Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Network

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4078)


We study on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on network to clarify the influence of the network structures on agent strategies, and vice versa. A model is proposed to treat an interaction between the agent strategies and the network formation process. In case of a fixed network, it is observed that the distribution as well as the propagation speed of an agent strategy depends on the network structure. In an experiment combining the agent evolution and the network formation, a novel network that has a few agents connected by all of other agents appears.


game theory prisoner’s dilemma small world network network formation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Information Science and TechnologyThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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