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The Significance of Voting Rule Selection

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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Abstract

A great deal of evidence has been accumulated to support the Borda Compromise when the goal is to select the winning candidate in an election setting. A significant amount of research has also been conducted to determine how significant the impact might be when different voting rules are used. That is, the issue is addressed as to how much difference it actually makes when a voting rule is being selected. The initial exploration of this problem focused on the likelihood that two different voting rules would elect the same winner.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware, 303 Alfred Lerner Hall, Newark, Delaware, 19716, USA

    Professor William V. Gehrlein

  2. Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, Université de La Réunion, 15, avenue René Cassin BP 7151, 97715, Saint-Denis Messag Cedex 9, Ile de La Réunion, FRANCE

    Professor Dominique Lepelley

Authors
  1. Professor William V. Gehrlein
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  2. Professor Dominique Lepelley
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Correspondence to William V. Gehrlein .

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Gehrlein, W.V., Lepelley, D. (2011). The Significance of Voting Rule Selection. In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03106-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03107-6

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