Abstract
We study a stochastic sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population of privately-informed buyers. We characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic VCG mechanism is both efficient and periodic ex post incentive compatible; we also show that the revenue-maximizing direct mechanism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. We then consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without a reserve price. We construct equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect mechanism where bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes.
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© 2009 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Said, M. (2009). Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization. In: Das, S., Ostrovsky, M., Pennock, D., Szymanksi, B. (eds) Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. AMMA 2009. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 14. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03820-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03821-1
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