Abstract
We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
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Pirandola, S., Braunstein, S.L., Lloyd, S. (2009). On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels. In: Childs, A., Mosca, M. (eds) Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography. TQC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5906. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10698-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10698-9_5
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