Toward the Theory of Cooperative Games under Incomplete Information
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In the conventional cooperative games, it is assumed that the payoff of each coalition is known. However, in the real world problems, there may exist situations in which some coalitional values are unknown. In this paper, we take the first step toward the theory of cooperative games under incomplete information of coalitional values. We define concepts related to such incomplete games. We investigate the solution concepts in a special case when only values of the grand coalition and singleton coalitions are known. We show that there exists a focal point solution which is commonly suggested in many points of view.
KeywordsCooperative game lower game upper game reference point game Shapley value nucleolus
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