Abstract
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of the implementation of a hierarchical authority structure on the set of players in the context of a cooperative game with transferable utilities. In this analysis it is assumed that an exogenously given authority structure is imposed and puts certain constraints on the behavior of the players in the game.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gilles, R.P. (2010). Cooperative Theories of Hierarchical Organizations. In: The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 44. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_6
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05281-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-05282-8
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