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Model-Driven Configuration of SELinux Policies

  • Conference paper
On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2009 (OTM 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5871))

Abstract

The need for access control in computer systems is inherent. However, the complexity to configure such systems is constantly increasing which affects the overall security of a system negatively. We think that it is important to define security requirements on a non-technical level while taking the application domain into respect in order to have a clear and separated view on security configuration (i.e. unblurred by technical details). On the other hand, security functionality has to be tightly integrated with the system and its development process in order to provide comprehensive means of enforcement. In this paper, we propose a systematic approach based on model-driven security configuration to leverage existing operating system security mechanisms (SELinux) for realising access control. We use UML models and develop a UML profile to satisfy these needs. Our goal is to exploit a comprehensive protection mechanism while rendering its security policy manageable by a domain specialist.

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Agreiter, B., Breu, R. (2009). Model-Driven Configuration of SELinux Policies. In: Meersman, R., Dillon, T., Herrero, P. (eds) On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2009. OTM 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5871. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05151-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05151-7_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05150-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-05151-7

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