Thinking beyond the Bereitschaftspotential: Consciousness of Self and Others as a Necessary Condition for Change

Summary

The electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of Benjamin Libet and col leagues, published in the early 1980s, served to focus scientific and philosophical attention upon the processing constraints of the human brain, with respect to the question of how much (or how little) a human actor could be said to know about the genesis of their own acts, in real time. If taken at face value, Libet’s findings (and those of others) seem to radically constrain the extent to which any actor may be said to be the “author” of his or her own voluntary acts, in the short-term present. Hence, there is a potential problem for traditional accounts of human agency and moral responsibility (i.e., if we learn of our intentions-to-act only after action-initiation has commenced, can we really be held responsible for what we have done?). However, such a problem is susceptible to solution if we adopt a longer-term perspective, one that focuses upon the “meanings” of acts for their agents and the latter’s pursuit of certain states of consciousness. For although consciousness does not initiate action, conscious states nevertheless provide the motive for much of what it is that humans “do” (for good or ill). An organism lacking consciousness would fail to constitute a moral agent; an unconscious being would be incapable of “sin.” Furthermore, an overly simplistic interpretation of Libet’s findings faces stern tests in certain areas of psychiatric and forensic practice. While we continue to uphold a legal distinction between murder and man slaughter it is highly likely that we shall imbue consciousness with some (long-term) influence over voluntary acts. Finally, conscious awareness of our “selves,” our patterns of behavior (e.g., our habits), and our effects upon others provides us with necessary data, should we wish to change our behaviors, our characters, in the future.