Abstract
The main fundamental question in cooperative game theory is the question how to allocate the total generated wealth by the collective of all players—the player set N itself—over the different players in the game. In other words, what binding contract between the players in N has to be written? Various criteria have been developed.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gilles, R.P. (2010). The Core of a Cooperative Game. In: The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 44. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_2
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05281-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-05282-8
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