further improvement: risk adjustment in the German health insurance system. Health Policy, 65(1), 21–35.
Butler, J. R. G. (2007). Adverse selection in Australian private health insurance. ACERH Policy Forum.
Connelly, L. B., & Brown, H. S., III. (2006). Lifetime subsidies in Australian private health insurance markets with community rating. The Geneva Papers, 31, 705–719.
Desmond, K. A., Rice, T., & Fox, P. D. (2006). Does greater Medicare HMO enrollment cause adverse selection into Medigap? Health Economics, Policy and Law, 1(1), 3–21.
Ergas, H., & Paolucci, F. (2010). Providing and financing aged care in Australia (mimeo).
Ettner, S. L. (1997). Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap Insurance by the elderly. Journal of Health Economics, 16(5), 543–562.
Murray, C. J. L., Lauer, J. A., Hutubessy, R. C. W., Niessen, L., Tomijima, N., Rodgers, A., et al. (2003). Effectiveness and costs of interventions to lower systolic blood pressure and cholesterol: a global and regional analysis onreduction of cardiovascular-disease risk. Lancet, 361, 717–725.
Paolucci, F., Butler, J. R. G., & van de Ven, W. P. M. M. (2008). Subsidising private health insurance in Australia: Why, how and how to proceed? ACERH Working Paper Series 2, October 2008.
Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC). (2007). Operations of the Private Health Insurers: Annual Report 2006–07. Canberra: PHIAC.
Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC). (2009). Operations of the Private Health Insurers: Annual Report 2008–09. Canberra: PHIAC.
Sandier, S., & Ulmann, P. (2001). Voluntary health insurance in France: a study for the European Commission. Paris: ARgeSES/CNAM.
Schokkaert, E., & Van de Voorde, C. (2003). Belgium: Risk adjustment and financial responsibility in a centralised system. Health Policy, 65(1), 5–19.
Shmueli, A., Chernivkovsky, D., & Zmora, I. (2003). Risk adjustment and risk sharing: The Israeli experience. Health Policy, 65(1), 37–48.
Steinbrook, R. M. D. (2006). Health care reform in Massachusetts – A work in progress. New England Journal of Medicine, 354, 2095–2098.
Newhouse, J. P. (1993b). Free for all? Lessons from the RAND health insurance experiment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M., Beck, K., Van de Voorde, C., Wasem, J., & Zmora, I. (2007). Risk adjustment and risk selection in Europe: 6 years later. Health Policy, 83(2–3), 162–179.
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M., & Schut, F. T. (2008). Universal mandatory health insurance in the Netherlands: A model for the United States? Health Affairs, 27(3), 771–781.
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M., & Schut, F. T. (2009). Managed competition in the Netherlands: still work-in-progress. Health Economics, 18(3), 253–255.
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M., van Vliet, R. C. J. A., Schut, F. T., & van Barneveld, E. M. (2000). Access to coverage for high-risks in a competitive individual health insurance market: via premium rate restrictions or risk-adjusted premium subsidies? Journal of Health Economics, 19(3), 311–339.
Van Kleef, R. C., Beck, K., van de Ven, W. P. M. M., & van Vliet, R. C. J. A. (2007). Does risk equalization reduce the viability of voluntary deductibles? International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 7, 43–58.
Van Kleef, R. C., van de Ven, W. P. M. M., & van Vliet, R. C. J. A. (2006). A voluntary deductible in social health insurance with risk equalization: Community-rated or risk-rated premium rebate? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73(3), 359–550.
Van Vliet, R. C. J. A. (2004). Deductibles and health care expenditures: empirical estimates of price sensitivity based on administrative data. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 4(4), 283–305.
Wolfe, J. R., & Goddeeris, J. H. (1991). Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Health Economics, 10(4), 433–459.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Paolucci, F. (2011). The Design of Health Care Financing Schemes in Different Countries. In: Health Care Financing and Insurance. Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10794-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10794-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10793-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10794-8
eBook Packages: MedicineMedicine (R0)