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Other Characteristics of Voting Rules

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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Abstract

The last chapter showed that different voting rules can be expected to have the greatest Condorcet Efficiency in various types of scenarios, depending upon the type and degree of group mutual coherence that is present in voting situations. The Borda Compromise concluded that BR could generally be expected to perform with relatively good measures of Condorcet Efficiency, without allowing the possibility of having very poor performance. We now continue with an analysis of other features of voting rules, with an emphasis on various properties of BR.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware, 303 Alfred Lerner Hall, Newark, Delaware, 19716, USA

    Professor William V. Gehrlein

  2. Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, Université de La Réunion, 15, avenue René Cassin BP 7151, 97715, Saint-Denis Messag Cedex 9, Ile de La Réunion, FRANCE

    Professor Dominique Lepelley

Authors
  1. Professor William V. Gehrlein
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Correspondence to William V. Gehrlein .

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Gehrlein, W.V., Lepelley, D. (2011). Other Characteristics of Voting Rules. In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_7

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03106-9

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