Axiomatic Value Theory

  • Robert P. GillesEmail author
Part of the Theory and Decision Library C book series (TDLC, volume 44)


So far we have focussed our discussion on the Core and related set theoretic solution concepts as concepts that address the fundamental problem of cooperative game theory—the identification of stable binding agreements between the participating players. As such these set theoretic solution concepts consist of allocations that satisfy some fundamental properties of negotiating power of coalitions and, consequently, are founded on a description of the bargaining power of the coalitions of players.


Cooperative Game Coalitional Structure Cooperative Game Theory Strong Monotonicity Null Player 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Management School, Queen’s UniversityBelfastUK

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