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Designing Adaptive Artificial Agents for an Economic Production and Conflict Model

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Artificial Life: Borrowing from Biology (ACAL 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5865))

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Abstract

Production and conflict models have been used over the past 30 years to represent the effects of unproductive resource allocation in economics. Their major applications are in modelling the assignment of property rights, rent-seeking and defense economics. This paper describes the process of designing an agent used in a production and conflict model. Using the capabilities of an agent-based approach to economic modelling, we have enriched a simple decision-maker of the kind used in classic general equilibrium economic models, to build an adaptive and interactive agent which uses its own attributes, its neighbors’ parameters and information from its environment to make resource allocation decisions. Our model presents emergent and adaptive behaviors than cannot be captured using classic production and conflict agents. Some possible extensions for future applications are also recommended.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, VIC, 3800, Australia

    Behrooz Hassani-M & Brett W. Parris

Authors
  1. Behrooz Hassani-M
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  2. Brett W. Parris
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology, Monash University, 3800, Clayton, Victoria, Australia

    Kevin Korb

  2. School of Information Technology, Bond University, University Drive, Gold Coast, 4229, Queensland, Australia

    Marcus Randall

  3. Faculty of Information and Communication Technologies, Swinburne University of Technology, 3112, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Tim Hendtlass

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hassani-M, B., Parris, B.W. (2009). Designing Adaptive Artificial Agents for an Economic Production and Conflict Model. In: Korb, K., Randall, M., Hendtlass, T. (eds) Artificial Life: Borrowing from Biology. ACAL 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5865. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10427-5_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10427-5_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10426-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10427-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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