Abstract
End-to-end voting schemes have shown considerable promise for allowing voters to verify that tallies are accurate. At the same time, the threat of coercion has generally been considered only when voting devices are honest, and in many schemes, voters can be forced or incentivized to cast votes of an adversary’s choice. In this paper, we examine the issue of voter coercion and identify one example method for coercing voters in a scheme by Benaloh. To address such attacks, we present a formal definition of coercion resistance for end-to-end voting. We then present a new scheme, extended from Benaloh’s, that is provably coercion resistant. In addition to providing accuracy and coercion resistance, our scheme emphasizes ease-of-use for the voter.
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation grant CNS-0524252.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Kohno, T., Stubblefield, A., Rubin, A.D., Wallach, D.S.: Analysis of an electronic voting system. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2004)
Feldman, A.J., Halderman, J.A., Felten, E.W.: Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine. In: EVT 2007:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Hursti, H.: Diebold TSx evaluation: Critical security issues with Diebold TSx (May 2006), http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreportIIunredacted.pdf
Proebstel, E., Riddle, S., Hsu, F., Cummins, J., Oakley, F., Stanionis, T., Bishop, M.: An analysis of the Hart Intercivic dau eslate. In: EVT 2007: USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Gardner, R., Yasinsac, A., Bishop, M., Kohno, T., Hartley, Z., Kerski, J., Gainey, D., Walega, R., Hollander, E., Gerke, M.: Software review and security analysis of the Diebold voting machine software. Technical report, Florida Department of State (July 2007)
Calandrino, J.A., Feldman, A.J., Halderman, J.A., Wagner, D., Yu, H., Zeller, W.P.: Source code review of the Diebold voting system. Technical report, California Secretary of State (July 2007)
Inguva, S., Rescorla, E., Shacham, H., Wallach, D.S.: Source code review of the Hart InterCivic voting system. Technical report, California Secretary of State (July 2007)
Blaze, M., Cordero, A., Engle, S., Karlof, C., Sastry, N., Sherr, M., Stegers, T., Yee, K.P.: Source code review of the Sequoia voting system. Technical report, California Secretary of State (July 2007)
Neff, A.: Practical high certainity intent verification for encrypted votes (2004), http://www.votehere.com/vhti/documentation
Chaum, D.: Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Security and Privacy 2(1), 38–47 (2004)
Riva, B., Ta-Shma, A.: Bare-handed electronic voting with pre-processing. In: EVT 2007:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Benaloh, J.: Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing. In: EVT 2007:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: EVT 2006:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2006)
Rivest, R.L., Smith, W.D.: Three voting protocols: Threeballot, VAV, and twin. In: EVT 2007: USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Cranor, L.F., Cytron, R.K.: Sensus: A security-conscious electronic polling system for the internet. In: HICSS 1997: Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (1997)
Karlof, C., Sastry, N., Wagner, D.: Cryptographic voting protocols: A systems perspective. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2005)
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust. In: CCS 2007: ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security (2007)
Chaum, D.: Punch scan, http://www.punchscan.org/learnmore.php
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 373–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract). In: STOC 1994: ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (1994)
Hirt, M., Sako, K.: Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, p. 539. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Stenger, R.: Vote-selling web site to be revived, possibly offshore. CNN (August 2005), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/24/internet.vote/index.html
Tribune, S.: U student who offered his vote on eBay gets community service. Star Tribune (2008), http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/26063069.html
Local 6, O.: Man accused of trying to sell vote (October 2004), http://www.local6.com/news/3834797/detail.html
Yao, A.C.: Protocols for secure computations. In: FOCS 1982: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (1982)
Benaloh, J.D.C.: Verifiable Secret-ballot Elections. PhD thesis, Yale University (1987)
Chaum, D.: Elections with unconditionally secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA. In: Günther, C.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1988. LNCS, vol. 330, pp. 177–182. Springer, Heidelberg (1988)
Magkos, E., Burmester, M., Chrissikopoulos, V.: Receipt-freeness in large-scale elections without untappable channels. In: I3E 2001: IFIP Conference on Towards The E-Society (2001)
Benaloh, J.: Administrative and public verifiablity: Can we have both? In: EVT 2008:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2008)
Chaum, D., Ryan, P.Y., Schneider, S.: A practical voter-verifiable election scheme. In: di Vimercati, S.d.C., Syverson, P.F., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 118–139. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Ryan, P.Y., Peacock, T.: Prêt à voter: A systems perspective. Technical report, University of Newcastle (2005)
Ryan, P.: Prêt à Voter with Pallier encryption. Technical report (2006), http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/research/pubs/trs/papers/965.pdf
Xia, Z., Schneider, S.A., Heather, J., Traore, J.: Analysis, improvement and simplification of prêt à voter with pallier encryption. In: EVT 2008:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2008)
Chaum, D., Carback, R., Clark, J., Essex, A., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R., Ryan, P., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T.: Scantegrity II: End-to-end verifiability for optical scan election systems using invisible ink confirmation codes. In: EVT 2008:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2008)
Chaum, D., Essex, A., Carback, R., Clark, J., Popveniuc, S., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.: Scantegrity: End-to-end voter verifiable optical scan voting. IEEE Security and Privacy 6 (2008)
Rackoff, C., Simon, D.R.: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 433–444. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Millimix: Mixing in small batches. Technical Report 99-33, DIMACS (1999)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Rivest, R.L.: Making mix nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2002)
Golle, P., Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Syverson, P.F.: Universal re-encryption for mixnets. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2004. LNCS, vol. 2964, pp. 163–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on Computing 18(1) (1989)
Pedersen, T.P.: A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party. In: Davies, D.W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1991. LNCS, vol. 547, pp. 522–526. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)
Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: WPES 2005:ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (2005)
Teague, V., Ramchen, K., Naish, L.: Coercion-resistant tallying for STV voting. In: EVT 2008:USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2008)
Canetti, R., Gennaro, R.: Incoercible multiparty computation (extended abstract). In: FOCS 1996: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (1996)
Dodis, Y., Yampolskiy, A.: A verifiable random function with short proofs and keys. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3386, pp. 416–431. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Efficient selective-ID secure identity-based encryption without random oracles. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Galbraith, S.D.: Supersingular curves in cryptography (2001)
Joux, A., Nguyen, K.: Separating decision diffie-hellman from computational diffie-hellman in cryptographic groups. Journal of Cryptography 16(4), 239–247 (2001)
Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, p. 213. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabalistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Science 28(2) (1984)
Micali, S., Rackoff, C., Sloan, B.: The notion of security for probabilistic cryptosystems. SIAM Journal on Computing 17(2), 412–426 (1988)
Neff, A.: Election confidence: A comparison of methodologies and their relative effectiveness at achieving it (2003), http://www.votehere.com .
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Gardner, R.W., Garera, S., Rubin, A.D. (2009). Coercion Resistant End-to-end Voting. In: Dingledine, R., Golle, P. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5628. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03548-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03549-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)