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Quantitative Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol through Model Checking

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Book cover Information Systems Security (ICISS 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5905))

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Abstract

In the probabilistic non-repudiation protocol without a trusted third party as presented in [5], the recipient of a service can cheat the originator of the service with some probability. This probability indicates the degree of fairness of the protocol and is referred as ε-fairness. In this paper, we analyze the protocol quantitatively through probabilistic model checking. The ε-fairness is quantitatively measured by modeling the protocol in PRISM model checker and verifying appropriate property specified in PCTL. Moreover, our analysis gives proper insight to choose proper values for different parameters associated with the protocol in such a way that certain degree of fairness can be achieved and therefore answers the reverse question, given the degree of fairness ε, how should one choose the protocol parameters to ensure fairness.

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References

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Saha, I., Mukhopadhyay, D. (2009). Quantitative Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol through Model Checking. In: Prakash, A., Sen Gupta, I. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5905. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10771-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10772-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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