Abstract
Modeling the competition among telecommunication operators (or providers) as a repeated game may explain why tacit collusion to maintain high charging prices can be observed. Such outcomes clearly do not benefit the users, nor do they provide operators with incentives to improve the network quality of service to outperform their competitors. We propose a simple regulation based on price stability over time, to modify the game played by operators in a way that could prevent collusion.
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Maillé, P., Naldi, M., Tuffin, B. (2009). Understanding and Preventing Tacit Collusion among Telecommunication Operators. In: Núñez-Queija, R., Resing, J. (eds) Network Control and Optimization. NET-COOP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5894. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10406-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10406-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10405-3
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