Abstract
We consider a process called Group Network Formation Game, which represents the scenario when strategic agents are building a network together. In our game, agents can have extremely varied connectivity requirements, and attempt to satisfy those requirements by purchasing links in the network. We show a variety of results about equilibrium properties in such games, including the fact that the price of stability is 1 when all nodes in the network are owned by players, and that doubling the number of players creates an equilibrium as good as the optimum centralized solution. For the most general case, we show the existence of a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as good as the centralized optimum solution, as well as how to compute good approximate equilibria in polynomial time. Our results essentially imply that for a variety of connectivity requirements, giving agents more freedom can paradoxically result in more efficient outcomes.
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Anshelevich, E., Caskurlu, B. (2009). Exact and Approximate Equilibria for Optimal Group Network Formation. In: Fiat, A., Sanders, P. (eds) Algorithms - ESA 2009. ESA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5757. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04128-0_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04128-0_21
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